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FROM   ISOLATION 
TO  LEADERSHIP 

REVISED 

A  Review  of 
American  Foreign  Policy 

BY 
JOHN  HOLLADAY  LATANE,  Ph.D.,  LL.D. 

PROFESSOR  OF  AMERICAN  HISTORY  AND  DEAN  OF  THE 
COLLEGE  FACULTY  IN  THE  JOHNS  HOPKINS  UNIVERSITY 

Author  of 

**The  Uniud  States  and  Latin  America" 

"America  as  a  World  Power" 

Etc. 


GARDEN    CITY  NEW   YORK 

DOUBLEDAY,  PAGE  &  COMPANY 
1922 


COPYRIGHT,  I918,  1922,  BY 

DOUBLEDAY,  PAGE  &  COMPANY 

ALL  RIGHTS  RESERVED,  INCLUDING  THAT  OF 

TRANSLATION  INTO  FOREIGN  LANGUAGES, 

INCLUDING  THE  SCANDINAVIAN 


PRINTED  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES 

AT 

THE  COUNTRY  LIFE  PRESS,  GARDEN  CITY,  N.'  Y. 


PREFACE 

The  first  edition  of  this  book  appeared  in 
October,  191 8,  a  few  weeks  before  the  signing  ot 
the  Armistice,  when  the  United  States  was  at 
the  high  tide  of  its  power  and  influence.  In 
view  of  the  subsequent  course  of  events,  some  of 
my  readers  may  question  the  propriety  of  the 
original  title.  In  fact,  one  of  my  friends  has 
suggested  that  a  more  appropriate  title  for  the 
new  edition  would  be  **  From  Isolation  to  Lead- 
ership, and  Back.'*  But  I  do  not  regard  the 
verdict  of  1920  as  an  expression  of  the  final  judg- 
ment of  the  American  people.  The  world  still 
waits  on  America,  and  sooner  or  later  we  must 
recognize  and  assume  the  responsibilities  of  our 
position  as  a  great  world  power. 

The  first  nine  chapters  are  reprinted  with  only 
a  few  verbal  changes.  Chapter  X  has  been 
rewritten,  and  chapters  XI  and  XII  have  been 
added. 

John  H.  Latane. 
Baltimore,  June  10,  1922. 


'CONTENTS 

CHAPTER                                                                                                                                    •  'AOB 

I.    Origin  of  the  Policy  of  Isolation  .  3 

II.    Formulation  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine       19 

III.  The    Monroe    Doctrine    and    the 

European  Balance  of  Power     .  43 

IV.  International  Cooperation  With- 

out THE  Sanction  of  Force   .     .  57 

V.    The  Open-Door  Policy    ....  83 

VI.    Anglo-American  Relations  ...  99 

VII.    Imperialistic    Tendencies    of    the 

Monroe  Doctrine 131 

VIII.    The  New  Pan- Americanism  .     .     .  151 

IX.  The    Failure    of   Neutrality   and 

Isolation 169 

X.  The  War  Aims  of  the  United  States  191 

XI.  The  Treaty  of  Versailles  .     .     .  225 
XII.    The  Washington  Conference    .     .  259 

Index 291 


I 

ORIGIN  OF  THE  POLICY  OF  ISOLATION 


'y 


From  Isolation  to  Leadership 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  POLICY  OF  ISOLATION 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the  policy  of  polit- 
ical isolation  are  two  phases  of  American  diplo- 
macy so  closely  related  that  very  few  writers 
appear  to  draw  any  distinction  between  them. 
The  Monroe  Doctrine  was  in  its  origin  nothing 
more  than  the  assertion,  with  special  applica- 
tion to  the  American  continents,  of  the  right  of 
independent  states  to  pursue  their  own  careers 
without  fear  or  threat  of  intervention,  domina- 
tion, or  subjugation  by  other  states.  President 
Monroe  announced  to  the  world  that  this  prin- 
ciple would  be  upheld  by  the  United  States  in 
this  hemisphere.  The  policy  of  isolation  was 
the  outgrowth  of  Washington's  warning  against 
permanent  alliances  and  Jefferson's  warning 
against  entangling  alliances.  Both  Washington 
and  Jefferson  had  in  mind  apparently  the  form 
of  European   alliance   common   in  their   day, 

3 


4  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

which  bound  one  nation  to  support  another 
both  diplomatically  and  by  force  in  any  dispute 
that  might  arise  no  matter  whether  it  concerned 
the  interests  of  the  first  state  or  not.  Such 
alliances  were  usually  of  the  nature  of  family 
compacts  between  different  dynasties,  or  be- 
tween different  branches  of  the  same  dynasty, 
rather  than  treaties  between  nations.  In  fact, 
dynastic  aims  and  ambitions  were  frequently, 
if  not  usually,  at  variance  with  the  real  interests 
of  the  peoples  affected.  It  will  be  shown  later 
that  neither  Washington  nor  Jefferson  intended 
that  the  United  States  should  refrain  perma- 
nently from  the  exercise  of  its  due  influence  in 
matters  which  properly  concern  the  peace  and 
welfare  of  the  community  of  nations.  Washing- 
ton did  not  object  to  temporary  alliances  for 
special  emergencies  nor  did  Jefferson  object  to 
special  alliances  for  the  accomplishment  of  defi- 
nite objects.  Their  advice  has,  however,  been 
generally  interpreted  as  meaning  that  the  United 
States  must  hold  aloof  from  world  politics  and 
attend  strictly  to  its  own  business. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  was  a  perfectly  sound 
principle  and  it  has  been  fully  justified  by  nearly 
a  century  of  experience.  It  has  saved  South 
America  from  the  kind  of  exploitation  to  which 
the  continents  of  Africa^nd  Asiajjave,  during 


Origin  of  the  Policy  of  Isolation  5 

the  past  generation,  fallen  a  prey.  The  policy 
of  isolation,  on  the  other  hand,  still  cherished 
by  so  many  Americans  as  a  sacred  tradition  of 
the  fathers,  is  in  principle  quite  distinct  from 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  is  in  fact  utterly  in- 
consistent with  the  position  and  importance  of 
the  United  States  as  a  world  power.  The  dif- 
ference in  principle  between  the  two  policies  can 
perhaps  best  be  illustrated  by  the  following  sup- 
position. If  the  United  States  were  to  sign  a 
permanent  treaty  with  England  placing  our 
navy  at  her  disposal  in  the  event  of  attack 
from  Germany  or  some  other  power,  on  condi- 
tion that  England  would  unite  with  us  in  oppos- 
ing the  intervention  of  any  European  power  in 
Latin  America,  such  a  treaty  would  not  be  a 
violation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  but  a  dis- 
tinct recognition  of  that  principle.  Such  a 
treaty  would,  however,  be  a  departure  from 
our  traditional  policy  of  isolation.  Of  the  two 
policies,  that  of  avoiding  political  alHances  is 
the  older.  It  was  announced  by  Washington 
under  circumstances  that  will  be  considered  in  a 
moment. 

In  the  struggle  for  independence  the  colonies 
deliberately  sought  foreign  alliances.  In  fact, 
the  first  treaty  ever  signed  by  the  United  States 
was  the  treaty  of  alliance  with  France,  negoti- 


6  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

ated  and  ratified  in  1778.  The  aid  which 
France  extended  under  this  treaty  to  our  revo- 
lutionary ancestors  in  men,  money,  and  ships 
enabled  them  to  establish  the  independence  of 
our  country.  A  few  years  later  came  the 
French  Revolution,  the  establishment  of  the 
French  Republic  followed  by  the  execution  of 
Louis  XVI,  and  in  1793  the  war  between  Eng- 
land and  France,  With  the  arrival  in  this 
country  of  Genet,  the  minister  of  the  newly 
established  French  Republic,  there  began  a 
heated  debate  in  the  newspapers  throughout 
the  country  as  to  our  obligations  under  the 
treaty  of  alliance  and  the  commercial  treaty  of 
1778.  President  Washington  requested  the 
opinions  in  writing  of  the  members  of  his  cabinet 
as  to  whether  Genet  should  be  received  and  the 
new  government  which  had  been  set  up  in 
France  recognized,  as  to  whether  the  treaties 
were  still  binding,  and  as  to  whether  a  procla- 
mation of  neutrality  should  be  issued.  Hamilton 
and  Jefferson  replied  at  great  length,  taking  as 
usual  opposite  sides,  particularly  on  the  ques- 
tion as  to  the  binding  force  of  the  treaties. 
Hamilton  took  the  view  that  as  the  government 
of  Louis  XVI,  with  which  the  treaties  had  been 
negotiated,  had  been  overthrown,  we  were 
under  no  obligations  to  fulfill  their  stipulations 


Origin  of  the  Policy  of  Isolation  7 

and  had  a  perfect  right  to  renounce  them. 
Jefferson  took  the  correct  view  that  the  treaties 
were  with  the  French  nation  and  that  they 
were  binding  under  whatever  government  the 
French  people  chose  to  set  up.  This^prijiciple, 
which  is  now  one  of  the  fundamental  doctrines 
of  international  law,  was  so  ably  expounded  by 
Jefferson  that  his  words  are  well  worth  quoting. 
"I  consider  the  people  who  constitute  a  so- 
ciety or  nation  as  the  source  of  all  authority 
in  that  nation,  as  free  to  transact  their  common 
concerns  by  any  agents  they  think  proper,  to 
change  these  agents  individually,  or  the  organ- 
ization of  them  in  form  or  function  whenever 
they  please:  that  all  the  acts  done  by  those 
agents  under  the  authority  of  the  nation,  are 
the  acts  of  the  nation,  are  obligatory  on  them, 
and  enure  to  their  use,  and  can  in  no  wise  be 
annulled  or  affected  by  any  change  in  the  form 
of  the  government,  or  of  the  persons  adminis- 
tering it.  Consequently  the  Treaties  between 
the  United  States  and  France  were  not  treaties 
between  the  United  States  and  Louis  Capet, 
but  between  the  two  nations  of  America  and 
France,  and  the  nations  remaining  in  existence, 
tho'  both  of  them  have  since  changed  their  forms 
of  government,  the  treaties  are  not  annulled  by 
these  changes." 


8  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

The  argument  was  so  heated  that  Washington 
was  reluctant  to  press  matters  to  a  definite  con- 
clusion. From  his  subsequent  action  it  appears 
that  he  agreed  with  Jefferson  that  the  treaties 
were  binding,  but  he  held  that  the  treaty  of 
alliance  was  purely  defensive  and  that  we  were 
under  no  obligation  to  aid  France  in  an  offensive 
war  such  as  she  was  then  waging.  He  accord- 
ingly issued  his  now  famous  proclamation  of 
neutrality,  April,  1793.  Of  this  proclamation 
W.  E.  Hall,  a  leading  English  authority  on  inter- 
national law,  writing  one  hundred  years  later, 
said:  "The  policy  of  the  United  States  in  1793 
constitutes  an  epoch  in  the  development  of 
the  usages  of  neutrality.  There  can  be  no 
doubt  that  it  was  intended  and  believed  to  give 
effect  to  the  obligations  then  Incumbent  upon 
neutrals.  But  it  represented  by  far  the  most 
advanced  existing  opinions  as  to  what  those 
obligations  were;  and  in  some  points  it  even  went 
farther  than  authoritative  international  custom 
has  up  to  the  present  time  advanced.  In  the 
main,  however,  it  is  identical  with  the  standard 
of  conduct  which  Is  now  adopted  by  the  com- 
munity of  nations."  Washington's  proclama- 
tion laid  the  real  foundations  of  the  American 
policy  of  isolation. 

The  very  novelty  of  the  rigid  neutrality  pro* 


Origin  of  the  Policy  ot  Isolation  9 

claimed  by  Washington  made  the  policy  a  diffi- 
cult one  to  pursue.  In  the  Revolutionary  and 
Napoleonic  wars,  which  lasted  for  nearly  a 
quarter  of  a  century,  the  United  States  was  the 
principal  neutral.  The  problems  to  which  this 
situation  gave  rise  were  so  similar  to  the  prob- 
lems raised  during  the  early  years  of  the  World 
War  that  many  of  the  diplomatic  notes  prepared 
by  Jefferson  and  Madison  might,  with  a  few 
changes  of  names  and  dates,  be  passed  off  as 
the  correspondence  of  Wilson  and  Lansing. 
Washington's  administration  closed  with  tht 
clouds  of  the  European  war  still  hanging  heavy 
on  the  horizon.  Under  these  circumstances  he 
delivered  his  famous  Farewell  Address  in  which 
he  said: 

"The  great  rule  of  conduct  for  us  in  regard 
to  foreign  nations  is,  in  extending  our  commer- 
cial relations  to  have  with  them  as  little  political 
connection  as  possible.  So  far  as  we  have  al- 
ready formed  engagements  let  them  be  fulfilled 
with  perfect  good  faith.     Here  let  us  stop. 

"Europe  has  a  set  of  primary  interests  which 
to  us  have  none  or  a  very  remote  relation. 
Hence  she  must  be  engaged  in  frequent  con- 
troversies, the  causes  of  which  are  essentially 
foreign  to  our  concerns.  Hence,  therefore, 
it  must  be  unwise  in  us  to  implicate  ourselves 


lO  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

by  artificial  ties  in  the  ordinary  vicissitudes  of 
her  politics  or  the  ordinary  combinations  and 
collisions  of  her  friendships  or  enmities. 

"Our  detached  and  distant  situation  invites 
and  enables  us  to  pursue  a  different  course. 
If  we  remain  one  people,  under  an  efficient 
government,  the  period  is  not  far  off  when  we 
may  defy  material  injury  from  external  annoy- 
ance; when  we  may  take  such  an  attitude  as 
will  cause  the  neutrality  we  may  at  any  time  re- 
solve upon  to  be  scrupulously  respected;  when 
belligerent  nations,  under  the  impossibility  of 
making  acquisitions  upon  us,  will  not  lightly 
hazard  the  giving  us  provocation;  when  we 
may  choose  peace  or  war,  as  our  interest,  guided 
by  justice,  shall  counsel. 

"Why  forego  the  advantages  of  so  peculiar 
a  situation  ?  Why  quit  our  own  to  stand  upon 
foreign  ground?  Why,  by  interweaving  our 
destiny  with  that  of  any  part  of  Europe,  en- 
tangle our  peace  and  prosperity  in  the  toils  of 
European  ambitions,  rivalship,  interest,  humor, 
or  caprice  ? 

"It  is  our  true  policy  to  steer  clear  of  perma- 
nent alliances  with  any  portion  of  the  foreign 
world,  so  far,  I  mean,  as  we  are  now  at  liberty 
to  do  it;  for  let  me  not  be  understood  as  capable 
of  patronizing   infidelity   to   existing   engage- 


Origin  of  the  Policy  of  Isolation         1 1 

ments.  I  hold  the  maxim  no  less  applicable 
to  public  than  to  private  affairs  that  honesty 
is  always  the  best  policy.  I  repeat,  therefore, 
let  thpse  engagements  be  observed  in  their 
genuine  sense.  But  in  my  opinion  it  is  un- 
necessary and  would  be  unwise  to  extend  them. 

"Taking  care  always  to  keep  ourselves  by 
suitable  establishments  on  a  respectable  defen- 
sive posture,  we  may  safely  trust  to  temporary 
alliances  for  extraordinary  emergencies.'* 

It  will  be  observed  that  Washington  warned 
his  countrymen  against  permanent  alliances. 
He  expressly  said  that  we  might  "safely  trust  to 
temporary  alliances  for  extraordinary  emergen- 
cies." Further  than  this  many  of  those  who 
are  continually  quoting  Washington's  warning 
against  alliances  not  only  fail  to  note  the 
limitations  under  which  the  advice  was  given, 
but  they  also  overlook  the  reasons  assigned. 
In  a  succeeding  paragraph  of  the  Farewell 
Address  he  said: 

"With  me  a  predominant  motive  has  been 
to  endeavor  to  gain  time  to  our  country  to 
settle  and  mature  its  yet  recent  institutions, 
and  to  progress  without  interruption  to  that 
degree  of  strength  and  consistency  which  is 
necessary  to  give  it,  humanly  speaking,  the 
command  of  its  own  fortunes." 


12  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

The  expression  "entangling  alHances"  does 
not  occur  in  the  Farewell  Address,  but  was 
given  currency  by  Jefferson.  In  his  first  in- 
augural address  he  summed  up  the  principles 
by  which  he  proposed  to  regulate  his  foreign 
poHcy  in  the  following  terms:  "Peace,  com- 
merce, and  honest  friendship  with  all  nations, 
entangling  alliances  with  none," 

During  the  brief  interval  of  peace  following 
the  treaty  of  Amiens  in  1801,  Napoleon  under- 
took the  reestablishment  of  French  power  in 
Santo  Domingo  as  the  first  step  in  the  develop- 
ment of  a  colonial  empire  which  he  determined 
upon  when  he  forced  Spain  to  retrocede  Louis- 
iana to  France  by  the  secret  treaty  of  San 
Ildefonso  in  1800.  Fortunately  for  us  the  ill- 
fated  expedition  to  Santo  Domingo  encountered 
the  opposition  of  half  a  million  negroes  and  ul- 
timately fell  a  prey  to  the  ravages  of  yellow 
fever.  As  soon  as  Jefferson  heard  of  the  cession 
of  Louisiana  to  France,  he  instructed  Living- 
ston, his  representative  at  Paris,  to  open  nego- 
tiations for  the  purchase  of  New  Orleans  and 
West  Florida,  stating  that  the  acquisition  of 
New  Orleans  by  a  powerful  nation  like  France 
would  inevitably  lead  to  friction  and  conflict. 
"The  day  that  France  takes  possession  of  New 
Orleans  fixes  the  sentence  which  is  to  restrain 


Origin  of  the  Policy  of  Isolation  13 

fier  forever  within  her  low  water  mark.  It 
seals  the  union  of  two  nations  who  in  conjunc- 
tion can  maintain  exclusive  possession  of  the 
ocean.  From  that  moment  we  must  marry 
ourselves  to  the  British  fleet  and  nation.  We 
must  turn  all  our  attentions  to  a  maritime 
force,  for  which  our  resources  place  us  on  very 
high  grounds :  and  having  formed  and  cemented 
together  a  power  which  may  render  reinforce- 
ment of  her  settlements  here  impossible  to 
France,  make  the  first  cannon,  which  shall  be 
fired  in  Europe  the  signal  for  tearing  up  any 
settlement  she  may  have  made,  and  for  holding 
the  two  continents  of  America  in  sequestration 
for  the  common  purposes  of  the  united  British 
and  American  nations.  This  is  not  a  state  of 
things  we  seek  or  desire.  It  is  one  which  this 
measure,  if  adopted  by  France,  forces  on  us, 
as  necessarily  as  any  other  cause,  by  the  laws 
of  nature,  brings  on  its  necessary  efi^ect." 

Monroe  was  later  sent  to  Paris  to  support 
Livingston  and  he  was  instructed,  in  case  there 
was  no  prospect  of  a  favorable  termination  of 
the  negotiations,  to  avoid  a  rupture  until  the 
spring  and  "in  the  meantime  enter  into  con- 
ferences with  the  British  Government,  through 
their  ambassador  at  Paris,  to  fix  principles  of 
alliance,  and  leave  us  in  peace  until  Congress 


14  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

meets."  Jefferson  had  already  informed  the 
British  minister  at  Washington  that  if  France 
should,  by  closing  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi, 
force  the  United  States  to  war,  "they  would 
throw  away  the  scabbard."  Monroe  and 
Livingston  were  now  instructed,  in  case  they 
should  become  convinced  that  France  medi- 
tated hostilities  against  the  United  States,  to 
negotiate  an  alliance  with  England  and  to 
stipulate  that  neither  party  should  make  peace 
or  truce  without  the  consent  of  the  other. 
Thus  notwithstanding  his  French  proclivities 
and  his  warning  against  "entangling  alliances," 
the  author  of  the  immortal  Declaration  of  In- 
dependence was  ready  and  willing  in  this 
emergency  to  form  an  alliance  with  England. 
The  unexpected  cession  of  the  entire  province 
of  Louisiana  to  the  United  States  made  the 
contemplated  alliance  with  England  unneces- 
sary. 

The  United  States  was  no  more  successful 
in  its  effort  to  remain  neutral  during  the  Na- 
poleonic wars  than  it  was  during  the  late 
war,  though  the  slow  means  of  communication 
a  hundred  years  ago  caused  the  struggle  for 
neutral  rights  to  be  drawn  out  for  a  much  longer 
period  of  time.  Neither  England  nor  France 
regarded  us  as  having  any  rights  which  they 


Origin  of  the  Policy  of  Isolation  1 5 

were  bound  to  respect,  and  American  commerce 
was  fairly  bombarded  by  French  decrees  and 
British  orders  in  council.  There  was  really  not 
much  more  reason  why  we  should  have  fought 
England  than  France,  but  as  England's  naval 
supremacy  enabled  her  to  interfere  more  effec- 
tually with  our  commerce  on  the  sea  and  as 
this  interference  was  accompanied  by  the 
practice  of  impressing  American  sailors  into 
the  British  service,  we  finally  declared  war 
against  her.  No  effort  was  made,  however, 
to  form  an  alliance  or  even  to  cooperate  with 
Napoleon.  The  United  States  fought  the  War 
of  181 2  without  allies,  and  while  we  gained  a 
number  of  single-ship  actions  and  notable 
victories  on  Lake  Erie  and  Lake  Champlain, 
we  failed  utterly  in  two  campaigns  to  occupy 
Canada,  and  the  final  result  of  the  conflict  was 
that  our  national  capitol  was  burned  and  our 
commerce  absolutely  swept  from  the  seas. 
Jackson's  victory  at  New  Orleans,  while  gratify- 
ing to  our  pride,  took  place  two  weeks  after 
the  treaty  of  Ghent  had  been  signed  and  had, 
consequently,  no  eflPect  on  the  outcome  of  the 
war. 


II 


FORMULATION  OF  THE   MONROE 
DOCTRINE 


n 


FORMULATION  OF  THE   MONROE 
DOCTRINE 

The  international  situation  which  gave  rise 
to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  the  most  unusual 
in  some  respects  that  modern  history  records. 
The  European  alliance  which  had  been  organ- 
ized in  1 813  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  about 
the  overthrow  of  Napoleon  continued  to  domi- 
nate the  affairs  of  Europe  until  1823.  This 
alliance,  which  met  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna 
in  18 1 5  and  held  later  meetings  at  Aix-la- 
Chapelle  in  181 8,  at  Troppau  in  1820,  at  Lay- 
bach  in  1 82 1,  and  at  Verona  in  1822,  undertook 
to  legislate  for  all  Europe  and  was  the  nearest 
approach  to  a  world  government  that  had  ever 
been  tried.  While  this  alliance  publicly  pro- 
claimed that  it  had  no  other  object  than  the 
maintenance  of  peace  and  that  the  repose  of 
the  world  was  its  motive  and  its  end,  its  real 
object  was  to  uphold  absolute  monarchy  and 
to  suppress  every  attempt  at  the  establishment 
of    representative    government.     As    long    as 

19 


20  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

England  remained  in  the  alliance  her  statesmen 
exercised  a  restraining  influence,  for  England 
was  the  only  one  of  the  allies  which  professed 
to  have  a  representative  system  of  government. 
As  Castlereagh.was  setting  out  for  the  meeting 
at  Aix-la-Chapelle  Lord  Liverpool,  who  was 
then  prime  minister,  warned  him  that,  "The 
Russian  must  be  made  to  feel  that  we  have  a 
parliament  and  a  public,  to  which  we  are  re- 
sponsible, and  that  we  cannot  permit  ourselves 
to  be  drawn  into  views  of  policy  which  are 
wholly  incompatible  with  the  spirit  of  our 
government.** 

The  reactionary  spirit  of  the  continental 
members  of  the  alliance  was  soon  thoroughly 
aroused  by  the  series  of  revolutions  that  fol- 
lowed one  another  in  1820.  In  March  the 
Spanish  army  turned  against  the  government 
of  Ferdinand  VII  and  demanded  the  restoration 
of  the  constitution  of  1812.  The  action  of  the 
army  was  everywhere  approved  and  sustained 
by  the  people  and  the  king  was  forced  to  pro- 
claim the  constitution  and  to  promise  to  uphold 
it.  The  Spanish  revolution  was  followed  in 
July  by  a  constitutional  movement  in  Naples, 
and  in  August  by  a  similar  movement  in  Portu- 
gal; while  the  next  year  witnessed  the  outbreak 
of  the  Greek  struggle  for  independence.    Thus 


Formulation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine      21 

in  all  three  of  the  peninsulas  of  Southern  Europe 
the  people  were  struggling  for  the  right  of  self- 
government.  The  great  powers  at  once  took 
alarm  at  the  rapid  spread  of  revolutionary  ideas 
and  proceeded  to  adopt  measures  for  the  suj)- 
pression  of  the  movements  to  which  these  ideas 
gave  rise.  At  Troppau  and  Laybach  measures 
were  taken  for  the  suppression  of  the  revolu- 
tionary movements  in  Italy.  An  Austrian 
army  entered  Naples  in  March,  1821,  over- 
threw the  constitutional  government  that  had 
been  inaugurated,  and  restored  Ferdinand  II 
to  absolute  power.  The  revolution  which 
had  broken  out  in  Piedmont  was  also  suppressed 
by  a  detachment  of  the  Austrian  army.  Eng- 
land held  aloof  from  all  participation  in  the 
conferences  at  Troppau  and  Laybach,  though 
her  ambassador  to  Austria  was  present  to  watch 
the  proceedings. 

The  next  meeting  of  the  allied  powers  was 
arranged  for  October,  1822,  at  Verona.  Here 
the  affairs  of  Greece,  Italy,  and  in  particular 
Spain  came  up  for  consideration.  At  this  con- 
gress all  five  powers  of  the  alliance  were  repre- 
sented. France  was  especially  concerned  about 
the  condition  of  affairs  in  Spain,  and  England 
sent  Wellington  out  of  self-defense.  The  Con- 
gress of  Verona  was  devoted  largely  to  a  discus- 


22  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

sion  of  Spanish  affairs.  Wellington  had  been 
instructed  to  use  all  his  influence  against  the 
adoption  of  measures  of  intervention  in  Spain. 
When  he  found  that  the  other  powers  were  bent 
upon  this  step  and  that  his  protest  would  be 
unheeded,  he  withdrew  from  the  congress. 
The  four  remaining  powers  signed  the  secret 
treaty  of  Verona,  November  22,  1822,  as  a 
revision,  so  they  declared  in  the  preamble,  of 
the  Treaty  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  which  had  been 
signed  at  Paris  in  181 5  by  Austria,  Russia^  and 
Prussia^  This  last  mentioned  treaty  sprang  from 
the  erratic  brain  of  the  Czar  Alexander  under  the 
influence  of  Baroness  Kriidener,  and  is  one  of 
the  most  remarkable  political  documents  extant. 
No  one  had  taken  it  seriously  except  the  Czar 
himself  and  it  had  been  without  influence  upon 
the  politics  of  Europe.  The  text  of  the  treaty 
of  Verona  was  never  ofiicially  published,  but  the 
following  articles  soon  appeared  in  the  press  of 
Europe  and  America: 

"Article  I. — ^The  high  contracting  powers; 
being  convinced  that  the  system  of  representa- 
tive government  is  equally  as  incompatible 
with  the  monarcljical  principles  as  the  maxim 
of  the  sovereignty  of  the  people  with  the  divine 
right,  engage  mutually,  in  the  most  solemn 
manner,  to  use  all  their  efforts  to  put  an  end  to 


Formulation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine      23 

the  system  of  representative  governments,  in 
whatever  country  it  may  exist  in  Europe,  and 
to  prevent  its  being  introduced  in  those  coun- 
tries where  it  is  not  yet  known. 

"Article  II. — As  it  cannot  be  doubted  that 
the  liberty  of  the  press  is  the  most  powerful 
means  used  by  the  pretended  supporters  of  the 
rights  of  nations,  to  the  detriment  of  those 
of  Princes,  the  high  contracting  parties  promise 
reciprocally  to  adopt  all  proper  measures  to 
suppress  it,  not  only  in  their  own  states,  but, 
also,  in  the  rest  of  Europe. 

"Article  III. — Convinced  that  the  principles 
of  reHgion  contribute  most  powerfully  to  keep 
narions  in  the  state  of  passive  obedience  which 
they  owe  to  their  Princes,  the  high  contracting 
parties  declare  it  to  be  their  intention  to  sustain, 
in  their  respective  states,  those  measures  which 
the  clergy  may  adopt,  with  the  aim  of  amelio- 
rating their  own  interests,  so  intimately  con- 
nected with  the  preservation  of  the  authority 
of  Princes;  and  the  contracting  powers  join  in 
offering  their  thanks  to  the  Pope,  for  what  he 
has  already  done  for  them,  and  solicit  his  con- 
stant cooperation  in  their  views  of  submitting 
the  nations. 

"Article  IV. — ^The  situation  of  Spain  and 
Portugal  unite  unhappily  all  the  circumstances 


24  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

to  which  this  treaty  has  particular  reference. 
The  high  contracting  parties,  in  confiding  to 
France  the  care  of  putting  an  end  to  them,  en- 
gage to  assist  her  in  the  manner  which  may  the 
least  compromise  them  with  their  own  people 
and  the  people  of  France,  by  means  of  a  sub- 
sidy on  the  part  of  the  two  empires,  of  twenty 
millions  of  francs  every  year,  from  the  date  of 
the  signature  of  this  treaty  to  the  end  of  the 
war." 

Such  was  the  code  of  despotism  which  the 
continental  powers  adopted  for  Europe  and 
which  they  later  proposed  to  extend  to  America. 
It  was  an  attempt  to  make  the  wo-rld  safe  for 
autocracy.  Wellington's  protest  at  Verona 
marked  the  final  withdrawal  of  England  from 
the  alliance  which  had  overthrown  Napoleon 
and  naturally  inclined  her  toward  a  rap- 
prochement with  the  United  States.  The 
aim  of  the  Holy  Allies,  as  the  remaining  mem- 
bers of  the  alliance  now  called  themselves, 
was  to  undo  the  work  of  the  Revolution  and  of 
Napoleon  and  to  restore  all  the  peoples  of 
Europe  to  the  absolute  sway  of  their  legitimate 
soverei^s.  After  the  overthrow  of  the  consti- 
tutional movements  in  Piedmont,  Naples,  and 
Spain,  absolutism  reigned  supreme  once  more 
in  western  Europe,  but  the  Holy  Allies  felt  that 


Formulation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine      25 

their  task  was  not  completed  so  long  as  Spain's 
revolted  colonies  in  America  remained  un- 
subjugated.  These  colonies  had  drifted  into 
practical  independence  while  Napoleon's  brother 
Joseph  was  on  the  throne  of  Spain.  Nelson's 
great  victory  at  Trafalgar  had  left  England 
supreme  on  the  seas  and  neither  Napoleon  nor 
Joseph  had  been  able  to  establish  any  control 
over  Spain's  American  colonies.  When  Ferdi- 
nand was  restored  to  his  throne  in  18 14,  he  un- 
wisely undertook  to  refasten  on  his  colonies  the 
yoke  of  the  old  colonial  system  and  to  break 
up  the  commerce  which  had  grown  up  with 
England  and  with  the  United  States.  The  dif- 
ferent colonies  soon  proclaimed  their  independ- 
ence and  the  wars  of  liberation  ensued.  By 
1822  it  was  evident  that  Spain  unassisted  could 
never  resubjugate  them,  and  the  United  States 
after  mature  deliberation  recognized  the  new 
republics  and  established  diplomatic  intercourse 
with  them.  England,  although  enjoying  the 
full  benefits  of  trade  with  the  late  colonies 
of  Spain,  still  hesitated  out  of  regard  for  the 
mother  country  to  take  the  final  step  of  recog- 
nition. 

In  the  late  summer  of  1823  circular  letters 
were  issued  inviting  the  powers  to  a  conference 
at    Paris    to    consider    the    Spanish-American 


26  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

question.  George  Canning,  the  British  foreign 
secretary,  at  once  called  into  conference  Richard 
Rush,  the  American  minister,  and  proposed 
joint  action  against  the  schemes  of  the  Holy 
Alliance.  Rush  replied  that  he  was  not  author- 
ized to  enter  into  such  an  agreement,  but  that 
he  would  communicate  the  proposal  at  once  to 
his  government.  As  soon  as  Rush's  dispatch 
was  received  President  Monroe  realized  fully 
the  magnitude  of  the  issue  presented  by  the 
proposal  of  an  Anglo-American  alliance.  Be- 
fore submitting  the  matter  to  his  cabinet  he 
transmitted  copies  of  Rush's  dispatch  to  ex- 
Presidents  JeflFerson  and  Madison  and  the  fol- 
lowing interesting  correspondence  took  place. 
In  his  letter  to  Jefferson  of  October  17th,  the 
President  said: 

"I  transmit  to  you  two  despatches,  which 
were  received  from  Mr.  Rush,  while  I  was  lately 
in  Washington,  which  involve  interests  of  the 
highest  importance.  They  contain  two  letters 
from  Mr.  Canning,  suggesting  designs  of  the 
holy  alliance,  against  the  Independence  of  S°. 
America,  &  proposing  a  co-operation,  between 
G.  Britain  &  the  U  States,  in  support  of  it, 
against  the  members  of  that  alliance.  The 
project  aims,  in  the  first  instance,  at  a  mere 
expression  of  opinion,  somewhat  in  the  abstract, 


Formulation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine      27 

but  which,  it  is  expected  by  Mr.  Canning,  will 
have  a  great  poHtical  effect,  by  defeating  the 
combination.  By  Mr.  Rush's  answers,  which 
are  also  enclosed,  you  will  see  the  light  in  which 
he  views  the  subject,  &  the  extent  to  which  he 
may  have  gone.  Many  important  considera- 
tions are  involved  in  this  proposition.  i" 
Shall  we  entangle  ourselves,  at  all,  in  European 
politicks,  &  wars,  on  the  side  of  any  power, 
against  others,  presuming  that  a  concert,  by 
agreement,  of  the  kind  proposed,  may  lead  to 
that  result?  2^  If  a  case  can  exist  in  which 
a  sound  maxim  may,  &  ought  to  be  departed 
from,  is  not  the  present  instance,  precisely^ 
that  case?  3**  Has  not  the  epoch  arriv'd  when 
G.  Britain  must  take  her  stand,  either  on  the 
side  of  the  monarchs  of  Europe,  or  of  the  U 
States,  &  in  consequence,  either  in  favor  of 
Despotism  or  of  liberty  &  may  it  not  be  pre- 
sum'd  that,  aware  of  that  necessity,  her  gov- 
ernment has  seiz'd  on  the  present  occurrence,  as 
that,  which  it  deems,  the  most  suitable,  to 
announce  &  mark  the  commenc'ment  of  that 
career  ? 

"My  own  impression  is  that  we  ought  to 
meet  the  proposal  of  the  British  govt.  &  to 
make  it  known,  that  we  would  view  an  inter- 
ference on  the  part  of  the  European  powers,  and 


28  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

especially  an  attack  on  the  Colonies,  by  them, 
as  an  attack  on  ourselves,  presuming  that,  if 
they  succeeded  with  them,  they  would  extend 
it  to  us.  I  am  sensible  however  of  the  extent 
&  difficulty  of  the  question,  &  shall  be  happy 
to  have  yours,  &  Mr.  Madison's  opinions  on  it." 

Jefferson's  reply  dated  Monticello,  October 
24th,  displays  not  only  a  profound  insight  into 
the  international  situation,  but  a  wide  vision 
of  the  possibilities  involved.     He  said : 

"The  question  presented  by  the  letters  you 
have  sent  me,  is  the  most  momentous  which 
has  ever  been  offered  to  my  contemplation 
since  that  of  Independence.  That  made  us  a 
nation,  this  sets  our  compass  and  points  the 
course  which  we  are  to  steer  through  the  ocean 
of  time  opening  on  us.  And  never  could  we 
embark  on  it  under  circumstances  more  aus- 
picious. Our  first  and  fundamental  maxim 
should  be,  never  to  entangle  ourselves  in  the 
broils  of  Europe.  Our  second,  never  to  suffer 
Europe  to  intermeddle  with  cis-Atlantic  affairs. 
America,  North  and  South,  has  a  set  of  in- 
terests distinct  from  those  of  Europe,  and 
peculiarly  her  own.  She  should  therefore  have 
a  system  of  her  own,  separate  and  apart  from 
that  of  Europe.  While  the  last  is  laboring  to 
become  the  domicil  of  despotism,  our  endeavor 


Formulation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine   29 

should  surely  be,  to  make  our  hemisphere  that 
of  freedom.  One  nation,  most  of  all,  could 
disturb  us  in  this  pursuit;  she  now  offers  to 
lead,  aid,  and  accompany  us  in  it.  By  acceding 
to  her  proposition,  we  detach  her  from  the 
bands,  bring  her  mighty  weight  into  the  scale 
of  free  government,  and  emancipate  a  continent 
at  one  stroke,  which  might  otherwise  linger 
long  in  doubt  and  difficulty.  Great  Britain 
is  the  nation  which  can  do  us  the  most  harm  of 
any  one,  or  all  on  earth;  and  with  her  on  our 
side  we  need  not  fear  the  whole  world.  With 
her  then,  we  should  most  sedulously  cherish  a 
cordial  friendship;  and  nothing  would  tend  more 
to  knit  our  affections  than  to  be  fighting  once 
more,  side  by  side,  in  the  same  cause.  Not 
that  I  would  purchase  even  her  amity  at  the 
price  of  taking  part  in  her  wars.  But  the  war 
in  which  the  present  proposition  might  engage 
us,  should  that  be  its  consequence,  is  not  her 
war,  but  ours.  Its  object  is  to  introduce  and 
establish  the  American  system,  of  keeping  out 
of  our  land  all  foreign  powers,  of  never  per- 
mitting those  of  Europe  to  intermeddle  with 
the  affairs  of  our  nations.  It  is  to  maintain 
our  own  principle,  not  to  depart  from  it.  And 
if,  to  facilitate  this,  we  can  effect  a  division 
in  the  body  of  the  European  powers,  and  draw 


30  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

over  to  our  side  its  most  powerful  member, 
surely  we  should  do  it.  But  I  am  clearly  of 
Mr.  Canning's  opinion,  that  it  will  prevent 
instead  of  provoking  war.  With  Great  Britain 
withdrawn  from  their  scale  and  shifted  into 
that  of  our  two  continents,  all  Europe  com- 
bined would  not  undertake  such  a  war.  For 
how  would  they  propose  to  get  at  either  enemy 
without  superior  fleets.?  Nor  is  the  occasion 
to  be  slighted  which  this  proposition  ofi^ers, 
of  declaring  our  protest  against  the  atrocious 
violations  of  the  rights  of  nations,  by  the  inter- 
ference of  any  one  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
another,  so  flagitiously  begun  by  Bonaparte, 
and  now  continued  by  the  equally  lawless 
Alliance,  calling  itself  Holy." 

Madison  not  only  agreed  with  Jeff'erson  as 
to  the  wisdom  of  accepting  the  British  proposal 
of  some  form  of  joint  action,  but  he  went  even 
further  and  suggested  that  the  declaration 
should  not  be  limited  to  the  American  republics, 
but  that  it  should  express  disapproval  of  the 
late  invasion  of  Spain  and  of  any  interference 
with  the  Greeks  who  were  then  struggling  for 
independence  from  Turkey.  Monroe,  it  ap- 
pears, was  strongly  inclined  to  act  on  Madison's 
suggestion,  but  his  cabinet  took  a  diff'erent 
view    of   the    situation.     From    the    diary    of 


Formulation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine      3 1 

John  Quincy  Adams,  Monroe's  secretary  of 
state,  it  appears  that  almost  the  whole  of 
November  was  taken  up  by  cabinet  discussions 
on  Canning's  proposals  and  on  Russia's  aggres- 
sions in  the  northwest.  Adams  stoutly  opposed 
any  alliance  or  joint  declaration  with  Great 
Britain.  The  composition  of  the  President's 
message  remained  in  doubt  until  the  27th, 
when  the  more  conservative  views  of  Adams 
were,  according  to  his  own  statement  of  the 
case,  adopted.  He  advocated  an  independent 
course  of  action  on  the  part  of  the  United  States, 
without  direct  reference  to  Canning's  proposals, 
though  substantially  in  accord  with  them. 
Adams  defined  his  position  as  follows:  "The 
ground  that  I  wish  to  take  is  that  of  earnest 
remonstrance  against  the  interference  of  the 
European  powers  by  force  with  South  America, 
but  to  disclaim  all  interference  on  our  part 
with  Europe;  to  make  an  American  cause  and 
adhere  inflexibly  to  that."  Adams's  dissent 
from  Monroe's  position  was,  it  is  claimed,  due 
partly  to  the  influence  of  Clay  who  advocated  a 
Pan-American  system,  partly  to  the  fact  that 
the  proposed  cooperation  with  Great  Britain 
would  bind  the  United  States  not  to  acquire 
some  of  the  coveted  parts  of  the  Spanish  posses- 
sions, and  partly  to  the  fear  that  the  United 


32  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

States  as  the  ally  of  Great  Britain  would  be 
compelled  to  play  a  secondary  part.  He  proba- 
bly carried  his  point  by  showing  that  the  same 
ends  could  be  accomplished  by  an  independent 
declaration,  since  it  was  evident  that  the  sea 
power  of  Great  Britain  would  be  used  to  prevent 
the  reconquest  of  South  America  by  the  Euro- 
pean powers.  Monroe,  as  we  have  seen, 
thought  that  the  exigencies  of  the  situation 
justified  a  departure  from  the  sound  maxim 
of  political  isolation,  and  in  this  opinion  he  was 
supported  by  his  two  predecessors  in  the  presi- 
dency. 

The  opinions  of  Monroe,  Jefferson,  and  Madi- 
son in  favor  of  an  alliance  with  Great  Britain 
and  a  broad  declaration  against  the  intervention 
of  the  great  powers  in  the  affairs  of  weaker 
states  in  any  part  of  the  world,  have  been 
severely  criticised  by  some  historians  and  ridi- 
culed by  Others,  but  time  and  circumstances 
often  bring  about  a  complete  change  in  our 
point  of  view.  After  the  beginning  of  the 
great  world  conflict,  especially  after  our  en- 
trance into  it,  several  writers  raised  the  ques- 
tion as  to  whether,  after  all,  the  three  elder 
statesmen  were  not  right  and  Adams  and  Clay 
wrong.  If  the  United  States  and  England 
had  come  out  in  favor  of  a  general  declaration 


Formulation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine      33 

against  intervention  in  the  concerns  of  small 
states  and  established  it  as  a  world-wide  princi- 
ple, the  course  of  human  history  during  the 
next  century  might  have  been  very  different, 
but  Adams's  diary  does  not  tell  the  whole 
story.  On  his  own  statement  of  the  case  he 
might  be  justly  censured  by  posterity  for  per- 
suading the  president  to  take  a  narrow  American 
view  of  a  question  which  was  world-wide  in 
its  bearing.  An  important  element  in  the 
situation,  however,  was  Canning's  change  of 
attitude  between  the  time  of  his  conference 
with  Rush  in  August  and  the  formulation  of 
the  president's  message.  Two  days  after  the 
delivery  of  his  now  famous  message  Monroe 
wrote  to  Jefferson  in  explanation  of  the  form 
the  declaration  had  taken:  "Mr.  Canning's 
zeal  has  much  abated  of  late."  It  appears 
from  Rush's  correspondence  that  the  only 
thing  which  stood  in  the  way  of  joint  action 
by  the  two  powers  was  Canning's  unwillingness 
to  extend  immediate  recognition  to  the  South 
American  republics.  On  August  27th,  Rush 
stated  to  Canning  that  it  would  greatly  facilitate 
joint  action  if  England  would  acknowledge 
at  once  the  full  independence  of  the  South 
American  colonies.  In  communicating  the  ac- 
count of  this  interview  to  his  government  Mr 


34  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

Rush  concluded:  "Should  I  be  asked  by  Mr. 
Canning,  whether,  in  case  the  recognition  be 
made  by  Great  Britain  without  more  delay, 
I  am  on  my  part  prepared  to  make  a  declara- 
tion, in  the  name  of  my  government,  that  it 
will  not  remain  inactive  under  an  attack  upon 
the  independence  of  those  states  by  the  Holy 
Alliance,  the  present  determination  of  my 
judgment  is  that  I  will  make  such  a  declaration 
explicitly,  and  avow  it  before  the  world." 
About  three  weeks  later  Canning,  who  was 
growing  restless  at  the  delay  in  hearing  from 
Washington,  again  urged  Rush  to  act  without 
waiting  for  specific  instructions  from  his  govern- 
ment. He  tried  to  show  that  the  proposed 
joint  declaration  would  not  conflict  with  the 
American  policy  of  avoiding  entangling  alliances, 
for  the  question  at  issue  was  American  as 
much  as  European,  if  not  more.  Rush  then 
indicated  his  willingness  to  act  provided  Eng- 
land would  "immediately  and  unequivocally 
acknowledge  the  independence  of  the  new 
states.'*  Canning  did  not  care  to  extend  full 
recognition  to  the  South  American  states  until 
he  could  do  so  without  giving  unnecessary 
ofi^ense  to  Spain  and  the  allies,  and  he  asked 
if  Mr.  Rush  could  not  give  his  assent  to  the 
proposal  on  a  promise  of  future  recognition. 


-Formulation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine      3  5 

Mr.  Rush  refused  to  accede  to  anything  but 
immediate  acknowledgment  of  independence 
and  so  the  matter  ended. 

As  Canning  could  not  come  to  a  formal  under- 
standing with  the  United  States,  he  determined 
to  make  a  frank  avowal  of  the  views  of  the  Brit- 
ish cabinet  to  France  and  to  this  end  he  had  an 
interview  with  Prince  Polignac,  the  French  am- 
bassador at  London,  October  9, 1823,  in  which  he 
declared  that  Great  Britain  had  no  desire  to  has- 
ten recognition,  but  that  any  foreigminterference, 
by  force,  or  by  menace,  would  be  a  motive  for 
immediate  recognition;  that  England  "could 
not  go  into  a  joint  deliberation  upon  the  sub- 
ject of  Spanish  America  upon  an  equal  footing 
with  other  powers,  whose  opinions  were  less 
formed  upon  that  question."  This  declaration 
drew  from  Polignac  the  admission  that  he  con- 
sidered the  reduction  of  the  colonies  by  Spain 
as  hopeless  and  that  France  "abjured  in  any 
case,  any  design  of  acting  against  the  colonies 
by  force  of  arms."  This  admission  was  a  dis- 
tinct victory  for  Canning,  in  that  it  prepared 
the  way  for  ultimate  recognition  by  England, 
and  an  account  of  the  interview  was  com- 
municated without  delay  to  the  allied  courts. 
The  interview  was  not  communicated  to  Rush 
until  the  latter  part  of  November,  and  therefore 


36  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

had  no  influence  upon  the  formation  of  Monroe's 
message. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  comprised  in  two 
widely  separated  paragraphs  that  occur  in  the 
message  of  December  2,  1823.  The  first, 
relating  to  Russia's  encroachments  on  the 
northwest  coast,  and  occurring  near  the  be- 
ginning of  the  message,  was  an  assertion  to  the 
efFecf  that  the  American  continents  had  as- 
sumed an  independent  condition  and  were  no 
longer  open  to  European  colonization.  This 
may  be  regarded  as  a  statement  of  fact.  No 
part  of  the  continent  at  that  time  remained 
unclaimed.  The  second  paragraph,  relating 
to  Spanish  America  and  occurring  near  the 
close  of  the  message,  was  a  declaration  against 
the  extension  to  the  American  continents 
of  the  system  of  intervention  adopted  by  the 
Holy  Alliance  for  the  suppression  of  popular 
government  in  Europe. 

The  language  used  by  President  Monroe  is 
as  follows: 

I.  "At  the  proposal  of  the  Russian  Imperial 
Government,  made  through  the  minister  of  the 
Emperor  residing  here,  a  full  power  and  instruc- 
tions have  been  transmitted  to  the  minister  of 
the  United  States  at  St.  Petersburg  to  arrange 
by  amicable  negotiation  the  respective  rights 


Formulation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine      37 

and  interests  of  the  two  nations  on  the  north- 
west coast  of  this  continent.  A  similar  pro- 
posal had  been  made  by  His  Imperial  Majesty 
to  the  Government  of  Great  Britain,  which  has 
likewise  been  acceded  to.  The  Government 
of  the  United  States  has  been  desirous  by  this 
friendly  proceeding  of  manifesting  the  great 
value  which  they  have  invariably  attached  to 
the  friendship  of  the  Emperor  and  their  solicitude 
to  cultivate  the  best  understanding  with  his 
Government.  In  the  discussions  to  which  this 
interest  has  given  rise  and  in  the  arrangements 
by  which  they  may  terminate  the  occasion  has 
been  judged  proper  for  asserting,  as  a  principle 
in  which  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  United 
States  are  involved,  that  the  American  conti- 
nents, by  the  free  and  independent  condition 
which  they  have  assumed  and  maintain,  are 
henceforth  not  to  be  considered  as  subjects  for 
future  colonization  by  any  European  powers.** 

2.  "In  the  wars  of  the  European  powers  in 
matters  relating  to  themselves  we  have  never 
taken  any  part,  nor  does  it  comport  with  our 
policy  so  to  do.  It  is  only  when  our  rights  are 
invaded  or  seriously  menaced  that  we  resent 
injuries  or  make  preparation  for  our  defense. 
With  the  movements  in  this  hemisphere  we  are 
of  necessity  more  immediately  connected,  and 


38  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

by  causes  which  must  be  obvious  to  all  enlight- 
ened and  impartial  observers.  The  political 
system  of  the  allied  powers  is  essentially  differ- 
ent in  this  respect  from  that  of  America.  This 
difference  proceeds  from  that  which  exists  in 
their  respective  Governments;  and  to  the  de- 
fense of  our  own,  which  has  been  achieved  by  the 
loss  of  so  much  blood  and  treasure,  and  matured 
by  the  wisdom  of  their  most  enlightened  citi- 
zens, and  under  which  we  have  enjoyed  unex- 
ampled felicity,  this  whole  nation  is  devoted. 
We  owe  it,  therefore,  to  candor  and  to  the 
amicable  relations  existing  between  the  United 
States  and  those  powers  to  declare  that  we 
should  consider  any  attempt  on  their  part  to 
extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of  this 
hemisphere  as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and 
safety.  With  the  existing  colonies  or  depend- 
encies of  any  European  power  we  have  not 
interfered  and  shall  not  interfere.  But  with 
the  Governments  who  have  declared  their  inde- 
pendence and  maintained  it,  and  whose  inde- 
pendence we  have,  on  great  consideration  and 
on  just  principles,  acknowledged,  we  could  not 
view  any  interposition  for  the  purpose  of  op- 
pressing them,  or  controlling  in  any  other 
manner  their  destiny,  by  any  European  power 
in  any  other  light  than  as  the  manifestation 


Formulation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine      39 

of  an  unfriendly  disposition  toward  the  United 
States/* 

The  message  made  a  profound  impression  on 
the  world,  all  the  more  profound  for  the  fact  that 
Canning's  interview  with  Polignac  was  known 
only  to  the  chancelleries  of  Europe.  To  the 
public  at  large  it  appeared  that  the  United 
States  was  blazing  the  way  for  democracy  and 
liberty  and  that  Canning  was  holding  back 
through  fear  of  giving  offense  to  the  allies. 
The  governments  of  Europe  realized  only  too 
well  that  Monroe's  declaration  would  be  backed 
by  the  British  navy,  andafl  thought  of  inter- 
venlion  "in''Xatm  America  was  therefore  aban- 
doned. A  few  months  later  England  formally 
recognized  the  independence  of  the  Spanish- 
American  republics,  and  Canning  made  his 
famous  boast  on  the  floor  of  the  House  of  Com- 
mons. In  a  speech  delivered  December  12, 
1826,  in  defense  of  his  position  in  not  having 
arrested  the  French  invasion  of  Spain,  he  said: 
"I  looked  another  way — I  sought  for  compensa- 
tion in  another  hemisphere.  Contemplating 
Spain,  such  as  our  ancestors  had  known  her,  I 
resolved  that,  if  France  had  Spain,  it  should 
not  be  Spain  with  the  Indies.  I  called  the  New 
World  into  existence  to  redress  the  balance  of 
the  Old." 


Ill 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  AND  THE 
EUROPEAN  BALANCE  OF  POWER 


Ill 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE   AND   THE 
EUROPEAN    BALANCE   OF    POWER 

President  Monroe  said  in  effect  that  the 
western  hemisphere  must  be  made  safe  for 
democracy.  It  was  reserved  for  our  own  gene- 
ration and  for  President  Wilson  to  extend  the 
declaration  and  to  say  that  the  world  must  be 
made  safe  for  democracy.  President  Monroe 
announced  that  we  would  uphold  international 
law  and  republican  government  in  this  hemi- 
sphere, and  as  ?.  quid  pro  quo  he  announced  that 
it  was  the  settled  policy  of  the  United  States  to 
refrain  from  all  interference  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  European  states.  He  based  his  decla- 
ration, therefore,  not  mainly  on  right  and  justice, 
but  on  the  doctrine  of  the  separation  of  the 
European  and  American  spheres  of  politics. 
The  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the  policy  of  isolation 
thus  became  linked  together  in  the  public  mind 
as  compensating  policies,  neither  one  of  which 
could  stand  without  the  other.  Even  Secre- 
tary Olney  as  late  as  1895  declared  that  **Ameri- 


44  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

can  non-intervention  in  Europe  implied  Euro- 
pean non-intervention  in  America."  It  is  not 
strange,  therefore,  that  the  public  at  large 
should  regard  the  policy  of  isolation  as  the  sole 
justification  for  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  There 
is,  however,  neither  logic  nor  justice  in  basing 
our  right  to  uphold  law  and  freedom  in  this 
hemisphere  on  our  promise  not  to  interfere 
with  the  violation  of  law  and  humanity  in  Eu- 
rope. The  real^  diffirulty  is  that  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  as  interpreted  in  recent  years  has 
developed  certain  imperiali^ic  tendencies  and 
that  the  imperialistic  implications  of  the  policy 
resemble  too  closely  the  imperialistic  aims  of 
the  European  powers. 

For  three  quarters  of  a  century  after  Monroe's 
declaration  the  policy  of  isolation  was  more 
rigidly  adhered  to  than  ever,  the  principal 
departure  from  it  being  the  signature  and  rati- 
fication of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  in  1850. 
By  the  terms  of^this" treaFy"we~fec6gmzed  a 
joint  British  interest  in  any  canal  that  might 
be  built  through  the  isthnius  connecting  North 
and  South  America,  undertook  to  establish  the 
general  neutralization  of  such  canal,  and  agreed 
to  invite  other  powers,  European  and  American, 
to  unite  in  protecting  the  same.  Owing  to  dif- 
ferences that  soon  arose  between  the  United 


Monroe  Doctrine  and  European  Balance    45 

States  and  England  as  to  the  interpretation  of 
the  treaty,  the  clause  providing  for  the  adher- 
ence of  other  powers  was  never  carried  out. 

For  nearly  a  hundred  years  we  have  success- 
fully upheld  the  Monroe  Doctrine  without  a 
resort  to  force.  The  policy  has  never  been 
favorably  regarded  by  the  powers  of  continental 
Europe.  Bismarck  described  it  as  "an  interna- 
tional impertinence."  In  recent  years  it  has 
stirred  up  rather  intense  opposition  in  certain 
parts  of  Latin  America.  Until  recently  no 
American  writers  appear  to  have  considered  the 
real  nature  of  the  sanction  on  which  the  doctrine 
rested.  How  is  it  that  without  an  army  and 
until  recent  years  without  a  navy  of  any  size  we 
have  been  able  to  uphold  a  policy  which  has 
been  described  as  an  impertinence  to  Latin 
America  and  a  standing  defiance  to  Europe? 
Americans  generally  seem  to  think  that  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  has  in  it  an  inherent  sanctity 
which  prevents  other  nations  from  violating  it. 
In  view  of  the  general  disregard  of  sanctities, 
inherent  or  acquired,  during  the  early  stages 
of  the  late  war,  this  explanation  will  not  hold 
good  and  some  other  must  be  sought,  Ameri- 
cans have  been  so  little  concerned  with  interna- 
tional affairs  that  they  have  failed  to  see  any 
connection  between  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and 


46  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

the  balance  ofjaower  in  Europe.  The  existence 
of  a  European  balance  of  power  is  the  only  ex- 
planation of  our  having  been  able  to  uphold 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  for  so  long  a  time  without 
a  resort  to  force.  Some  one  or  more  of  the  Eu- 
ropean powers  would  long  ago  have  stepped  in 
and  called  our  bluff,  that  is,  forced  us  to  repudi- 
ate the  Monroe  Doctrine  or  fight  for  it,  had  it 
not  been  for  the  well-grounded  fear  that  as  soon 
as  they  became  engaged  with  us  some  other 
European  power  would  attack  them  in  the  rear. 
A  few  illustrations  will  be  sufficient  to  establish 
this  thesis. 

The  most  serious  strain  to  which  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  was  ever  subjected  was  the  attempt 
of  Louis  Napoleon  during  the  American  Civil 
War  to  establish  the  empire  of  Maximilian  in 
Mexico  under  French  auspices.  He  was  clever 
enough  to  induce  England  and  Spain  to  go  in 
with  him  in  1861  for  the  avowed  purpose  of 
collecting  the  claims  of  their  subjects  against 
the  government  of  Mexico.  Before  the  joint 
intervention  had  gone  very  far,  however,  these 
two  powers  became  convinced  that  Napoleon 
had  ulterior  designs  and  withdrew  their  forces. 
Napoleon's._Mexican  venture  was  deliberately 
calculated  on  the  success  of  the  Southern  Con- 
federacy.    Hence,  his  friendly    relations   with 


Monroe  Doctrine  and  European  Balance    47 

the  Confederate  commissioners  and  the  talk 
of  an  alliance  between  the  Confederacy  and 
Maximilian  backed  by  the  power  of  France. 
Against  each  successive  step  taken  by  France  in 
Mexico  Mr.  Seward,  Lincoln's  Secretary  of 
State,  protested.  As  the  Civil  War  drew  to  a 
successful  conclusion  his  protests  became  more 
and  more  emphatic.  Finally,  in  the  spring  of 
1866,  the  United  States  Government  began 
massing  troops  on  the  Mexican  border  and  Mr. 
Seward  sent  what  was  practically  an  ultimatum 
to  the  French  Emperor;  he  requested  to  know 
when  the  long-promised  withdrawal  of  the 
French  troops  would  take  place.  Napoleon 
replied,  fixing  the  dates  for  their  withdrawal 
in  three  separate  detachments. 

American  historians  have  usually  attributed 
Napoleon's  backdown  to  Seward's  diplomacy 
supported  by  the  military  power  of  the  United 
States,  which  was,  of  course,  greater  then  than 
at  any  previous  time  in  our  history.  All  this  un- 
doubtedly had  its  eflPect  on  Napoleon's  mind,  but 
it  appears  that  conditions  in  Europe  just  at 
that  particular  moment  had  an  even  greater 
influence  in  causing  him  to  abandon  his  Mexi- 
can scheme.  Within  a  few  days  of  the  receipt 
of  Seward's  ultimatum  Napoleon  was  informed 
of  Bismarck's  determination  to  force  a  war  with 


48  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

Austria  over  the  Schleswig-Holstein  contro- 
versy. Napoleon  realized  that  the  territorial 
aggrandizement  of  Prussia,  without  any  corres- 
ponding gains  by  France,  would  be  a  serious 
blow  to  his  prestige  and  in  fact  endanger  his 
throne.  He  at  once  entered  upon  a  long  and 
hazardous  diplomatic  game  in  which  Bismarck 
outplayed  him  and  eventually  forced  him  into 
war.  In  order  to  have  a  free  hand  to  meet 
the  European  situation  he  decided  to  yield  to 
the  American  demands.  As  the  European  situa- 
tion developed  he  hastened  the  final  withdrawal 
of  his  troops  and  left  Maximilian  to  his  fate. 
Thus  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  vindicated ! 
Let  us  take  next  President  Cleveland's  inter- 
Y^  vention  in  the  Venezuelan  boundary  dispute. 
Here  surely  was  a  clear  and  spectacular  vindi- 
cation of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  which  no  one  can 
discount.  Let  us  briefly  examine  the  facts. 
Some  30,000  square  miles  of  territory  on  the 
border  of  Venezuela  and  British  Guiana  were  in 
dispute.  Venezuela,  a  weak  and  helpless  state, 
had  offered  to  submit  the  question  to  arbitra- 
tion. Great  Britain,  powerful  and  overbearing, 
refused.  After  Secretary  Olney,  in  a  long 
correspondence  ably  conducted,  had  failed 
to  move  the  British  Government,  President 
Cleveland  decided  to  intervene.     In  a  message 


Monroe  Doctrine  and  European  Balance    49 

to  Congress  in  December,  1895,  ^^  reviewed 
the  controversy  at  length,  declared  that  the 
acquisition  of  territory  in  America  by  a  Euro- 
pean power  through  the  arbitrary  advance  of  a 
boundary  line  was  a  clear  violation  of  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  and  asked  Congress  for  an  appro- 
priation to  pay  the  expenses  of  a  commission 
which  he  proposed  to  appoint  for  the  purpose  of 
determining  the  true  boundary,  which  he  said 
it  would  then  be  our  duty  to  uphold.  Lest 
there  should  be  any  misunderstanding  as  to  his 
intentions  he  solemnly  added:  "In  making  these 
recommendations  I  am  fully  alive  to  the  respon- 
sibility incurred  and  keenly  realize  all  the  conse- 
quences that  may  follow.'*  Congress  promptly 
voted  the  appropriation. 

Here  was  a  bold  and  unqualified  defiance  of 
England.  No  one  before  had  ever  trod  so 
roughly  on  the  British  lion's  tail  with  impunity. 
The  English-speaking  public  on  both  sides  of 
the  Atlantic  was  stunned  and  amazed.  Outside 
of  diplomatic  circles  few  persons  were  aware 
that  any  subject  of  controversy  between  the 
two  countries  existed,  and  no  one  had  any  idea 
that  it  was  of  a  serious  nature.  Suddenly  the 
two  nations  found  themselves  on  the  point  of 
war.  After  the  first  outburst  of  indignation 
the  storm  passed;  and  before  the  American 


50  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

boundary  commission  completed  its  investiga- 
tion England  signed  an  arbitration  agreement 
with  Venezuela.  Some  persons,  after  looking 
in  vain  for  an  explanation,  have  concluded 
that  Lord  Salisbury's  failure  to  deal  more  seri- 
ously with  Mr.  Cleveland's  affront  to  the  British 
Government  was  due  to  his  sense  of  humor. 

But  here  again  the  true  explanation  is  to  be 
found  in  events  that  were  happening  in  another 
quarter  of  the  globe.  Cleveland's  Venezuelan 
message  was  sent  to  Congress  on  December  17th. 
At  the  end  of  the  year  came  Dr.  Jameson's  raid 
into  the  Transvaal  and  on  the  third  of  January 
the  German  Kaiser  sent  his  famous  telegram 
of  congratulation  to  Paul  Kruger.-  The  wrath 
of  England  was  suddenly  diverted  from  America 
to  Germany,  and  Lord  Salisbury  avoided  a 
rupture  with  the  United  States  over  a  matter 
which  after  all  was  not  of  such  serious  moment 
to  England  in  order  to  be  free  to  deal  with  a 
question  involving  much  greater  interests  in 
South  Africa.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  was 
none  the  less  effectively  vindicated. 

In  1902  Germany  made  a  carefully  planned 
and  determined  effort  to  test  out  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  and  see  whether  we  would  fight  for  it. 
In  that  year  Germany,  England,  and  Italy 
made  a  naval  demonstration  against  Venezuela 


Monroe  Doctrine  and  European  Balance    51 

for  the  purpose  of  forcing  her  to  recognize  as 
valid  certain  claims  of  their  subjects.  How 
England  was  led  into  the  trap  is  still  a  mystery, 
but  the  Kaiser  thought  that  he  had  her  thor- 
oughly committed,  that  if  England  once  started 
in  with  him  she  could  not  turn  against  him. 
But  he  had  evidently  not  profited  by  the  ex- 
perience of  Napoleon  III  in  Mexico.  Through 
the  mediation  of  Herbert  Bowen,  the  American 
minister,  Venezuela  agreed  to  recognize  in 
principle  the  claims  of  the  foreign  powers  and 
to  arbitrate  the  amount.  England  and  Italy 
accepted  this  offer  and  withdrew  their  squad- 
rons. Germany,  however,  remained  for  a 
time  obdurate.  This  much  was  known  at  the 
time. 

A  rather  sensational  account  of  what  followed 
next  has  recently  been  made  public  in  Thayer's 
"Life  and  Letters  of  John  Hay.'*  Into  the 
merits  of  the  controversy  that  arose  over 
Thayer's  version  of  the  Roosevelt-Holleben 
interview  it  is  not  necessary  to  enter.  The 
significant  fact,  that  Germany  withdrew  from 
Venezuela  under  pressure,  is,  however,  amply 
established.  Admiral  Dewey  stated  publicly 
that  the  entire  American  fleet  was  assembled  at 
the  time  under  his  command  in  Porto  Rican 
waters  ready  to  move  at  a  moment's  notice. 


52  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

Why  did  Germany  back  down  from  her  posi- 
tion? Her  navy  was  supposed  to  be  at  least 
as  powerful  as  ours.  The  reason  why  the 
Kaiser  concluded  not  to  measure  strength 
with  the  United  States  was  that  England  had 
accepted  arbitration  and  withdrawn  her  support 
and  he  did  not  dare  attack  the  United  States 
with  the  British  navy  in  his  rear.  Again  the 
nicely  adjusted  European  balance  prevented 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  from  being  put  to  the 
test  of  actual  war. 

While  England  has  from  time  to  time  ob- 
jected to  some  of  the  corollaries  deduced  from 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  she  has  on  the  whole 
been  not  unfavorably  disposed  toward  the 
essential  features  of  that  policy.  The  reason 
for  this  is  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  been 
an  open-door  policy,  and  has  thus  been  in 
general  accord  with  the  British  policy  of  free 
trade.  The  United  States  has  not  used  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  for  the  establishment  of 
exclusive  trade  relations  with  our  southern 
neighbors.  In  fact,  we  have  largely  neglected 
the  South  American  countries  as  a  field  for 
the  development  of  American  commerce.  The 
failure  to  cultivate  this  field  has  not  been  due 
wholly  to  neglect,  however,  but  to  the  fact 
that  we  have  had  employment  for  all  our  capital 


Monroe  Doctrine  and  European  Balance    53 

at  home  and  consequently  have  not  been  in  a 
position  to  aid  in  the  industrial  development 
of  the  Latin-American  states,  and  to  the  further 
fact  that  our  exports  have  been  so  largely  the 
came  and  hence  the  trade  of  both  North  and 
South  America  has  been  mainly  with  Europe. 
There  has,  therefore,  been  little  rivalry  between 
the  United  States  and  the  powers  of  Europe 
in  the  field  of  South  American  commerce.  Our 
interest  has  been  political  rather  than  com- 
mercial. We  have  prevented  the  establish- 
ment of  spheres  of  influence  and  preserved  the 
open  door.  This  situation  has  been  in  full 
accord  with  British  policy.  Had  Great  Britain 
adopted  a  high  tariff  policy  and  been  compelled 
to  demand  commercial  concessions  from  Latin 
America  by  force,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  would 
long  since  have  gone  by  the  board  and  been 
forgotten.  Americans  should  not  forget  the 
fact,  moreover,  that  at  any  time  during  the 
past  twenty  years  Great  Britain  could  have 
settled  all  her  outstanding  difficulties  with 
Germany  by  agreeing  to  sacrifice  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  and  give  her  rival  a  free  hand  in 
South  America.  In  the  face  of  such  a  combina- 
tion our  navy  would  have  been  of  little  avail. 


IV 


INTERNATIONAL  COOPERATION  WITH 
OUT  THE  SANCTION  OF  FORCE 


IV 


INTERNATIONAL  COOPERATION  WITH- 
OUT  THE  SANCTION  OF  FORCE 

President  Monroe's  declaration  had  a  nega- 
tive as  well  as  a  positive  side.  It  was  in  effect 
an  announcement  to  the  world  that  we  would 
not  use  force  in  support  of  law  and  justice 
anywhere  except  in  the  Western  Hemisphere, 
that  we  intended  to  stay  at  home  and  mind  our 
own  business.  Washington  and  Jefferson  had 
recommended  a  policy  of  isolation  on  grounds 
of  expediency.  Washington,  as  we  have  seen, 
regarded  this  policy  as  a  temporary  expedient, 
wkile  Jefferson  upon  two  separate  occasions 
was  ready  to  form  an  alliance  with  England. 
Probably  neither  one  of  them  contemplated 
the  possibility  of  the  United  States  shirking  its 
responsibilities  as  a  member  of  the  family  of 
nations.  Monroe's  message  contained  the  im- 
plied promise  that  if  Europe  would  refrain  from 
interfering  in  the  political  concerns  of  this 
hemisphere,  we  would  abstain  from  all  inter- 
vention in  Europe.     From  that  day  until  our 

ST 


58  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

entrance  into  the  World  War  it  was  generally- 
understood,  and  on  numerous  occasions  offi- 
cially proclaimed,  that  the  United  States 
would  not  resort  to  force  on  any  question  arising 
outside  of  America  except  where  its  material 
interests  were  directly  involved.  We  have 
not  refrained  from  diplomatic  action  in  matters 
not  strictly  American,  but  it  has  always  been 
understood  that  such  action  would  not  be 
backed  by  force.  In  the  existing  state  of  world 
politics  this  limitation  has  been  a  serious  handi- 
cap to  American  diplomacy.  To  take  what  we 
could  get  and  to  give  nothing  in  return  has  been 
a  hard  rule  for  our  diplomats,  and  has  greatly 
circumscribed  their  activities.  Diplomatic  ac- 
tion without  the  use  or  threat  of  force  has, 
however,  accomplished  something  in  the  world 
at  large,  so  that  American  influence  has  by  no 
means  been  limited  to  the  western  hemisphere. 
During  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century 
the  subject  of  slavery  absorbed  a  large  part  of 
the  attention  of  American  statesmen.  The 
fact  that  they  were  not  concerned  with  foreign 
problems  outside  of  the  American  hemisphere 
probably  caused  them  to  devote  more  time  and 
attention  to  this  subject  than  they  would 
otherwise  have  done.  Slavery  and  isolation 
had  a  very  narrowing  effect  on  men  in  public 


International  Cooperation  59 

life,  especially  during  the  period  from  1830 
to  i860.  As  the  movement  against  slavery 
in  the  early  thirties  became  world-wide,  the 
retention  of  the  "peculiar  institution"  in  this 
country  had  the  effect  of  increasing  our  isola- 
tion. The  effort  of  the  American  Colonization 
Society  to  solve  or  mitigate  the  problem  of 
slavery  came  very  near  giving  us  a  colony  in 
Africa.  In  fact,  Liberia,  the  negro  republic 
founded  on  the  west  coast  of  Africa  by  the 
Colonization  Society,  was  in  all  essentials  an 
American  protectorate,  though  the  United 
States  carefully  refrained  in  its  communications 
with  other  powers  from  doing  more  than  ex- 
pressing its  good  will  for  the  little  republic. 
As  Liberia  was  founded  years  before  Africa 
became  a  field  for  European  exploitation,  it 
was  suffered  to  pursue  its  course  without  outside 
interference,  and  the  United  States  was  never 
called  upon  to  decide  whether  its  diplomatic 
protection  would  be  backed  up  by  force. 

The  slave  trade  was  a  subject  of  frequent 
discussion  between  the  United  States  and  Eng- 
land during  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  and  an  arrangement  for  its  suppression 
was  finally  embodied  in  Article  VIII  of  the 
Webster-Ashburton  Treaty  of  1842.  The  only 
reason  why  the  two  countries  had  never  been 


6o  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

able  to  act  in  accord  on  this  question  before 
was  that  Great  Britain  persistently  refused  to 
renounce  the  right  of  impressment  which  she 
had  exercised  in  the  years  preceding  the  War 
of  1812.  The  United  States  therefore  refused 
to  sign  any  agreement  which  would  permit 
British  naval  officers  to  search  American  vessels 
in  time  of  peace.  In  1820  the  United  States 
declared  the  slave  trade  to  be  a  form  of  piracy, 
and  Great  Britain  advanced  the  view  that  as 
there  was  no  doubt  of  the  right  of  a  naval 
officer  to  visit  and  search  a  ship  suspected  of 
piracy,  her  officers  should  be  permitted  to  visit 
and  search  ships  found  off  the  west  coast  of 
Africa  under  the  American  flag  which  were 
suspected  of  being  engaged  in  the  slave  trade. 
The  United  States  stoutly  refused  to  acquiesce 
in  this  view.  In  the  Webster-Ashburton  Treaty 
of  1842  it  was  finally  agreed  that  each  of  the 
two  powers  should  maintain  on  the  coast  of 
Africa  a  sufficient  squadron  "to  enforce,  sepa- 
rately and  respectively,  the  laws,  rights,  and 
obligations  of  each  of  the  two  countries  for  the 
suppression  of  the  slave  trade."  It  was  further 
agreed  that  the  officers  should  act  in  concert 
and  cooperation,  but  the  agreement  was  so 
worded  as  to  avoid  all  possibility  of  our  being 
drawn  into  an  entangling  alliance. 


International  Cooperation  6i 

The  United  States  has  upon  various  occa- 
sions expressed  a  humanitarian  interest  in  the 
natives  of  Africa.  In  1884  two  delegates  were 
sent  to  the  Berlin  conference  which  adopted  a 
general  act  giving  a  recognized  status  to  the 
Kongo  Free  State.  The  American  delegates 
signed  the  treaty  in  common  with  the  delegates 
of  the  European  powers,  but  it  was  not  sub- 
mitted to  the  Senate  for  ratification  for  reasons 
stated  as  follows  by  President  Cleveland  in  his 
annual  message  of  December  8,  1885: 

"A  conference  of  delegates  of  the  principal 
commercial  nations  was  held  at  Berlin  last  winter 
to  discuss  methods  whereby  the  Kongo  basin 
might  be  kept  open  to  the  world's  trade.  Dele- 
gates attended  on  behalf  of  the  United  States 
on  the  understanding  that  their  part  should  be 
merely  deliberative,  without  imparting  to  the 
results  any  binding  character  so  far  as  the 
United  States  were  concerned.  This  reserve 
was  due  to  the  indisposition  of  this  Government 
to  share  in  any  disposal  by  an  international 
congress  of  jurisdictional  questions  in  remote 
foreign  territories.  The  results  of  the  confer- 
ence were  embodied  in  a  formal  act  of  the  na- 
ture of  an  international  convention,  which  laid 
down  certain  obligations  purporting  to  be 
binding  on  the  signatories,  subject  to  ratifica- 


62  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

tion  within  one  year.  Notwithstanding  the 
reservation  under  which  the  delegates  of  the 
United  States  attended,  their  signatures  were 
attached  to  the  general  act  in  the  same  manner 
as  those  of  the  plenipotentiaries  of  other  govern- 
ments, thus  making  the  United  States  appear, 
without  reserve  or  qualification,  as  signatories 
to  a  joint  international  engagement  imposing 
on  the  signers  the  conservation  of  the  territorial 
integrity  of  distant  regions  where  we  have  no 
established  interests  or  control. 

"This  Government  does  not,  however,  regard 
its  reservation  of  liberty  of  action  in  the  premises 
as  at  all  impaired;  and  holding  that  an  engage- 
ment to  share  in  the  obligation  of  enforcing 
neutrality  in  the  remote  valley  of  the  Kongo 
would  be  an  alliance  whose  responsibilities 
we  are  not  in  a  position  to  assume,  I  abstain 
from  asking  the  sanction  of  the  Senate  to  that 
general  act." 

The  United  States  also  sent  delegates  to  the 
international  conference  held  at  Brussels  in 
1890  for  the  purpose  of  dealing  with  the  slave 
trade  in  certain  unappropriated  regions  of 
Central  Africa.  The  American  delegates  in- 
sisted that  prohibitive  duties  should  be  imposed 
on  the  importation  of  spirituous  liquors  into 
the    Kongo.     The    European    representatives, 


International  Cooperation  65, 

being  unwilling  to  incorporate  the  American 
proposals,  framed  a  separate  tariff  convention 
for  the  Kongo,  which  the  American  delegates 
refused  to  sign.  The  latter  did,  however,  aflSx 
their  signatures  to  the  general  treaty  which  pro- 
vided for  the  suppression  of  the  African  slave 
trade  and  the  restriction  of  the  sale  of  firearms, 
ammunition,  and  spirituous  liquors  in  certain 
parts  of  the  African  continent.  In  ratifying 
the  treaty  the  Senate  reaffirmed  the  American 
policy  of  isolation  in  the  following  resolution: 
"That  the  United  States  of  America,  having 
neither  possessions  nor  protectorates  in  Africa, 
hereby  disclaims  any  intention,  in  ratifying  this 
treaty,  to  indicate  any  interest  whatsoever  in  the 
possessions  or  protectorates  established  or 
claimed  on  that  Continent  by  the  other  powers, 
or  any  approval  of  the  wisdom,  expediency  or 
lawfulness  thereof,  and  does  not  join  in  any 
expressions  in  the  said  General  Act  which  might 
be  construed  as  such  a  declaration  or  acknowl- 
edgement; and,  for  this  reason,  that  it  is  desir- 
able that  a  copy  of  this  resolution  be  inserted 
in  the  protocol  to  be  drawn  up  at  the  time  of 
the  exchange  of  the  ratifications  of  this  treaty 
on  the  part  of  the  United  States." 

The   United    States    has    always    stood    for 
legality  in  international  relations  and  has  al- 


64  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

ways  endeavored  to  promote  the  arbitration  of 
international  disputes.  Along  these  lines  we 
have  achieved  notable  success.  It  is,  of  course, 
sometimes  difficult  to  separate  questions  ®f  in- 
ternational law  from  questions  of  international 
politics.  We  have  been  so  scrupulous  in  our 
efforts  to  keep  out  of  political  entanglements 
that  we  have  sometimes  failed  to  uphold  prin- 
ciples of  law  in  the  validity  of  which  we  were 
as  much  concerned  as  any  other  nation.  We 
have  always  recognized  international  law  as  a 
part  of  the  law  of  the  land,  and  we  have  al- 
ways acknowledged  the  moral  responsibilities 
that  rested  on  us  as  a  member  of  the  society  of 
nations.  In  fact,  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  expressly  recognizes  the  binding  force 
of  the  law  of  nations  and  of  treaties.  As  inter- 
national law  is  the  only  law  that  governs  the 
relations  between  states,  we  are,  of  course,  di- 
rectly concerned  in  the  enforcement  of  exist- 
ing law  and  in  the  development  of  new  law. 
When  the  Declaration  of  Paris  was  drawn  up  by 
the  European  powers  at  the  close  of  the  Crimean 
War  in  1856,  the  United  States  was  invited  to 
give  its  adherence.  The  four  rules  embodied 
in  the  declaration,  which  have  since  formed  the 
basis  of  maritime  law,  are  as  follows:  First, 
privateering  is,  and  remains,  abolished.     Sec- 


International  Cooperation  65 

end,  the  neutral  flag  covers  enemy*s  goods,  with 
the  exception  of  contraband  of  war.  Third, 
neutral  goods,  with  the  exceptioa  of  contraband 
of  war,  are  not  liable  to  capture  under  the 
enemy's  flag.  Fourth,  blockades,  in  order  to  be 
binding,  must  be  effective.  The  United  States 
Government  was  in  thorough  accord  with  the 
second,  third,  and  fourth  rules  but  was  unwill- 
ing, as  matters  then  itood,  to  commit  itself 
to  the  first  rule.  It  had  never  been  our  policy 
to  maintain  a  large  standing  navy.  In  the  War 
of  181 2,  as  in  the  Revolution,  we  depended  upon 
privateers  to  attack  the  commerce  of  the  enemy. 
In  reply  to  the  invitation  to  give  our  adherence 
to  the  declaration.  Secretary  Marcy  made  a 
counter  proposition,  namely,  that  the  powers  of 
Europe  should  agree  to  exempt  all  private  prop- 
erty, except  of  course  contraband  of  war,  from 
capture  on  the  high  seas  in  time  of  war.  He 
said  that  if  they  would  agree  to  this,  the  United 
States  would  agree  to  abolish  privateering.  The 
powers  of  Europe  refused  to  accept  this  amend- 
ment. We  refrained  from  signing  the  Declara- 
tion of  Paris,  therefore,  not  because  it  went  too 
far,  but  because  it  did  not  go  far  enough. 

During  the  Civil  War  the  United  States 
Government  used  its  diplomatic  eff"orts  to  pre- 
vent the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  the 


(>6  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

Confederacy  and  the  formation  of  hostile  alli- 
ances. It  made  no  effort  to  form  any  alliance 
itself  and  insisted  that  the  struggle  be  regarded 
as  an  American  question.  The  dispute  with 
England  over  the  Alabama  Claims  came 
near  precipitating  war,  but  the  matter  was 
finally  adjusted  by  the  Treaty  of  Washington. 
The  most  significant  feature  of  this  treaty,  as 
far  as  the  present  discussion  is  concerned,  was 
the  formal  adoption  of  three  rules  which  were 
not  only  to  govern  the  decision  of  the  "Ala- 
bama Claims,"  but  which  were  to  be  binding 
upon  England  and  the  United  States  for  the 
future.  It  was  further  agreed  that  these  rules 
should  be  brought  to  the  knowledge  of  other 
maritime  powers  who  should  be  invited  to 
accede  to  them.  The  rules  forbade  the  fitting 
out,  arming,  or  equipping  within  neutral  juris- 
diction of  vessels  intended  to  cruise  or  carry  on 
war  against  a  power  with  which  the  neutral  is  at 
peace;  they  forbade  the  use  of  neutral  ports  or 
waters  as  a  base  of  naval  operations;  and  they 
imposed  upon  neutrals  the  exercise  of  due  dili- 
gence to  prevent  these  things  from  being  done. 
While  these  rules  have  never  been  formally 
adopted  by  the  remaining  powers,  they  are  gen- 
erally recognized  as  embodying  obligationswhich 
are  now  incumbent  upon  all  neutrals. 


International  Cooperation  67 

When  the  United  States  decided  to  accept 
the  invitation  of  the  Czar  of  Russia  to  attend 
the  first  peace  conference  at  The  Hague  in  1899, 
grave  misgivings  were  expressed  by  many  of 
the  more  conservative  men  in  public  Hfe.  The 
participation  of  the  United  States  with  the 
powers  of  Europe  in  this  conference  was  taken 
by  many  Americans  to  mark  the  end  of  the 
old  order  and  the  beginning  of  a  new  era  in 
American  diplomacy.  The  conference,  how- 
ever, was  concerned  with  questions  of  general 
international  interest,  and  had  no  bearing 
upon  the  internal  affairs  of  any  state,  European 
or  American.  Lest  there  should  be  any  mis- 
apprehension as  to  the  historic  policy  of  the 
United  States,  the  final  treaty  was  signed  by 
the  American  delegation  under  the  express 
reservation  of  a  declaration  previously  read  in 
open  session.  This  declaration  was  as  follows: 
"Nothing  contained  in  this  convention  shall 
be  so  construed  as  to  require  the  United  States 
of  America  to  depart  from  its  traditional  policy 
of  not  intruding  upon,  interfering  with,  or 
entangling  itself  in  the  political  questions  or 
policy  or  internal  administration  of  any  foreign 
state;  nor  shall  anything  contained  in  the  said 
convention  be  construed  to  imply  a  relinquish- 
ment  by   the   United    States   of  America   of 


68  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

its  traditional  attitude  toward  purely  American 
questions."  The  establishment  of  the  Perma- 
nent Court  of  Arbitration  at  The  Hague  which 
resulted  from  the  first  conference  was  a  notable 
achievement,  although  the  Court  has  accom- 
plished less  than  its  advocates  hoped.  This 
was  the  most  important  occasion  on  which 
American  delegates  had  sat  together  with 
European  diplomats  in  a  general  conference. 
Our  delegation  was  the  object  of  considerable 
interest  and  was  not  without  influence  in  shap- 
ing the  provisions  of  the  final  treaty.  It  was 
through  the  personal  influence  of  Andrew  D. 
White  that  the  Emperor  of  Germany  was  per- 
suaded to  permit  his  delegation  to  take  part  in 
the  proceedings  establishing  the  Court  of  Arbi- 
tration. 

The  second  Hague  Conference  revised  the 
Convention  for  the  Pacific  Settlement  of  Inter- 
national Disputes,  drew  up  a  plan  for  an  Inter- 
national Prize  Court,  and  attempted  a  codifica- 
tion of  the  rules  of  international  law  on  a  number 
of  subjects  relating  to  the  conduct  of  war  and 
the  rights  of  neutrals.  The  American  dele- 
gates, headed  by  Mr.  Choate,  not  only  took  a 
prominent  part  in  these  proceedings,  but, 
acting  under  instructions  from  Secretary  Root, 
they  proposed  to  the  Conference  the  creation 


International  Cooperation  69 

of  a  permanent  international  court  of  justice. 
The  creation  of  an  international  court  of  justice 
whose  decisions  would  have  the  force  of  law,  as 
distinguished  from  an  international  court  of 
arbitration  whose  decisions  are  usually  arrived 
at  by  a  compromise  of  conflicting  legal  or  poli- 
tical points  of  view,  had  long  been  advocated 
by  advanced  thinkers,  but  the  proposition  had 
always  been  held  by  practical  statesmen  to  be 
purely  academic.  The  serious  advocacy  of  the 
proposition  at  this  time  by  a  great  nation  like 
the  United  States  and  the  able  arguments  ad- 
vanced by  Mr.  Choate  marked  an  important 
step  forward  and  made  a  profound  impression. 
There  were  two  difficulties  in  the  way  of  estab- 
lishing such  a  court  at  the  second  Hague 
Conference.  In  the  first  place,  the  delegation 
of  the  United  States  was  the  only  one  which 
had  instructions  on  this  subject,  and  in  the 
second  place  it  was  found  to  be  impossible  to 
agree  upon  a  method  of  selecting  the  judges. 
The  great  world  powers,  with  the  exception  of 
the  United  States,  demanded  permanent  repre- 
sentation on  the  court.  The  smaller  nations, 
relying  on  the  doctrine  of  the  equality  of  states, 
demanded  likewise  to  be  represented.  If  each 
nation  could  have  been  given  the  right  to 
appoint  a  judge,  the  court  could  have  been 


70  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

organized,  but  there  would  have  been  forty- 
four  judges  instead  of  fifteen,  the  number 
suggested  in  the  American  plan.  The  Draft 
Convention  for  the  Establishment  of  the  Court 
of  Arbitral  Justice,  as  it  was  agreed  the  new 
court  should  be  designated,  was  submitted  to 
the  Conference  and  its  adoption  recommended 
to  the  signatory  powers.  This  Draft  contained 
thirty-five  articles  and  covered  everything 
except  the  method  of  appointing  judges.  This 
question  was  to  be  settled  by  diplomatic  nego- 
tiation, and  it  was  agreed  that  the  court  should 
be  established  as  soon  as  a  satisfactory  agree- 
ment with  regard  to  the  choice  of  judges  could 
be  reached.  After  the  adjournment  of  the  Con- 
ference the  United  States  continued  its  ad- 
vocacy of  the  international  court  of  justice 
through  the  ordinary  diplomatic  channels. 
The  proposal  was  made  that  the  method  of 
selecting  judges  for  the  Prize  Court  be  adopted 
for  the  court  of  justice,  that  is,  that  each  power 
should  appoint  a  judge,  that  the  judges  of  the 
larger  powers  should  always  sit  on  the  court 
while  the  judges  of  the  other  powers  should  sit 
by  a  system  ofL-fotatipn  for—limited- periods. 
It  was  found,  however,  that  many  of  the  smaller 
states  were  unwilling  to  accept  this  suggestion, 
and  as  difficulties  which  we  will  mention  pres- 


International  Cooperation  71 

ently  prevented  the  establishment  of  the  Prize 
Court,  the  whole  question  of  the  court  of 
justice  was  postponed. 

Most  of  the  conventions  adopted  by  the 
second  Hague  Conference  were  ratified  by  the 
United  States  without  reservation.  The  fact, 
however,  that  certain  of  these  conventions  were 
not  ratified  by  all  the  powers  represented 
at  the  Conference,  and  that  others  were  ratified 
with  important  reservations,  left  the  status  of 
most  of  the  conventions  in  doubt,  so  that  at 
the  beginning  of  the  World  War  there  was  great 
confusion  as  to  what  rules  were  binding  and 
what  were  not  binding.  The  Conference  found 
it  impossible  to  arrive  at  an  agreement  on  many 
of  the  most  vital  questions  of  maritime  law. 
Under  these  circumstances  the  powers  were  not 
wiUing  to  have  the  proposed  International 
Prize  Court  established  without  the  previous 
codification  of  the  body  of  law  which  was  to 
govern  its  decisions. 

In  order  to  supply  this  need  the  London 
Naval  Conference  was  convened  in  December, 
1908,  and  issued  a  few  months  later  the  Declara- 
tion of  London.  The  London  Naval  Confer- 
ence was  attended  by  representatives  of  the 
principal  maritime  powers  including  the  United 
States,  and  the  Declaration  which  it  issued  was 


72  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

avowedly  a  codification  of  the  existing  rules 
of  international  law.  This  was  not  true,  how- 
ever, of  all  the  provisions  of  the  Declaration. 
On  several  of  the  most  vital  questions  of  mari- 
time law,  such  as  blockade,  the  doctrine  of 
continuous  voyage,  the  destruction  of  neutral 
prizes,  and  the  inclusion  of  food  stuffs  in  the 
list  of  conditional  contraband,  the  Declaration 
was  a  compromise  and  therefore  unsatisfactory. 
It  encountered  from  the  start  the  most  violent 
opposition  in  England.  In  Parliament  the 
Naval  Prize  Bill,  which  was  to  give  the  Declara- 
tion effect,  was  discussed  at  considerable  length. 
It  passed  the  House  of  Commons  by  a  small 
vote,  but  was  defeated  in  the  House  of  Lords. 
It  was  denounced  by  the  press,  and  a  petition 
to  the  king,  drawn  up  by  the  Imperial  Maritime 
League  protesting  against  it,  was  signed  by  a 
long  list  of  commercial  associations,  mayors, 
members  of  the  House  of  Lords,  general  offi- 
cers, and  other  public  officials.  One  hundred 
and  thirty-eight  naval  officers  of  flag  rank 
addressed  to  the  prime  minister  a  public  protest 
against  the  Declaration.  In  the  debate  in 
the  House  of  Lords  the  main  objections  to 
the  Declaration  were  (i)  that  it  made  food  stuffs 
conditional  contraband  instead  of  placing  them 
on  the  free  list,  (2)  that  the  clause  permitting 


International  Cooperation  73 

the  seizure  of  conditional  contraband  bound 
for  a  fortified  place  or  *'oth«r  place  serving  as 
a  base  for  the  armed  forces  of  the  enemy"  would 
render  all  English  ports  Hable  to  be  treated 
as  ba«es  by  an  enemy,  and  (3)  that  it  permitted 
the  destruction  of  neutral  prizes. 

The  refusal  of  England  to  ratify  the  Declara- 
tion of  London  sealed  it«  fate.  The  United 
States  Senate  formally  ratified  it,  but  this  rati- 
fication was,  of  course,  conditional  on  the  rati- 
fication of  other  powers.  At  the  beginning  of 
the  Great  War  the  United  States  made  a  formal 
proposal  to  the  belligerent  powers  that  they 
should  agree  to  adopt  the  Declaration  for  the 
period  of  the  war  in  order  that  there  might  be  a 
definite  body  of  law  for  all  parties  concerned. 
This  proposal  was  accepted  by  Germany  and 
Austria,  but  England,  France,  and  Russia 
were  not  willing  to  accept  the  Declaration 
of  London  without  modifications.  The  United 
States,  therefore,  promptly  withdrew  its  pro- 
posal and  stated  that  where  its  rights  as  a 
neutral  were  concerned  it  would  expect  the 
belligerent  powers  to  observe  the  recognized 
rules  of  international  law  and  existing  treaties. 

The  Hague  Conferences  were  concerned 
with  questions  of  gwieral  international  in- 
terest, and  had  no  bearing  upon  the  internal 


74  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

affairs  of  states.  Such,  however,  was  not  the 
character  of  the  conference  which  convened  at 
Algeciras,  Spain,  in  December,  1905,  for  the 
purpose  of  adjusting  the  very  serious  dispute 
that  had  arisen  between  France  and  Germany 
over  the  status  of  Morocco.  France  had  been 
engaged  for  some  years  in  the  peaceful  penetra- 
tion of  Morocco.  By  the  terms  of  the  Entente 
of  1904  England  recognized  Morocco  as  being 
within  the  French  sphere  of  influence  and  France 
agreed  to  recognize  England's  position  in  Egypt. 
The  German  Kaiser  had  no  idea  of  permitting 
any  part  of  the  world  to  be  divided  up  without 
his  consent.  In  March,  1905,  while  on  a  cruise 
in  the  Mediterranean,  he  disembarked  at  Tan- 
gier and  paid  a  visit  to  the  Sultan  "in  his 
character  of  independent  sovereign."  As  the 
Russian  armies  had  just  suffered  disastrous 
defeats  at  the  hands  of  the  Japanese,  France 
could  not  count  on  aid  from  her  ally  and  the 
Kaiser  did  not  believe  that  the  recently  formed 
Entente  was  strong  enough  to  enable  her  to 
count  on  English  support.  His  object  in 
landing  at  Tangier  was,  therefore,  to  check 
and  humiliate  France  while  she  was  isolated 
and  to  break  up  the  Entente  before  it  should 
develop  into  an  alliance.  Delcasse,  the  French 
foreign   minister,  ^vanted   to   stand   firm,   but 


International  Cooperation  75 

Germany  demanded  his  retirement  and  the 
prime  minister  accepted  his  resignation.  In 
recognition  of  this  triumph,  the  German  chan- 
cellor Count  von  Billow  was  given  the  title  of 
Prince.  Not  satisfied  with  this  achievement, 
the  Kaiser  demanded  a  general  European  con- 
ference on  the  Moroccan  question,  and,  in  order 
to  avoid  war,  President  Roosevelt  persuaded 
France  to  submit  the  whole  dispute  to  the  pow- 
ers interested.  The  Algeciras  conference  turned 
out  to  be  a  bitter  disappointment  to  Germany. 
Not  only  did  France  receive  the  loyal  support  of 
England,  but  she  was  also  backed  by  the  United 
States  and  even  by  Italy — a  warning  to  Germany 
that  the  Triple  Alliance  was  in  danger.  As  the 
conference  was  called  nominally  for  the  purpose 
of  instituting  certain  administrative  reforms 
in  Morocco,  President  Roosevelt  decided,  in 
view  of  our  rights  under  a  commercial  treaty  of 
1880,  to  take  part  in  the  proceedings.  The 
American  delegates  were  Henry  White,  at 
that  time  ambassador  to  Italy,  and  Samuel 
R.  Gummere,  minister  to  Morocco.  As  the 
United  States  professed  to  have  no  political 
interests  at  stake,  its  delegates  were  instrumen- 
tal in  composing  many  of  the  difficulties  that 
arose  during  the  conference  and  their  influence 
was  exerted  to  preserve  the  European  balance  of 


yS  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

power.  The  facts  in  regard  to  America's  part 
in  this  conference  were  carefully  concealed  from 
the  public.  There  was  nothing  in  any  published 
American  document  to  indicate  that  the  par- 
ticipation of  our  representatives  was  anything 
more  than  casual.  Andre  Tardieu,  the  well- 
known  French  publicist,  who  reported  the  con- 
ference and  later  published  his  impressions  in 
book  form,  first  indicated  that  President  Roose- 
velt was  a  positive  factor  in  the  proceedings. 
But  it  was  not  until  the  publication  of  Bishop's 
"Theodore  Roosevelt  and  His  Time"  that  the 
full  extent  of  Roosevelt's  activities  in  this  con- 
nection became  known. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  our  participation 
in  the  Moroccan  conference  was  the  most  radical 
departure  ever  made  from  our  traditional  policy 
of  isolation.  Roosevelt's  influence  was  exerted 
for  preserving  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe. 
As  we  look  back  upon  the  events  of  that  year 
we  feel,  in  view  of  what  has  since  happened, 
that  he  was  fully  justified  in  the  course  he 
pursued.  Had  his  motives  for  participating 
in  the  conference  been  known  at  the  time, 
they  would  not  have  been  upheld  either  by  the 
Senate  or  by  public  opinion.  There  are  many 
serious  objections  to  secret  diplomacy,  but  it 
cannot  be  entirely  done  away  with  even  under 


International  Cooperation  77 

a  republican  form  of  government  until  the 
people  are  educated  to  a  fuller  understanding 
of  international  politics.  The  German  Kaiser 
was  relentless  in  his  attempt  to  score  a  diplo- 
matic triumph  while  France  was  isolated. 
He  was  thwarted,  however,  by  the  moral  sup- 
port which  England,  Italy,  and  the  United 
States  gave  to  France. 

During  the  proceedings  of  the  conference 
the  American  delegates  declared  in  open  session 
that  the  United  States  had  no  political  interest 
in  Morocco  and  that  they  would  sign  the  treaty 
only  with  the  understanding  that  the  United 
States  would  thereby  assume  no "  obligation 
or  responsibility  for  the  enforcement  thereof." 
This  declaration  did  not  satisfy  the  United 
States  Senate,  which  no  doubt  suspected  the 
part  that  was  actually  played  by  America  in 
the  conference.  At  any  rate,  when  the  treaty 
was  finally  ratified  the  Senate  attached  to  its 
resolution  of  ratification  the  following  declara- 
tion: 

"Resolved  further.  That  the  Senate,  as  a 
part-  of  this  act  of  ratification,  understands 
that  the  participation  of  the  United  States 
in  the  Algeciras  conference  and  in  the  formation 
and  adoption  of  the  general  act  and  protocol 
which   resulted  therefrom,  was  with  the  sole 


78  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

purpose  of  preserving  and  increasing  its  com- 
merce in  Morocco,  the  protection  as  to  life, 
liberty,  and  property  of  its  citizens  residing  or 
traveling  therein,  and  of  aiding  by  its  friendly 
offices  and  efforts,  in  removing  friction  and 
controversy  which  seemed  to  menace  the  peace 
between  powers  signatory  with  the  United 
States  to  the  treaty  of  1880,  all  of  which  are 
on  terms  of  amity  with  this  Government;  and 
W^ithout  purpose  to  depart  from  the  traditional 
American  foreign  policy  which  forbids  partici- 
pation by  the  United  States  in  the  settlement  of 
political  questions  which  are  entirely  European 
in  their  scope." 

The  determination  of  the  United  States  not 
to  interfere  in  the  internal  politics  of  European 
states  has  not  prevented  occasional  protests 
in  the  name  of  humanity  against  the  harsh 
treatment  accorded  the  Jews  in  certain  European 
countries.  On  July  17,  1902,  Secretary  Hay 
protested  in  a  note  to  the  Rumanian  govern- 
ment against  a  policy  which  was  forcing  thou- 
sands of  Jews  to  emigrate  from  that  country. 
The  United  States,  he  claimed,  had  more  than 
a  philanthropic  interest  in  this  matter,  for  the 
enforced  emigration  of  the  Jews  from  Rumania 
in  a  condition  of  utter  destitution  was  "the  mere 
transplantation    of    an     artificially    produced 


International  Cooperation  79 

diseased  growth  to  a  new  place";  and,  as  the 
United  States  was  practically  their  only  place 
of  refuge,  we  had  a  clearly  established  right  of 
remonstrance.  In  the  case  of  Russia  informa- 
tion has  repeatedly  been  sought  through  diplo- 
matic channels  as  to  the  extent  of  destitution 
among  the  Jewish  population,  and  permission 
has  been  requested  for  the  distribution  of  relief 
funds  raised  in  the  United  States.  Such  in- 
quiries have  been  so  framed  as  to  amount  to 
diplomatic  protests.  In  his  annual  message  of 
1904  President  Roosevelt  went  further  and 
openly  expressed  the  horror  of  the  nation  at 
the  massacre  of  the  Jews  at  Kishenef.  These 
protests,  however,  were  purely  diplomatic  in 
character.  There  was  not  the  slightest  hint 
at  intervention.  During  the  early  stages  of 
the  Great  War  in  Europe  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  endeavored  to  adhere  strictly 
to  its  historic  policy.  The  German  invasion  of 
Belgium  with  its  attendant  horrors  made  a  deep 
impression  upon  the  American  people  and 
aroused  their  fighting  spirit  even  more  per- 
haps than  the  German  policy  of  submarine  war- 
fare, but  it  was  on  the  latter  issue,  in  which  the 
interests  and  rights  of  the  United  States  were 
directly  involved,  that  we  finally  entered  the 
war. 


V 

THE  OPEN-DOOR  POLICY 


V 

THE  OPEN-DOOR  POLICY 

In  the  Orient  American  diplomacy  has  had  a 
somewhat  freer  hand  than  in  Europe.  Com- 
modore Perry's  expedition  to  Japan  in  1852- 
1854  was  quite  a  radical  departure  from  the 
general  policy  of  attending  strictly  to  our  own 
business.  It  would  hardly  have  been  under- 
taken against  a  country  lying  within  the  Euro- 
pean sphere  of  influence.  There  were,  it  is 
true,  certain  definite  grievances  to  redress,  but 
the  main  reason  for  the  expedition  was  that 
Japan  refused  to  recognize  her  obligations  as  a 
member  of  the  family  of  nations  and  closed  her 
ports  to  all  intercourse  with  the  outside  world. 
American  sailors  who  had  been  shipwrecked 
on  the  coast  of  Japan  had  failed  to  receive  the 
treatment  usually  accorded  by  civilized  nations. 
Finally  the  United  States  decided  to  send  a 
naval  force  to  Japan  and  to  force  that  country 
to  abandon  her  policy  of  exclusion  and  to  open 
her  ports  to  intercourse  with  other  countries. 
Japan  yielded  only  under  the  threat  of  superior 

83 


84  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

force.  The  conduct  of  the  expedition,  as  well 
as  our  subsequent  diplomatic  negotiations  with 
Japan,  was  highly  creditable  to  the  United 
States,  and  the  Japanese  people  later  erected  a 
monument  to  the  memory  of  Perry  on  the  spot 
where  he  first  landed. 

The  acquisition  of  the  Philippine  Islands 
tended  to  bring  us  more  fully  into  the  current  of 
world  politics,  but  it  did  not  necessarily  disturb 
the  balancing  of  European  and  American 
spheres  as  set  up  by  President  Monroe.  Vari- 
ous explanations  have  been  given  of  President 
McKinley*s  decision  to  retain  the  Philippine 
group,  but  the  whole  truth  has  in  all  probability 
not  yet  been  fully  revealed.  The  partition  of 
China  through  the  establishment  of  European 
spheres  of  influence  was  well  under  way  when 
the  Philippine  Islands  came  within  our  grasp. 
American  commerce  with  China  was  at  this 
time  second  to  that  of  England  alone,  and  the 
concessions  which  were  being  wrung  from 
China  by  the  European  powers  in  such  rapid 
succession  presented  a  bad  outlook  for  us. 
The  United  States  could  not  follow  the  example 
of  the  powers  of  Europe,  for  the  seizure  of  a 
sphere  of  influence  in  China  would  not  have  been 
supported  by  the  Senate  or  upheld  by  public 
opinion.     It  is  probable  that  President  McKin- 


The  Open-Door  Policy  85 

ley  thought  that  the  Philippine  Islands  would 
not  only  provide  a  market  for  American  goods, 
which  owing  to  the  Dingley  tariff  were  begin- 
ning to  face  retaliatory  legislation  abroad,  but 
that  they  would  provide  a  naval  base  which 
would  be  of  great  assistance  in  upholding  our 
interests  in  China. 

Talcott  Williams  made  public  some  years  later 
another  explanation  of  President  McKinley's 
decision  which  is  interesting  and  appears  to  be 
well  vouched  for.  He  was  informed  by  a  mem- 
ber of  McKinley's  cabinet  that  while  the  Presi- 
dent's mind  was  not  yet  made  up  on  the  ques- 
tion, a  personal  communication  was  received 
from  Lord  Salisbury  who  warned  the  President 
that  Germany  was  preparing  to  take  over  the 
PhiUppine  Islands  in  case  the  United  States 
should  withdraw;  that  such  a  step  would  prob- 
ably precipitate  a  world  war  and  that  in  the 
interests  of  peace  and  harmony  it  would  be  best 
for  the  United  States  to  retain  the  entire  group. 

The  famous  open-door  policy  was  outlined 
by  Secretary  Hay  in  notes  dated  September  6, 
1899,  addressed  to  Great  Britain,  Germany,  and 
Russia.  Each  of  these  powers  was  requested  to 
give  assurance  and  to  make  a  declaration  to  the 
following  effect:  (i)  that  it  would  not  interfere 
with  any  treaty  port  or  vested  interests  in  its  so- 


86  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

called  sphere  of  influence;  (2)  that  it  would  per- 
mit the  Chinese  tariflF  to  continue  in  force*in 
such  sphere  and  to  be  collected  by  Chinese 
cflnicials;  (3)  that  it  would  not  discriminate 
against  other  foreigners  in  the  matter  of  port 
dues  or  railroad  rates.  Similar  notes  were  later 
addressed  to  France,  Italy,  and  Japan.  Eng- 
land alone  expressed  her  willingness  to  sign 
such  a  declaration.  The  other  powers,  while 
professing  thorough  accord  with  the  principles 
set  forth  by  Mr.  Hay,  avoided  committing  them- 
selves to  a  formal  declaration  and  no  such  decla- 
ration was  ever  made.  Mr.'Hay  made  a  skill- 
ful move,  however,  to  clinch  matters  by  in- 
forming each  of  the  powers  to  whom  the  note 
had  been  addressed  that  in  view  of  the  favor- 
able replies  from  the  other  powers,  its  acceptance 
of  the  proposals  of  the  United  States  was  con- 
sidered "as  final  and  definitive." 

Americans  generally  are  under  the  impres- 
sion that  John  Hay  originated  the  open-door 
policy  and  that  it  was  successfully  upheld 
by  the  United  States.  Neither  of  these  im- 
pressions is  correct.  A  few  months  before 
John  Hay  formulated  his  famous  note  Lord 
Charles  Beresford  came  through  America  on 
his  return  from  China  and  addressed  the  lead- 
ing chambers  of  commerce  from  San  Francisco 


The  Open-Door  Policy  87 

to  New  York,  telling  Americans  what  was  actu- 
ally taking  place  in  China  and  urging  this  coun« 
try  to  unite  with  England  and  Japan  in  an  ef- 
fort to  maintain  the  open  door.  Like  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  the  open-door  policy  was  thus 
Anglo-American  in  origin.  There  is  little  doubt 
that  England  and  Japan  were  willing  to  form  an 
alliance  with  the  United  States  for  the  purpose 
of  maintaining  the  open  door  in  China,  but  our 
traditional  policy  of  isolation  prevented  our 
committing  ourselves  to  the  employment  of 
force.  President  McKinley,  following  the  ex- 
ample of  President  Monroe,  preferred  an- 
nouncing our  policy  independently  and  re- 
questing the  other  powers  to  consent  to  it. 
Had  John  Hay  been  able  to  carry  out  the  plan 
which  he  favored  of  an  alliance  with  England 
and  Japan,  the  mere  announcement  of  the  fact 
would  have  been  sufficient  to  check  the  aggres- 
sions of  the  powers  in  China.  Instead  of  such 
an  alliance,  however,  we  let  it  be  known  that 
while  we  favored  the  open  door  we  would  not 
fight  for  it  under  any  conditions. 

The  utter  worthlessness  of  the  replies  that 
were  made  in  response  to  Hay's  note  of  Septem- 
ber 6,  1899,  became  fully  apparent  in  the 
discussions  that  soon  arose  as  to  the  status 
of  consuls  in  the  various  spheres  of  influence. 


88  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

Japan  claimed  that  sovereignty  did  not  pass 
vrith  a  lease  and  that  even  if  China  should  sur- 
render jurisdiction  over  her^  own  people,  the 
lessee  governments  could  not  acquire  jurisdic- 
tion over  foreigners  in  leased  territory.  This 
position  was  undoubtedly  correct  if  the  terri- 
torial integrity  of  China  was  really  to  be  pre- 
served, but  after  negotiations  with  Russia  and 
the  other  powers  concerned  Mr.  Hay  wrote  to 
Minister  Conger  on  February  3,  1900,  that 
"The  United  States  consuls  in  districts  adja- 
cent to  the  foreign  leased  territories  are  to  be 
instructed  that  they  have  n®  authority  to 
exercise  extra-territorial  consular  jurisdiction 
or  to  perform  ordinary  non-judicial  consular 
acts  within  the  leased  territory  under  their 
present  Chinese  exequaturs."  Application  was 
then  made  to  the  European  powers  for  the  ad- 
mission of  American  consuls  in  the  leased  ter- 
ritories for  the  performance  of  the  ordinary 
consular  functions,  but  in  no  case  were  they  to 
exercise  extra-territorial  jurisdiction  within  a 
leased  territory. 

The  exploitation  of  China  which  continued 
at  a  rapid  rate  naturally  aroused  an  intense 
anti-foreign  sentiment   and  led  to  the   Boxer 
v       uprising.     Events  moved  with  startling  rapid- 
ity and  United  States  troops  took  a  prominent 


/ 


The  Open-Door  Policy  89 

part  with  those  of  England,  France,  Russia,  and 
Japan  in  the  march  to  Peking  for  the  relief  of 
the  legations.  In  a  note  to  the  powers  July  3, 
1900,  Secretary  Hay,  in  defining  the  attitude 
of  the  United  States  on  tke  Chinese  question, 
said:  "The  policy  of  the  government  of  the 
United  States  is  to  seek  a  solution  which  may 
bring  about  permanent  safety  and  peace  to 
China,  preserve  Chinese  territorial  and  admin- 
istrative entity-  protect  all  rights  guaranteed 
to  friendly  powers  by  treaty  and  Internationa!* 
law,  and  safeguard  for  the  world  the  principle 
^f  equal  and  impartial  trade  with  all  parts  of 
che  Chinese  empire."  Mr.  Hay's  notes  were 
skillfully  worded  and  had  some  influence  in 
helping  to  formulate  public  opinion  on  the 
Chinese  question  both  in  this  country  and 
abroad,  but  we  know  now  from  his  private 
letters  which  have  recently  been  made  public 
that  he  realized  only  too  fully  the  utter  futility 
of  his  efforts  to  stay  the  course  of  events.  Dur- 
ing the  exciting  days  of  June,  1900,  when  the 
foreign  legations  at  Peking  were  in  a  state. of 
siege,  Mr.  Hay  wrote  to  John  W.  Foster  as 
follows : 

"What  can  be  done  in  the  present  diseased 
state  of  the  public  mind  ?  There  is  such  a  mad- 
dog  hatred  of  England  prevalent  among  news- 


90  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

papers  and  politicians  that  anything  we  should 
now  do  in  China  to  take  care  of  our  imperiled 
interests  would  be  set  down  to  'subservience 
to  Great  Britain*.  .  .  .  Every  Senator  I 
see  says,  *For  God's  sake,  don't  let  it  appear 
we  have  any  understanding  with  England.' 
How  can  I  make  bricks  without  straw?  That 
we  should  be  compelled  to  refuse  the  assistance  of 
the  greatest  power  in  the  world,  in  carrying  out 
our  own  policy,  because  all  Irishmen  are  Demo- 
crats and  some  Germans  are"  fools — is  enough 
to  drive  a  man  mad.  Yet  we  shall  do  what  we 
can." 

A  little  later  (September  20,  1900)  in  confi- 
dential letters  to  Henry  Adams,  he  exclaimed : 

"About  China,  it  is  the  devil's  own  mess. 
We  cannot  possibly  publish  all  the  facts  without 
breaking  off  relations  with  several  Powers. 
We  shall  have  to  do  the  best  we  can,  and  take 
the  consequences,  which  will  be  pretty  serious,  I 
do  not  doubt.  'Give  and  take' — the  axiom  of 
diplomacy  to  the  rest  of  the  world — is  posi- 
tively forbidden  to  us,  by  both  the  Senate  and 
public  opinion.  We  must  take  what  we  can 
and  give  nothing — which  greatly  narrows  our 
possibilities. 

"I  take  it,  you  agree  with  us  that  we  are  to 
limit  as  far  as  possible  our  military  operations 


The  Open-Door  Policy  91 

in  China,  to  withdraw  our  troops  at  the  earliest 
day  consistent  with  our  obHgations,  and  in  the 
final  adjustment  to  do  everything  we  can  for  the 
integrity  and  reform  of  China,  and  to  hold  on 
like  grim  death  to  the  Open  Door.     .     .     ." 

Again,  November  21,  1900: 

"What  a  business  this  has  been  in  China! 
So  far  we  have  got  on  by  being  honest  and  naif. 
.  .  .  At  least  we  are  spared  the  infamy  of 
an  alliance  with  Germany.  I  would  rather,  I 
think,  be  the  dupe  of  China,  than  the  chum  of 
the  Kaiser.  Have  you  noticed  how  the  world 
will  take  anything  nowadays  from  a  German? 
Billow  said  yesterday  in  substance — *We  have 
demanded  of  China  everything  we  can  think  of. 
If  we  think  of  anything  else  we  will  demand 
that,  and  be  d — d  to  you' — and  not  a  man  in 
the  world  kicks." 

During  the  long  negotiations  that  followed 
the  occupation  of  Peking  by  the  powers,  the 
United  States  threw  the  weight  of  its  influence 
on  the  side  of  moderation,  urging  the  powers  not 
to  impose  too  many  burdens  on  China  and 
declaring  that  the  only  hope  for  the  future  lay 
in  a  strong,  independent,  responsible  Chinese 
government.  Contrary  to  the  terms  of  the 
final  protocol,  however,  Russia  retained  in 
Manchuria  the  troops  concentrated  there  dur- 


92  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

ing  the  Boxer  movement  with  a  view  to  ex- 
acting further  concessions  from  China.  The 
open-door  poHcy  was  again  ignored.  The  seri- 
ousness of  the  situation  led  England  and  Japan 
to  sign  a  defensive  agreement  January  30, 
1902,  recognizing  England's  interest  in  China 
and  Japan's  interest  in  Korea,  and  providing 
that  if  either  party  should  be  attacked  in  de- 
fense of  its  interest,  the  other  party  would  re- 
main neutral,  unless  a  third  power  joined  in,  in 
which  event  the  second  party  would  come  to  the 
assistance  of  the  first.  A  formal  protest  made 
by  the  United  States,  February  i,  against  some 
of  the  demands  Russia  was  making  on  China 
led  Russia  to  conclude  that  the  American  gov- 
ernment had  an  understanding  with  England 
and  Japan,  but  Mr.  Hay  gave  the  assurance 
that  he  had  known  nothing  about  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  agreement  until  it  was  made  public. 
He  succeeded  in  securing  from  Russia,  however, 
a  definite  promise  to  evacuate  Manchuria,  but 
as  the  time  for  the  withdrawal  of  her  troops  drew 
near,  Russia  again  imposed  new  conditions  on 
China,  and  deliberately  misrepresented  to  the 
United  States  the  character  of  the  new  proposals. 
After  the  suppression  of  the  Boxer  uprising, 
China  had  agreed  to  extend  the  scope  of  her 
<;ommercial  treaties  with  the  powers.     When 


The  Open-Door  Policy  93 

the  negotiation  of  a  new  treaty  with  the  United 
States  was  begun,  our  representative  demanded 
that  at  least  two  new  ports  in  Manchuria  be 
opened  to  foreign  trade  and  residence.  The 
Chinese  commissioners  declined  to  discuss  the 
subject  on  the  alleged  ground  that  they  had 
no  instructions  to  do  so.  It  was  evident  that 
there  was  secret  opposition  somewhere,  and  after 
considerable  difficulty  Mr.  Hay  finally  secured 
evidence  that  it  came  from  Russia.  When  con- 
fronted with  the  evidence  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment finally  admitted  the  facts.  We  were  told 
that  we  could  not  be  admitted  to  one  of  the 
ports  that  we  had  designated  because  it  was 
situated  within  the  Russian  railway  zone,  and 
therefore  not  under  the  complete  jurisdiction  of 
China,  but  that  another  port  would  be  substi- 
tuted for  it.  Secretary  Hay  and  President  Roose- 
velt were  helpless.  They  accepted  what  they 
could  get  and  kept  quiet.  "The  administra- 
tive entity"  of  China  was  again  utterly  ignored. 
The  difficulty  was  that  we  did  not  have  a  strong 
enough  navy  in  the  Pacific  to  fight  Russia 
alone,  and  President  Roosevelt  and  Secretary 
Hay  realized  that  neither  the  Senate  nor  public 
opinion  would  consent  to  an  alliance  with 
England  and  Japan.  Had  these  three  powers 
made  a  joint  declaration  in  support  of  the  open- 


94  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

door  policy,  the  exploitation  of  China  would 
have  ceased,  there  would  have  been  no  Russo- 
Japanese  war,  and  the  course  of  world  history 
during  the  period  that  has  since  intervened 
might  have  been  very  different. 

When  we  backed  down  and  abandoned  Man- 
churia to  Russian  exploitation  Japan  stepped 
into  the  breach.  After  long  negotiations  the 
Japanese  Government  finally  delivered  an  ulti- 
matum to  Russia  which  resulted  in  the  rupture 
of  diplomatic  relations  and  war.  After  a  series 
of  notable  victories  on  land  and  sea  Japan  was 
fast  approaching  the  end  of  her  resources,  and 
it  is  now  an  open  secret  that  the  Emperor  wrote 
a  personal  letter  to  President  Roosevelt  re- 
questing him  to  intervene  diplomatically  and 
pave  the  way  for  peace.  The  President  was 
quick  to  act  on  the  suggestion  and  the  commis- 
sioners of  Russia  and  Japan  met  at  Portsmouth, 
New  Hampshire.  Here  President  Roosevelt's 
intervention  should  have  ceased.  The  terms 
of  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth  were  a  bitter 
disappointment  to  the  Japanese  people  and  the 
Japanese  commissioners  undertook  to  shift  the 
burden  from  their  shoulders  by  stating  that 
President  Roosevelt  had  urged  them  to  sur- 
render their  claim  to  the  Island  of  Saghalien 
and  to  give  up  all  idea  of  an  indemnity.    Japa- 


The  Open-Door  Policy  95 

nese  military  triumph  had  again,  as  at  the  close 
of  the  Chino-Japanese  War,  been  followed  by  di- 
plomatic defeat,  and  for  this  defeat  Japanese 
public  opinion  held  President  Roosevelt  respon- 
sible. From  the  days  of  Commodore  Perry  and 
Townsend  Harris  to  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth, 
relations  between  the  United  States  and  Japan 
had  been  almost  ideal.  Since  the  negotiations 
at  Portsmouth  there  has  been  a  considerable 
amount  of  bad  feeling,  and  at  times  diplomatic 
relations  have  been  subjected  to  a  severe  strain. 
Having  fought  a  costly  war  in  order  to 
check  the  Russian  advance  in  Manchuria,  the 
Japanese  naturally  felt  that  they  had  a  para- 
mount interest  in  China.  They  consequently 
sharply  resented  the  attempts  which  the  United 
States  subsequently  made,  particularly  Secre- 
tary Knox's  proposal  for  the  neutralization  of 
the  railways  of  Manchuria,  to  formulate  policies 
for  China.  They  took  the  position  that  we 
had  had  our  day  and  that  we  must  henceforth 
remain  hands  off  so  far  as  China  was  concerned. 
This  attitude  of  mind  was  not  unnatural  and 
during  the  World  War  the  United  States,  in 
order  to  bind  the  Japanese  government  more 
closely  to  the  Allied  Cause,  agreed  to  recognize, 
in  the  Lansing-Ishii  agreement,  the  "special  in- 
terests" of  Japan  in  China. 


VI 
ANGLO-AMERICAN  RELATIONS 


VI 

ANGLO-AMERICAN  RELATIONS 

A  FEW  years  ago  George  L.  Beer,  one  of  oi^r 
leading  students  of  British  colonial  policy,  said. 
**  It  is  easily  conceivable,  and  not  at  all  improb- 
able, that  the  political  evolution  of  the  next 
centuries  may  take  such  a  course  that  the 
American  Revolution  will  lose  the  great  sig- 
nificance that  is  now  attached  to  it,  and  will 
appear  merely  as  the  temporary  separation  of 
two  kindred  peoples  whose  inherent  similarity 
was  obscured  by  superficial  differences  result- 
ing from  dissimilar  economic  and  social  condi- 
tions." This  statement  does  not  appear  as 
extravagant  to-day  as  it  did  ten  years  ago.  As 
early  as  1894,  Captain  Mahan,  the  great  author- 
ity on  naval  history,  published  an  essay  entitled 
"Possibilities  of  an  Anglo-American  Reunion," 
in  which  he  pointed  out  that  these  two  countries 
were  the  only  great  powers  which  were  by  geo- 
graphical position  exempt  from  the  burden  of 
large  armies  and  dependent  upon  the  sea  for 
intercourse  with  the  other  great  nations. 

90 


100  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

In  a  volume  dealing  with  questions  of  Ameri- 
can foreign  policy,  published  in  1907,  the  pres- 
ent writer  concluded  the  last  paragraph  with 
this  statement :  *'  By  no  means  the  least  signifi- 
cant of  recent  changes  is  the  development  of 
cordial  relations  with  England;  and  it  seems 
now  that  the  course  of  world  politics  is  destined 
to  lead  to  the  further  reknitting  together  of  the 
two  great  branches  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  in 
bonds  of  peace  and  international  sympathy,  in  a 
union  not  cemented  by  any  formal  alliance,  but 
based  on  community  j)fjnterests  and  of  aims, 
a  union  that  will  constitute  the  highest  guar- 
antee of  the  political  stability  and  moral  progress 
of  the  world.** 

The  United  States  has  very  naturally  had 
closer  contact  with  England  than  with  any 
other  European  power.  This  has  been  due  to 
the  fact  that  England  was  the  mother  country, 
that  after  independence  was  established  a  large 
part  of  our  trade  continued  to  be  with  the 
British  Isles,  that  our  northern  boundary 
touches  British  territory  for  nearly  four  thou- 
sand miles,  and  that  the  British  navy  and 
mercantile  marine  have  dominated  the  Atlantic 
Ocean  which  has  been  our  chief  highway  of 
intercourse  with  other  nations.  Having  had 
more  points  of  contact  we  have  had  more  dis- 


Anglo-American  Relarions  loi 

putes  with  England  than  with  any  other  nation. 
Some  writers  have  half  jocularly  attributed 
this  latter  fact  to  our  common  language.  The 
Englishman  reads  our  books,  papers,  and 
magazines,  and  knows  what  we  think  of  him, 
while  we  read  what  he  writes  about  us,  and  in 
neither  case  is  the  resulting  impression  flatter- 
ing to  the  national  pride. 

Any  one  who  takes  the  trouble  to  read  what 
was  written  in  England  about  America  and  the 
Americans  between  1820  and  1850  will  wonder 
how  war  was  avoided.  A  large  number  of 
English  travellers  came  to  the  United  States 
during  this  period  and  published  books  about 
us  when  they  got  home.  The  books  were 
bad  enough  in  themselves,  but  the  great  Eng- 
lish periodicals,  the  Edinburgh  Review,  Black' 
wood's,  the  British  Review,  and  the  Quarterly, 
quoted  at  length  the  most  objectionable  pas- 
sages from  these  writers  and  made  malicious 
attacks  on  Americans  and  American  institu- 
tions. American  men  were  described  as  "tur- 
bulent citizens,  abandone^L  Christians,  incon- 
stant husbands,  unnatural  fathers,  and  treach- 
erous friends."  Our  soldiers  and  sailors  were 
charged  with  cowardice  in  the  War  of  181 2. 
It  was  stated  that  "in  the  southern  parts  of  the 
Union  the  rites  of  our  holy  faith  are  almost 


I02  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

never  practised.  .  ;  .  Three  and  a  half 
millions  enjoy  no  means  of  religious  instruction. 
The  religious  principle  is  gaining  ground  in  the 
northern  parts  of  the  Union;  it  is  becoming 
fashionable  among  the  better  orders  of  society 
to  go  to  church  .  .  .  The  greater  number 
of  states  declare  it  to  be  unconstitutional  to 
refer  to  the  providence  of  God  in  any  of  their 
public  acts/'  The  Quarterly  Review  informed 
its  readers  that  "the  supreme  felicity  of  a  true- 
born  American  is  inaction  of  body  and  inanity 
of  mind."  Dickens's  American  Notes  was  an 
ungrateful  return  for  the  kindness  and  enthusi- 
asm with  which  he  had  been  received  in  this 
country.  De  Tocqueville's  Democracy  in  Amer- 
ica was  widely  read  in  England  and  doubtless 
had  its  influence  in  revising  opinion  concerning 
America.  Richard  Cobden  was,  however,  the 
first  Englishman  to  interpret  correctly  the 
significance  of  America  as  an  economic  force. 
His  essay  on  America,  published  in  1835, 
pointed  out  that  British  policy  should  be  more 
concerned  with  economic  relations  with  Amer- 
ica than  with  European  politics.  As  Professor 
Dunning  says,  "Cobden  made  the  United  States 
the  text  of  his  earliest  sermon  against  mihtarism 
and  protectionism." 

Notwithstanding  innumerable  disputes  over 


Anglo-American  Relations  103 

boundaries,  fisheries,  and  fur  seals,  trade  with 
the  British  West  Indies  an^  Canada,  and  ques- 
tions of  neutral  rights  and  obligations,  we 
have  had  unbroken  peace  for  more  than  a  hun- 
dred years.  Upon  several  occasions,  notably 
during  the  Canadian  insurrection  of  1837  and 
during  our  own  Civil  War,  disturbances  along 
the  Canadian  border  created  strained  relations, 
but  absence  of  frontier  guards  and  forts  has 
prevented  hasty  action  on  the  part  of  either 
government.  The  agreement  of  1 8 17,  effecting 
disarmament  on  the  Great  Lakes,  has  not  only 
saved  both  countries  the  enormous  cost  of 
maintaining  navies  on  these  inland  waters, 
but  it  has  prevented  hostile  demonstrations  in 
times  of  crisis. 

During  the  Canadian  rebellion  of  1837  Ameri- 
cans along  the  border  expressed  openly  their 
sympathy  for  the  insurgents  who  secured  arms 
and  munitions  from  the  American  side.  In 
December  a  British  force  crossed  the  Niagara 
River,  boarded  and  took  possession  of  the  Caro- 
line, a  vessel  which  had  been  hired  by  the 
insurgents  to  convey  their  cafnnon  and  other  sup- 
plies. The  ship  was  fired  and  sent  over  the 
Falls.  When  the  Caroline  was  boarded  one 
American,  Amos  Durfee,  was  killed  and  several 
others  wounded.     The  United  States  at  once 


I04  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

demanded  redress,  but  the  British  Government 
took  the  position  that  the  seizure  of  the  Caro- 
line was  a  justifiable  act  of  self-defense  against 
people  whom  their  own  government  either 
could  not  or  would  n®t  control. 

The  demands  of  the  United  States  were  still 
unredressed  when  in  1840  a  Canadian  named 
Alexander  McLeod  made  the  boast  in  a  tavern 
on  the  American  side  that  he  had  slain  Durfee. 
He  was  taken  at  his  word,  examined  before  a 
magistrate,  and  committed  to  jail  in  Lockport. 
McLeod 's  arrest  created  great  excitement  on 
both  sides  of  the  border.  The  British  minister 
at  Washington  called  upon  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  "to  take  prompt  and  effectual 
steps  for  the  liberation  of  Mr.  McLeod." 
Secretary  of  State  Forsyth  replied  that  the  of-^ 
fense  with  which  McLeod  was  charged  had 
been  committed  within  the  State  of  New  York; 
that  the  jurisdiction  of  each  State  of  the  United 
States  was,  within  its  proper  sphere,  perfectly 
independent  of  the  Federal  Government;  that 
the  latter  could  not  interfere.  The  date  set  for 
the  trial  of  McLeod  was  the  fourth  Monday  in 
March,  1841.  Van  Buren's  term  ended  and 
Harrison's  began  on  the  4th  of  March,  and 
Webster  became  Secretary  of  ,State.  The 
British  minister  was  given  instructions  bv  his 


Anglo-American  Relations  105 

government  to  demand  the  immediate  release 
of  McLeod.  This  demand  was  made,  he  said, 
because  the  attack  on  the  Caroline  was  an  act 
of  a  pubHc  character;  because  it  was  a  justifiable 
use  of  force  for  the  defense  of  British  territory 
against  unprovoked  attack  by  "British  rebels 
and  American  pirates";  because  it  was  contrary 
to  the  principles  of  civilized  nations  to  hold 
individuals  responsible  for  acts  done  by  order  of 
the  constituted  authorities  of  the  State;  and  be- 
cause Her  Majesty's  government  could  not  ad- 
mit the  doctrine  that  the  Federal  Government 
had  no  power  to  interfere  and  that  the  decision 
must  rest  with  the  State  of  New  York.  The 
relations  of  foreign  powers  were  with  the  Fed- 
eral Government.  To  admit  that  the  Federal 
Government  had  no  control  over  a  State  would 
lead  to  the  dissolution  of  the  Union  so  far  as 
foreign  powers  were  concerned,  and  to  the 
accrediting  of  foreign  diplomatic  agents,  not  to 
the  Federal  Government,  but  to  each  separate 
State.  Webster  received  the  note  quietly  and 
sent  the  attorney-general  to  Lockport  to  see  that 
McLeod  had  competent  counsel.  After  con- 
siderable delay,  during  which  Webster  replied 
to  the  main  arguments  of  the  British  note, 
McLeod  was  acquitted  and  released. 

In  the  midst  of  the  dispute  over  the  case  of  the 


lo6  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

Caroline  serious  trouble  arose  between  the 
authorities  of  Maine  and  New^jBxiinswick  over 
the  undetermmen)oundary  between  the  St. 
Croix^River  and  the  K[ighlands,  and  there  en- 
dued the  so-called  "Aroostook  War."  During 
the  summer  of  1838  British  and  American  lum- 
bermen began  operating  along  the  Aroostook 
River  in  large  numbers.  The  governor  of 
Maine  sent  a  body  of  militia  to  enforce  the  au- 
thority of  that  State,  and  the  New  Brunswick 
authorities  procured  a  detachment  of  British 
regulars  to  back  up  their  position.  Bloodshed 
was  averted  by  the  arrival  of  General  Winfield 
Scott,  who  managed  to  restrain  the  Maine 
authorities.  The  administration  found  it  neces- 
sary to  take  up  seriously  the  settlement  of  the 
boundary  question,  and  for  the  next  three  years 
the  matter  was  under  consideration,  while  each 
side  had  surveyors  employed  in  a  vain  attempt 
to  locate  a  line  which  would  correspond  to  the 
line  of  the  treaty.  As  soon  as  the  McLeod 
affair  was  settled,  Webster  devoted  himself 
earnestly  to  the  boundary  question.  He  de- 
cided to  drop  the  mass  of  data  accumulated  by 
the  surveyors  and  historians,  and  to  reach  an 
agreement  by  direct  negotiation. 

In  April,  1842,  Alexander  Baring,  Lord  Ash- 
burton,  arrived  in  Washington  and  the  follow- 


Anglo-American  Relations  107 

ing  August  the  Webster-Ashburton  treaty  was 
signed.  The  boundary  fixed  by  the  treaty  gave 
Maine  a  little  more  than  half  the  area  which 
she  claimed  and  the  United  States  appropriated 
$150,000  to  compensate  Maine  for  the  territory 
which  she  had  lost. 

The  settlement  of  these  matters  did  not,  how- 
ever, insure  peace  with  England.  Settlers 
were  crowding  into  Oregon  and  it  was  evident 
that  the  joint  occupation,  established  by  the 
convention  of  18 18,  would  soon  have  to  be  ter^ 
minated  and  a  divisional  line  agreed  upon. 
Great  Britain  insisted  that  her  southern  bound- 
ary should  extend  at  least  as  far  as  the  Columbia 
River,  while  Americans  finally  claimed  the 
whole  of  the  disputed  area,  and  one  of  the  slo- 
gans of  the  presidential  campaign  of  1844  was 
"Fifty-Four-Forty  or  Fight."  At  the  same 
time  Great  Britain  actively  opposed  the  an- 
nexation of  Texas  by  the  United  States.  Her 
main  reason  for  this  course  was  that  she  wished 
to  encourage  the  development  of  Texas  as  a 
cotton-growing  country  from  which  she  could 
draw  a  large  enough  supply  to  make  her  in- 
dependent of  the  United  States.  If  Texas 
should  thus  devote  herself  to  the  production 
of  cotton  as  her  chief  export  crop,  she  would, 
of  course,  adopt  a  free-trade  policy  and  thus 


io8  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

create  a  considerable  market  for  British 
goods. 

As  soon  as  it  became  evident  that  Tyler  con- 
templated taking  definite  steps  toward  annexa- 
tion, Lord  Aberdeen  secured  the  cooperation  of 
the  government  of  Louis  Philippe  in  opposing 
the  absorption  of  Texas  by  the  American  repub- 
lic. While  the  treaty  for  the  annexation  of 
Texas  was  before  the  Senate,  Lord  Aberdeen 
came  forward  with  a  proposition  that  England 
and  France  should  unite  with  Texas  and  Mexico 
in  a  diplomatic  act  or  perpetual  treaty,  securing 
to  Texas  recognition  as  an  independent  republic, 
but  preventing  her  from  ever  acquiring  territory 
beyond  the  Rio  Grande  or  joining  the  American 
union.  While  the  United  States  would  be  in- 
vited to  join  in  this  act,  it  was  not  expected  that 
the  government  of  that  country  would  agree  to 
it.  Mexico  obstinately  refused  to  recognize  the 
independence  of  Texas.  Lord  Aberdeen  was 
30  anxious  to  prevent  the  annexation  of  Texas 
that  he  was  ready,  if  supported  by  France,  to 
coerce  Mexico  and  fight  the  United  States,  but 
the  French  Government  was  not  willing  to  go 
this  far,  so  the  scheme  was  abandoned. 

The  two  foremost  issues  in  the  campaign  of 
1844  were  the  annexation  of  Texas  and  the  occu- 
pation of  Oregon.    Texas  was  annexed  by  joint 


Anglo-American  Relations  109 

resolution  a  few  days  before  the  inauguration 
of  Polk.  This  act,  it  was  foreseen,  would  prob- 
ably provoke  a  war  with  Mexico,  so  Polk's  first 
task  was  to  adjust  the  Oregon  dispute  in  order 
to  avoid  complications  with  England.  The 
fate  of  California  was  also  involved.  That 
province  was  not  likely  to  remain  long  in  the 
hands  of  a  weak  power  like  Mexico.  In  fact, 
British  consular  agents  and  naval  officers  had 
for  several  years  been  urging  upon  their  govern- 
ment the  great  value  of  Upper  California. 
Aberdeen  refused  to  countenance  any  insur- 
rectionary movement  in  California,  but  he 
directed  his  agents  to  keep  vigilant  watch  on  the 
proceedings  of  citizens  of  the  United  States  in 
that  province.  Had  England  and  Mexico 
arrived  at  an  understanding  and  joined  in  a  war 
against  the  United  States,  the  probabilities  are 
that  England  would  have  acquired  not  only  the 
whole  of  Oregon,  but  California  besides.  In 
fact,  in  May,  1846,  just  as  we  were  on  the  point 
of  going  to  war  with  Mexico,  the  president  of 
Mexico  officially  proposed  to  transfer  California 
to  England  as  security  for  a  loan.  Fortunately, 
the  Oregon  question  had  been  adjusted  and 
England  had  no  reason  for  wishing  to  go  to  war 
with  the  United  States.  Mexico's  offer  was 
therefore  rejected.     Polk  managed  the  diplo- 


no  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

matic  situation  with  admirable  promptness  and 
firmness.  Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the 
democratic  platform  had  demanded  "Fifty- 
Four-Forty  or  Fight,"  as  soon  as  Polk  became 
President  he  offered  to  compromise  with  Eng- 
land on  the  49th  parallel.  When  this  offer  was 
declined  he  asked  permission  of  Congress  to  give 
England  the  necessary  notice  for  the  termina- 
tion of  the  joint  occupation  agreement,  to  pro- 
vide for  the  military  defense  of  the  territory 
in  dispute,  and  to  extend  over  it  the  laws  of  the 
United  States.  A  few  months  later  notice  was 
given  to  England,  but  at  the  same  time  the  hope 
was  expressed  that  the  matter  might  be  adjusted 
diplomatically.  As  soon  as  it  was  evident  that 
the  United  States  was  in  earnest,  England 
gracefully  yielded  and  accepted  the  terms  which 
had  been  first  proposed. 

As  war  with  Mexico  was  imminent  the  public 
generally  approved  of  the  Oregon  compromise, 
though  the  criticism  was  made  by  some  in  the 
North  that  the  South,  having  secured  in  Texas 
a  large  addition  to  slave  territory,  was  indifferent 
about  the  expansion  of  free  territory.  In  fact, 
Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  in  his  recent  little  book,  "One 
Hundred  Years  of  Peace,"  says:  "The  loss  of 
the  region  between  the  forty-ninth  parallel  and 
the  line  of  54-40  was  one  of  the  most  severe 


Anglo-American  Relations  iir 

which  ever  befell  the  United  States.  Whether 
it  could  have  been  obtained  without  a  war  is 
probably  doubtful,  but  it  never  ought  to  have 
been  said,  officially  or  otherwise,  that  we  would 
fight  for  54-40  unless  we  were  fully  prepared  to 
do  so.  If  we  had  stood  firm  for  the  line  of  54-40 
without  threats,  it  is  quite  possible  that  we 
might  have  succeeded  in  the  end;  but  the  hy- 
potheses of  history  are  of  little  practical  value, 
and  the  fact  remains  that  by  the  treaty  of 
1846  we  lost  a  complete  control  of  the  Pacific 
coast." 

That  the  United  States  lived  through  what 
Professor  Dunning  calls  "the  roaring  forties" 
without  a  war  with  England  seems  now  little 
less  than  a  miracle.  During  the  next  fifteen 
years  relations  were  much  more  amicable, 
though  by  no  means  free  from  disputes.  The 
most  important  diplomatic  act  was  the  signa- 
ture in  1850  of  the  Claytpn-Bulwer  treaty 
which  conceded  to  England  a  joint  interest  in 
any^canal  that  might  be  built  through  the  isth- 
mus connecting  North  and  South  America^ 
One  of  the  interesting  episodes  of  this  period  was 
the  dismissal  of  Crampton,  the  British  minister, 
who  insisted  on  enlisting  men  in  the  United 
States  for  service  in  the  Crimean  War,  an  act 
which  pales  into  insignificance  in  comparison 


112  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

with  some  of  the  things  which  BernstorfF  did 
during  the  early  stages  of  the  Great  War. 

Relations  between  the  United  States  and 
England  during  the  American  Civil  War  in- 
volved so  many  highly  technical  questions  that 
it  is  impossible  to  do  more  than  touch  upon 
them  in  the  present  connection.  Diplomatic 
discussions  centred  about  such  questions  as 
the  vaHdity  of  the,  blockade  established  by 
President  Lincoln,  the  recognition  by  England 
of  Confederate  belligerency,  the  Trent  affair, 
and  the  responsibiHty  of  England  for  the  depre- 
dations committed  by  the  Alabama  and  other 
Confederate  cruisers.  When  the  United  States 
first  demanded  reparation  for  the  damage  in- 
flicted on  American  commerce  by  the  Confed- 
erate cruisers,  the  British  Government  dis- 
claimed all  liability  on  the  ground  that  the 
fitting  out  of  the  cruisers  had  not  been  com- 
pleted within  British  jurisdiction.  Even  after 
the  close  of  the  war  the  British  Government 
continued  to  reject  all  proposals  for  a  settle- 
ment. The  American  nation,  flushed  with  vic- 
tory, was  bent  on  redress,  and  so  deep-seated 
was  the  resentment  against  England,  that  the 
Fenian  movement,  which  had  for  its  object 
the  establishment  of  an  independent  republic 
in  Ireland,  met  with  open  encouragement  in  this 


Anglo-American  Relations  113 

country.  The  House  of  Representatives  went 
so  far  as  to  repeal  the  law  forbidding  Americans 
to  fit  out  ships  for  belligerents,  but  the  Senate 
failed  to  concur.  The  successful  war  waged  by 
Prussia  against  Austria  in  1866  disturbed  the 
European  balance,  and  rumblings  of  the  ap- 
proaching Franco-Prussian  war  caused  uneasi- 
ness in  British  cabinet  circles.  Fearing  that  if 
Great  Britain  were  drawa  into  the  conflict  the 
American  people  might  take  a  sweet  revenge  by 
fitting  out  "Alabamas"  for  her  enemies,  the 
British  Government  assumed  a  more  concilia- 
tory attitude,  and  in  January,  1869,  Lord  Clar- 
endon signed  with  Reverdy  Johnson  a  conven- 
tion providing  for  the  submission  to  a  mixed 
commission  of  all  claims  which  had  arisen  since 
1853.  Though  the  convention  included,  it  did 
not  specifically  mention,  the  Alabama  Claims, 
and  it  failed  to  contain  any  expression  of  regret 
for  the  course  pursued  by  the  British  Govern- 
ment during  the  war.  The  Senate,  therefore, 
refused  by  an  almost  unanimous  vote  to  ratify 
the  arrangement. 

When  Grant  became  President,  Hamilton 
Fish  renewed  the  negotiations  through  Motley, 
the  American  minister  at  London,  but  the  latter 
was  unduly  influenced  by  the  extreme  views 
of  Sumner,  chairman  of  the  Senate  committee 


114  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

on  foreign  relations,  to  whose  influence  he 
owed  his  appointment,  and  got  things  in  a  bad 
tangle.  Fish  then  transferred  the  negotiations 
to  Washington,  where  a  joint  high  commission, 
appointed  to  settle  the  various  disputes  with 
Canada,  convened  in  1871.  A  few  months 
later  the  treaty  of  Washington  was  signed. 
Among  other  things  it  provided  for  submitting 
the  Alabama  Claims  to  an  arbitration  tri- 
bunal composed  of  five  members,  one  appointed 
by  England,  one  by  the  United  States,  and  the 
other  three  by  the  rulers  of  Italy,  Switzerland, 
and  Brazil.  When  this  tribunal  met  at  Geneva, 
the  following  year,  the  United  States,  greatly 
to  the  surprise  of  everybody,  presented  not 
only  the  direct  claims  for  the  damage  inflicted 
by  the  Confederate  cruisers,  but  also  indirect 
claims  for  the  loss  sustained  through  the  transfer 
of  American  shipping  to  foreign  flags,  for  the 
prolongation  of  the  war,  and  for  increased 
rates  of  insurance.  Great  Britain  threatened 
to  withdraw  from  the  arbitration,  but  Charles 
Francis  Adams,  the  American  member  of  the 
tribunal,  rose  nobly  to  the  occasion  and  decided 
against  the  contention  of  his  own  government. 
The  indirect  claims  were  rejected  by  a  unani- 
mous vote  and  on  the  direct  claims  the  United 
States  was  awarded  the  sum  of  $i5,500,ocx>. 


Anglo-American  Relations  115 

Although  the  British  member  of  the  tribunal 
dissented  from  the  decision  his  government 
promptly  paid  the  award.  This  was  the  most 
important  case  that  had  ever  been  submitted 
to  arbitration  and  its  successful  adjustment 
encouraged  the  hope  that  the  two  great  branches 
of  the  English-speaking  peoples  would  never 
again  have  to  resort  to  war. 

Between  the  settlement  of  the  Alabama 
Claims  and  the  controversy  over  the  Venezue- 
lan boundary,  diplomatic  intercourse  between 
the  two  countries  was  enlivened  by  the  efforts 
of  Blaine  and  Frelinghuysen  to  convince  the 
British  Government  that  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  was  out  of  date  and  therefore  no  longer 
binding,  by  the  assertion  of  American  ownership 
in  the  seal  herds  of  Bering  Sea  and  the  attempt 
to  prevent  Canadians  from  taking  these  animals 
in  the  open  sea,  and  by  the  summary  dismissal 
of  Lord  Sackville-West,  the  third  British  minis- 
ter to  receive  his  passports  from  the  United 
States  without  request. 

President  Cleveland's  bold  assertion  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  in  the  Venezuelan  boundary 
dispute,  while  the  subject  of  much  criticism 
at  the  time  both  at  home  and  abroad,  turned 
out  to  be  a  most  opportune  assertion  of  the 
intention  of  the  United  States  to  protect  the 


Il6  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

American  continents  from  the  sort  of  exploita-> 
tion  to  which  Africa  and  Asia  have  fallen  a 
prey,  and,  strange  to  say,  it  had  a  clarifying 
effect  on  our  relations  with  England,  whose 
attitude  has  since  been  uniformly  friendly. 

The  Venezuelan  affair  was  followed  by  the 
proposal  of  Lord  Salisbury  to  renew  the  nego- 
tiations for  a  permanent  treaty  of  arbitration 
which  had  been  first  entered  into  by  Secretary 
Gresham  and  Sir  Julian  Pauncefote.  In  the 
spring  of  1890  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States  had  adopted  a  resolution  in  favor  of  the 
negotiation  of  arbitration  treaties  with  friendly 
nations,  and  the  British  House  of  Commons  had 
in  July,  1893,  expressed  its  hearty  approval  of  a 
general  arbitration  treaty  between  the  United 
States  and  England.  The  matter  was  then 
taken  up  diplomatically,  as  stated  above,  but 
was  dropped  when  the  Venezuelan  boundary 
dispute  became  acute.  Lord  Salisbury's  pro- 
posal was  favorably  received  by  President 
Cleveland,  and  after  mature  deliberation  the 
draft  of  a  treaty  was  finally  drawn  up  and 
signed  by  Secretary  Olney  and  Sir  Julian 
Pauncefote.  This  treaty  provided  for  the 
submission  of  pecuniary  claims  to  the  familiar 
mixed  commission  with  an  umpire  or  referee 
to  decide  disputed  points.     Controversies  in- 


Anglo-American  Relarions  117 

volving  the  determination  of  territorial  claims 
were  to  be  submitted  to  a  tribunal  composed 
of  six  members,  three  justices  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  or  judges  of  the 
Circuit  Court  to  be  nominated  by  the  president 
of  the  United  States,  and  three  judges  of  the 
British  Supreme  Court  of  Judicature  or  mem- 
bers of  the  Judicial  Committee  of  the  Privy 
Council  to  be  nominated  by  the  British  sovereign, 
and  an  award  made  by  a  majority  of  not  less 
than  five  to  one  was  to  be  final.  In  case  of  an 
award  made  by  less  than  the  prescribed  ma- 
jority, the  award  was  also  to  be  final  unless 
either  power  should  within  three  months  protest 
against  it,  in  which  case  the  award  was  to  be 
of  no  validity.  This  treaty  was  concluded  in 
January,  1897,  and  promptly  submitted  to  the 
Senate.  When  President  Cleveland's  term  ex- 
pired in  March  no  action  had  been  taken. 
President  McKinley  endorsed  the  treaty  in 
his  inaugural  address  and  urged  the  Senate  to 
take  prompt  action,  but  when  the  vote  was 
t^iken.  May  5th,  it  stood  forty-three  for,  and 
twenty-six  against,  the  treaty.  It  thus  lacked 
three  votes  of  the  two  thirds  required  for  rati- 
fication. The  failure  of  this  treaty  was  a 
great  disappointment  to  the  friends  of  inter- 
national   arbitration.    The   opposition   within 


Ii8  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

his  own  party  to  President  Cleveland,  undet 
whose  direction  the  treaty  had  been  negotiated, 
and  the  change  of  administration,  probably 
had  a  good  deal  to  do  with  its  defeat.  Public 
opinion,  especially .  in  the  Northern  States  of 
the  Union,  was  still  hostile  to  England.  Irish 
agitators  could  always  get  a  sympathetic  hear- 
ing in  America,  and  politicians  could  not  resist 
the  temptation  to  play  on  anti-British  preju- 
dices in  order  to  bring  out  the  Irish  vote. 

The  Spanish  War  was  the  turning  point  in 
our  relations  with  England  as  in  many  other 
things.  The  question  as  to  who  were  our  friends 
in  1898  was  much  discussed  at  the  time,  and 
when  revived  by  the  press  upon  the  occasion 
of  the  visit  of  Prince  Henry  of  Prussia  to  the 
United  States  in  February,-  1902,  even  the 
cabinets  of  Europe  could  not  refrain  from 
taking  part  in  the  controversy.  In  order  to 
diminish  the  enthusiasm  over  the  Prince's 
visit  the  British  press  circulated  the  story 
that  Lord  Pauncefote  had  checked  a  movement 
of  the  European  powers  to  prevent  any  inter- 
vention of  the  United  States  in  Cuba;  while 
the  German  papers  asserted  that  Lord  Paunce- 
fote had  taken  the  initiative  in  opposing 
American  intervention.  It  is  certain  that  the 
attitude  of  the  British  Government,  as  well  as 


Anglo-American  Relations  119 

of  the  British  people,  from  the  outbreak  of 
hostilities  to  the  close  of  the  war,  was  friendly. 
As  for  Germany,  while  the  conduct  of  the 
government  was  officially  correct,  public  sen- 
timent expressed  itself  with  great  violence 
against  the  United  States.  The  conduct  of 
the  German  admiral,  Diederichs,  in  Manila 
Bay  has  never  been  satisfactorily  explained. 
Shortly  after  Dewey's  victory  a  German  squad- 
ron, superior  to  the  American  in  strength, 
steamed  into  the  Bay  and  displayed,  according 
to  Dewey,  an  "extraordinary  disregard  of  the 
usual  courtesies  of  naval  intercourse."  Dewey 
finally  sent  his  flag-lieutenant.  Brumby,  to 
inform  the  German  admiral  that  "if  he  wants 
a  fight  he  can  have  it  right  now."  The  German 
admiral  at  once  apologized.  It  is  well  known 
now  that  the  commander  of  the  British  squad- 
ron, which  was  in  a  position  to  bring  its  guns 
to  bear  on  the  Germans,  gave  Dewey  to  under- 
stand that  he  could  rely  on  more  than  moral 
support  from  him  in  case  of  trouble.  In  fact, 
John  Hay  wrote  from  London  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war  that  the  British  navy  was  at  our 
disposal  for  the  asking. 

Great  Britain's  change  of  attitude  toward 
the  United  States  was  so  marked  that  some 
writers  have  naively  concluded  that  a  secret 


I^  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

treaty  of  alliance  between  the  two  countries 
was  made  in  1897.  The  absurdity  of  such  a 
statement  was  pointed  out  by  Senator  Lodge 
several  years  ago.  England's  change  of  attitude 
is  not  difficult  to  understand.  For  a  hundred 
years  , after  the  battle  of  Trafalgar,  England 
had  pursued  the  policy  of  maintaining  a  navy 
large  enough  to  meet  all  comers.  With  the 
rapid  growth  of  other  navies  during  the  closing 
years  of  the  nineteenth  century,  England  real- 
ized that  she  could  no  longer  pursue  this  policy. 
Russia,  Japan,  and  Germany  had  all  adopted 
extensive  naval  programs  when  we  went  to 
war  with  Spain.  Our  acquisition  of  the  Philip- 
pines and  Porto  Rico  and  our  determination  to 
build  an  isthmian  canal  made  a  large  American 
navy  inevitable.  Great  Britain  realized,  there- 
fore, that  she  would  have  to  cast  about  for 
future  allies.  She  therefore  signed  the  Hay- 
Pauncefote  Treaty  with  us  in  1901,  and  a  de- 
fensive alliance  with  Japan  in  1902. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  United  States 
was  bent  on  carrying  out  the  long-deferred  canal 
scheme,  Great  Britain  realized  that  a  further 
insistence  on  her  rights  under  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  Treaty  would  lead  to  friction  and 
possible  conflict.  She  wisely  decided,  therefore, 
tx)  recede  from  the  position  which  she  had  held 


Anglo-American  Relations  121 

for  half  a  century  and  to  give  us  a  free  hand 
in  the  construction  and  control  of  the  canal 
at  whatever  point  we  might  choose  to  build  it. 
While  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  was  limited 
in  terms  to  the  canal  question,  it  was  in  reality 
of  much  wider  significance.  It  amounted,  in 
fact,  to  the  recognition  of  American  naval  su** 
premacy  in  the  West  Indies,  and  since  its  signa- 
ture Great  Britain  has  withdrawn  her  squadron 
from  this  important  strategic  area.  The  su- 
premacy of  the  United  States  in  the  Caribbean 
is  now  firmly  established  and  in  fact  unques- 
tioned. The  American  public  did  not  appre^ 
ciate  at  the  time  the  true  significance  of  the 
Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty,  and  a  few  years  later 
Congress  inserted  in  the  Panama  Tolls  Act  a 
clause  exempting  American  ships  engaged  in 
the  coast-wise  trade  from  the  payment  of  tolls. 
Great  Britain  at  once  protested  against  the 
exemption  clause  as  a  violation  of  the  Hay- 
Pauncefote  Treaty  and  anti-British  sentiment 
at  once  flared  up  in  all  parts  of  the  United 
States.  Most  American  authorities  on  inter- 
national law  and  diplomacy  believed  that 
Great  Britain's  interpretation  of  the  treaty 
was  correct.  Fortunately  President  Wilson 
took  the  same  view,  and  in  spite  of  strong  oppo- 
sition he  persuaded  Congress  to  repeal  the  ex- 


122  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

emption  clause.  This  was  an  act  of  simple 
justice  and  it  removed  the  only  outstanding 
subject  of  dispute  between  the  two  countries. 

The  Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty  was  by  no  means 
the  only  evidence  of  a  change  of  attitude  on 
the  part  of  Great  Britain.  As  we  have  already 
seen,  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  were 
in  close  accord  during  the  Boxer  uprising  in 
China  and  the  subsequent  negotiations.  During 
the  Russo-Japanese  war  public  sentiment  in 
both  England  and  the  United  States  was 
strongly  in  favor  of  Japan.  At  the  Algeciras 
conference  on  Moroccan  affairs  in  1905  the 
United  States,  in  its  effort  to  preserve  the 
European  balance  of  power,  threw  the  weight  of 
its  influence  on  the  side  of  England  and  France. 

The  submission  of  the  Alaskan  boundary  dis- 
pute to  a  form  of  arbitration  in  which  Canada 
could  not  win  and  we  could  not  lose  was  another 
evidence  of  the  friendly  attitude  of  Great  Brit- 
ain. The  boundary  between  the  southern 
strip  of  Alaska  and  British  Columbia  had  never 
been  marked  or  even  accurately  surveyed  when 
gold  was  discovered  in  the  Klondike.  The 
shortest  and  quickest  route  to  the  gold-bearing 
region  was  by  the  trails  leading  up  from  Dyea 
and  Skagway  on  the  headwaters  of  Lynn  Canal. 
The  Canadian  officials  at  once  advanced  claims 


Anglo-American  Relations  123 

to  jurisdiction  over  these  village  ports.  The 
question  turned  on  the  treaty  made  in  1825 
between  Great  Britain  and  Russia.  Whatever 
rights  Russia  had  under  that  treaty  we  ac- 
quired by  the  purchase  of  Alaska  in  1867.  Not 
only  did  a  long  series  of  maps  issued  by  the 
Canadian  government  in  years  past  confirm  the 
American  claim  to  the  region  in  dispute,  but 
the  correspondence  of  the  British  negotiator 
of  the  treaty  of  1825  shows  that  he  made  every 
effort  to  secure  for  England  an  outlet  to  deep  \| 
water  through  this  strip  of  territory  and  failed. 
Under  the  circumstances  President  Roosevelt 
was  not  willing  to  submit  the  case  to  the  arbi- 
tration of  third  parties.  He  agreed,  however, 
to  submit  it  to  a  mixed  commission  composed 
of  three  Americans,  two  Canadians,  and  Lord 
Alverstone,  chief  justice  of  England.  As  there 
was  little  doubt  as  to  the  views  that  would  be 
taken  by  the  three  Americans  and  the  two  Cana- 
dians it  was  evident  from  the  first  that  the  trial 
was  really  before  Lord  Alverstone.  In  case  he 
sustained  the  American  contention  there  would 
be  an  end  of  the  controversy;  in  case  he  sus- 
tained the  Canadian  view,  there  would  be  an 
even  division,  and  matters  would  stand  where 
they  stood  when  the  trial  began  except  that 
a  great  deal  more  feeiing  would  have  been  en- 


124  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

gendered  and  the  United  States  might  have  had 
to  make  good  its  claims  by  force.  Fortunately 
Lord  Alverstone  agreed  with  the  three  Ameri- 
cans on  the  main  points  involved  in  the  contro- 
versy. The  decision  was,  of  course,  a  disap- 
pointment to  the  Canadians  and  it  was  charged 
that  Lord  Alverstone  had  sacrificed  their 
interest  in  order  to  further  the  British  policy  of 
friendly  relations  with  the  United  States. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  Great  War  the  in- 
terference of  the  British  navy  with  cargoes  con- 
signed to  Germany  at  once  aroused  the  latent 
anti-British  feeling  in  this  country.  Owing 
to  the  fact  that  cotton  exports  were  so  largely 
involved  the  feeling  against  Great  Britain  was 
even  stronger  in  the  Southern  States  than  in  the 
Northern.  The  State  Department  promptly 
protested  against  the  naval  policy  adopted  by 
Great  Britain,  and  the  dispute  might  have  as- 
sumed very  serious  proportions  had  not  Ger- 
many inaugurated  her  submarine  campaign. 
The  dispute  with  England  involved  merely  prop- 
erty rights,  while  that  with  Germany  involved 
the  safety  and  lives  of  American  citizens.  The 
main  feature  of  British  policy,  that  is,  her  appli- 
cation of  the  doctrine  of  continuous  voyage,  was 
so  thoroughly  in  line  with  the  policy  adopted  by 
the  United  States  during  the  Civil  War  that 


Anglo-American  Relations  125 

the  protests  of  our  State  Department  were  of 
little  avail.  In  fact  Great  Britain  merely 
carried  the  American  doctrine  to  its  logical 
conclusions. 

We  have  undertaken  in  this  brief  review  of 
Anglo-American  relations  to  outline  the  more 
important  controversies  that  have  arisen  be- 
tween the  two  countries.  They  have  been  suf- 
ficiently numerous  and  irritating  to  jeopardize 
seriously  the  peace  which  has  so  happily  sub- 
sisted for  one  hundred  years  between  the  two 
great  members  of  the  English-speaking  family. 
After  all,  they  have  not  been  based  on  any  fun- 
damental conflict  of  policy,  but  have  been  for 
the  most  part  superficial  and  in  many  cases  the 
result  of  bad  manners.  In  this  connection 
Lord  Bryce  makes  the  following  interesting 
observations: 

"There  were  moments  when  the  stiff  and 
frigid  attitude  of  the  British  foreign  secretary 
exasperated  the  American  negotiators,  or  when 
a  demagogic  Secretary  of  State  at  Washington 
tried  by  a  bullying  tone  to  win  credit  as  the  pa- 
triotic champion  of  national  claims.  But  when- 
ever there  were  bad  manners  in  London  there 
was  good  temper  at  Washington,  and  when  there 
was  a  storm  on  the  Potomac  there  was  calm  on 
the  Thames.     It  was  the  good  fortune  of  the  two 


126  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

countries  that  if  at  any  moment  rashness  or  vehe- 
mence was  found  on  one  side,  it  never  happened 
to  be  met  by  the  like  quality  on  the  other." 

"The  moral  of  the  story  of  Anglo-American 
relations,"  Lord  Bryce  says,  "is  that  peace  can 
always  be  kept,  whatever  be  the  grounds  of  con- 
troversy, between  peoples  that  wish  to  keep  it." 
He  adds  that  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States  "have  given  the  finest  example  ever 
seen  in  history  of  an  undefended  frontier, 
along  which  each  people  has  trusted  to  the  good 
faith  of  the  other  that  it  would  create  no  naval 
armaments;  and  this  very  absence  of  armaments 
has  itself  helped  to  prevent  hostile  demonstra- 
tions. Neither  of  them  has  ever  questioned  the 
sanctity  of  treaties,  or  denied  that  states  are 
bound  by  the  moral  law." 

It  is  not  strange  that  so  many  controversies 
about  more  or  less  trivial  matters  should  have 
obscured  in  the  minds  of  both  Englishmen  and 
Americans  the  fundamental  identity  of  aim  and 
purpose  in  the  larger  things  of  life.  For  not- 
withstanding the  German  influence  in  America 
which  has  had  an  undue  part  in  shaping  our  edu- 
cational methods,  our  civilization  is  still  Eng- 
lish. Bismarck  realized  this  when  he  said 
that  one  of  the  most  significant  facts  in  modern 
history  was  that  all  North  America  was  English- 


Anglo-American  Relations  127 

speaking.  Our  fundamental  ideals  are  the 
same.  We  have  a  passion  for  liberty;  we  up- 
hold the  rights  of  the  individual  as  against  the 
extreme  claims  of  the  state;  we  believe  in  govern- 
ment through  public  opinion;  we  believe  in 
the  rule  of  law;  we  believe  in  government  lim- 
ited by  fundamental  principles  and  constitu- 
tional restraints  as  against  the  exercise  of  arbi- 
trary power;  we  have  never  been  subjected  to 
militarism  or  to  the  dominance  of  a  military 
caste;  we  are  both  so  situated  geographically 
as  to  be  dependent  on  sea  power  rather  than  on 
large  armies,  and  not  only  do  navies  not  en- 
danger the  liberty  of  peoples  but  they  are 
negligible  quantities  politically.  Great  Britain 
had  in  191 4  only  137,500  officers  and  men  in  her 
navy  and  26,200  reserves,  a  wholly  insignificant 
number  compared  to  the  millions  that  formed 
the  army  of  Germany  and  gave  a  military  color 
to  the  whole  life  and  thought  of  the  nation. 

Not  only  are  our  polidcal  ideals  the  same, 
but  in  general  our  attitude  toward  world  poli- 
tics is  the  same,  and  most  people  are  surprised 
when  they  are  told  that  our  fundamental 
foreign  policies  are  identical.  The  two  most 
characteristic  American  foreign  policies,  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  and  the  Open  Door,  were  both, 
as  we  have  seen,  Anglo-American  in  origin. 


VII 


IMPERIALISTIC  TENDENCIES  OF  THE 
MONROE  DOCTRINE 


VII 

IMPERIALISTIC  TENDENCIES  OF  THE 
MONROE  DOCTRINE 

In  its  original  form  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  a 
direct  defiance  of  Europe,  and  it  has  never  been 
favorably  regarded  by  the  nations  of  the  old 
world.  Latterly,  however,  it  has  encountered 
adverse  criticism  in  some  of  the  Latin-American 
states  whose  independence  it  helped  to  secure 
and  whose  freedom  from  European  control  it 
has  been  instrumental  in  maintaining.  The 
Latin-American  attacks  on  the  Doctrine  during 
the  last  few  years  have  been  reflected  to  a  greater 
or  less  extent  by  writers  in  this  country,  par- 
ticularly in  academic  circles.  The  American 
writer  who  has  become  most  conspicuous  in  this 
connection  is  Professor  Bingham  of  Yale,  who 
has  travelled  extensively  in  South  America 
and  who  published  in  191 3  a  little  volume  en- 
titled "The  Monroe  Doctrine,  an  Obsolete 
Shibboleth."  The  reasons  why  the  "-Monroe 
Doctrine  has  called  forth  so  much  criticism 
during  the  last  few  years  are  not  far  to  seek. 
131 


132  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

The  rapid  advance  of  the  United  States  in  the 
Caribbean  Sea  since  1898  has  naturally  aroused 
the  apprehensions  of  the  feebler  Latin-American 
states  in  that  region,  while  the  building  of  the 
Panama  Canal  has  rendered  inevitable  the 
adoption  of  a  policy  of  naval  supremacy  in  the 
Caribbean  and  has  led  to  the  formulation  of 
new  political  policies  in  the  zone  of  the  Carib- 
bean— what  Admiral  Chester  calls  the  larger 
Panama  Canal  Zone — that  is,  the  West  Indies, 
Mexico  and  Central  America,  Colombia  and 
Venezuela.  Some  of  these  policies,  which 
have  already  been  formulated  to  a  far  greater 
extent  than  is  generally  realized,  are  the  estab- 
lishment of  protectorates,  the  supervision  of 
finances,  the  control  of  all  available  canal  routes, 
the  acquisition  of  coaling  stations,  and  the  polic- 
ing of  disorderly  countries. 

The  long-delayed  advance  of  the  United  States 
in  the  Caribbean  Sea  actually  began  with  the 
Spanish  War.  Since  then  we  have  made  rapid 
strides.  Porto  Rico  was  annexed  at  the  close 
of  the  war,  and  Cuba  became  a  protectorate; 
the  Canal  Zone  was  a  little  later  leased  on  terms 
that  amounted  to  practical  annexation,  and 
the  Dominican  Republic  came  under  the 
financial  supervision  of  the  United  States; 
President  Wilson  went   further   and   assumed 


Imperialistic  Tendencies  133 

the  administration  of  Haitian  affairs,  leased 
from  Nicaragua  for  a  term  of  ninety-nine  years 
a  naval  base  on  Fonseca  Bay,  and  purchased 
the  Danish  West  Indies.  As  a  result  of  this 
rapid  extension  of  American  influence  the 
political  relations  of  the  countries  bordering 
on  the  Caribbean  will  of  necessity  be  profoundly 
affected.  Our  Latin-American  policy  has  been 
enlarged  in  meaning  and  limited  in  territorial 
application  so  far  as  its  newer  phases  are 
concerned. 

In  1904  President  Roosevelt  made  a  radical 
departure  from  our  traditional  poHcy  in  propos- 
ing that  we  should  assume  financial  supervision 
over  the  Dominican  Republic  in  order  to  prevent 
certain  European  powers  from  forcibly  collect- 
ing debts  due  their  subjects.  Germany  seemed 
especially  determined  to  force  a  settlement  of 
her  demands,  and  it  was  well  known  that  Ger- 
many had  for  years  regarded  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine as  the  main  hindrance  in  the  way  of  her 
acquiring  a  foothold  in  Latin  America.  The 
only  eflFective  method  of  collecting  the  interest 
on  the  foreign  debt  of  the  Dominican  Republic 
appeared  to  be  the  seizure  and  administration 
of  her  custom  houses  by  some  foreign  power  or 
group  of  foreign  powers.  President  Roosevelt 
foresaw  that  such  an  occupation  of  the  Domini- 


134  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

can  custom  houses  would,  in  view  of  the  large 
debt,  constitute  the  occupation  of  American 
territory  by  European  powers  for  an  indefinite 
period  of  time,  and  would,  therefore,  be  a  vio- 
lation of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  He  had  before 
him  also  the  results  of  a  somewhat  similar 
financial  administration  of  Egypt  undertaken 
jointly  by  England  and  France  in  1878,  and 
after  Arabi's  revolt  continued  by  England 
alone,  with  the  result  that  Egypt  soon  became  a 
possession  of  the  British  crown  to  almost  as 
great  a  degree  as  if  it  had  been  formally  an- 
nexed, and  during  the  World  War  it  was  in 
fact  treated  as  an  integral  part  of  the  Brit- 
ish Empire.  President  Roosevelt  concluded, 
therefore,  that  where  it  was  necessary  to  place 
a  bankrupt  American  republic  in  the  hands 
of  a  receiver,  the  United  States  must  under- 
take to  act  as  receiver  and  take  over  the  ad- 
ministration of  its  finances.  He  boldly  adopted 
this  policy  and  finally  forced  a  reluctant  Senate 
to  acquiesce.  The  arrangement  has  worked 
admirably.  In  spite  of  the  criticism  that  this 
policy  encountered,  the  Taft  administration 
not  only  continued  it  in  Santo  Domingo,  but 
tried  to  extend  it  to  Nicaragua  and  Honduras. 
In  January,  191 1,  a  treaty  placing  the  finances 
of   Honduras    under    the    supervision    of   the 


Imperialistic  Tendencies  135 

United  States  was  signed  by  Secretary  Knox, 
and  in  June  a  similar  treaty  was  signed  with 
Nicaragua.  These  treaties  provided  for  the 
refunding  of  the  foreign  debt,  in  each  case 
through  loans  made  by  American  bankers  and 
secured  by  the  customs  duties,  the  collector 
in  each  case  to  be  approved  by  the  United  States 
and  to  make  an  annual  report  to  the  Depart- 
ment of  State.  These  treaties  were  not  ratified 
by  the  Senate. 

Secretary  Knox  then  tried  another  solution 
of  the  question.  On  February  26,  1913,  a 
new  treaty  with  Nicaragua  was  submitted  to 
the  Senate  by  the  terms  of  which  Nicaragua 
agreed  to  give  the  United  States  an  exclusive 
right  of  way  for  a  canal  through  her  territory 
and  a  naval  base  in  Fonseca  Bay,  in  return  for 
the  payment  of  three  millions  of  dollars.  The 
Senate  failed  to  act  on  this  treaty,  as  the  close 
of  the  Taft  administration  was  then  at  hand. 
The  Wilson  administration  followed  the  same 
policy,  however,  and  in  July,  191 3,  Mr.  Bryan 
submitted  to  the  Senate  a  third  treaty  with 
Nicaragua  containing  the  provisions  of  the 
second  Knox  treaty  and  in  addition  certain  pro- 
visions of  the  Piatt  amendment,  which  defines 
our  protectorate  over  Cuba.  This  treaty 
aroused  strong  opposition  in  the  other  Central 


136  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

American  states,  and  Costa  Rica,  Salvador, 
and  Honduras  filed  formal  protests  with  the 
United  States  Government  against  its  ratifica- 
tion on  the  ground  that  it  would  convert  Nic- 
aragua into  a  protectorate  of  the  United  States 
and  thus  defeat  the  long-cherished  plan  for 
a  union  of  the  Central  American  republics. 
The  Senate  of  the  United  States  objected  to 
the  protectorate  feature  of  the  treaty  and  re- 
fused to  ratify  it,  but  the  negotiations  were 
renewed  by  the  Wilson  administration  and 
on  February  18,  1916,  a  new  treaty,  which 
omits  the  provisions  of  the  Piatt  amendment, 
was  accepted  by  the  Senate.  This  treaty 
grants  to  the  United  States  in  perpetuity  the 
exclusive  right  to  construct  a  canal  by  way  of 
the  San  Juan  River  and  Lake  Nicaragua,  and 
leases  to  the  United  States  for  ninety-nine  years 
a  naval  base  on  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca,  and  also 
the  Great  Corn  and  Little  Corn  islands  as  coal- 
ing stations.  The  consideration  for  these  favors 
was  the  sum  of  three  millions  of  dollars  to  be 
expended,  with  the  approval  of  the  Secretary  of 
State  of  the  United  States,  in  paying  the  public 
debt  of  Nicaragua  and  for  other  public  purposes 
to  be  agreed  on  by  the  two  contracting  parties. 
The  treaty  with  the  black  RepubUc  of  Haiti, 
ratified    by    the    Senate    February    28,    1916, 


Imperialistic  Tendencies  137 

carries  the  new  Caribbean  policies  of  the 
United  States  to  the  farthest  Hmits  short  of 
actual  annexation.  It  provides  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  receivership  of  Haitian  customs 
under  the  control  of  the  United  States  similar 
in  most  respects  to  that  established  over  the 
Dominican  Republic.  It  provides  further  for 
the  appointment,  on  the  nomination  of  the 
President  of  the  United  States,  of  a  financial 
adviser,  who  shall  assist  in  the  settlement  of 
the  foreign  debt  and  direct  expenditures  of 
the  surplus  for  the  development  of  the  agricul- 
tural, mineral,  and  commercial  resources  of  the 
republic.  It  provides  further  for  a  native 
constabulary  under  American  officers  appointed 
by  the  President  of  Haiti  upon  nomination  by 
the  President  of  the  United  States.  It  further 
extends  to  Haiti  the  main  provisions  of  the 
Piatt  amendment.  By  controlling  the  internal 
financial  administration  of  the  government  the 
United  States  hopes  to  remove  all  incentives  for 
those  revolutions  which  have  in  the  past  had 
for  their  object  a  raid  on  the  public  treasury, 
and  by  controlling  the  customs  and  maintaining 
order  the  United  States  hopes  to  avoid  all 
possibility  of  foreign  intervention.  The  treaty 
is  to  remain  in  force  for  a  period  of  ten  years 
and  for  another  period  of  ten  years  if  either 


138  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

party  presents  specific  reasons  for  continuing 
it  on  the  ground  that  its  purpose  has  not  been 
fully  accomplished. 

Prior  to  the  Roosevelt  administration  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  was  regarded  by  the  Latin- 
American  states  as  solely  a  protective  policy. 
The  United  States  did  not  undertake  to  control 
the  financial  administration  or  the  foreign 
policy  of  any  of  these  republics.  It  was  only 
after  their  misconduct  had  gotten  them  into 
difficulty  and  some  foreign  power,  or  group 
of  foreign  powers,  was  on  the  point  of  demand- 
ing reparation  by  force  that  the  United  States 
stepped  in  and  undertook  to  see  to  it  that  foreign 
intervention  did  not  take  the  form  of  occupation 
of  territory  or  interference  in  internal  politics. 
The  Monroe  Doctrine  has  always  been  in  prin- 
ciple a  policy  of  American  intervention  for  the 
purpose  of  preventing  European  intervention, 
but  American  intervention  always  awaited  the 
threat  of  immediate  action  on  the  part  of 
some  European  power.  President  Roosevelt 
concluded  that  it  would  be  wiser  to  restrain 
the  reckless  conduct  of  the  smaller  American 
republics  before  disorders  or  public  debts  should 
reach  a  point  which  gave  European  powers  an 
excuse  for  intervening.  In  a  message  to  Con- 
gress in  1904  he  laid  down  this  new  doctrine, 


Imperialistic  Tendencies  139 

which  soon  became  famous  as  the  Big  Stick 
policy.  He  said:  "If  a  nation  shows  that  it 
knows  how  to  act  with  reasonable  efficiency 
and  decency  in  social  and  political  matters,  if 
it  keeps  order  and  pays  its  obligations,  it  need 
fear  no  interference  from  the  United  States. 
Chronic  wrongdoing,  or  an  impotence  which 
results  in  a  general  loosening  of  the  ties  of  civil- 
ized society,  may  in  America,  as  elsewhere, 
ultimately  require  intervention  by  some  civil- 
ized nation,  and  in  the  Western  Hemisphere 
the  adherence  of  the  United  States  to  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  may  .force  the  United  States, 
however  reluctantly,  in  flagrant  cases  of  such 
wrongdoing  or  impotence,  to  the  exercise  of 
an  international  police  power."  In  other  words, 
since  we  could  not  permit  European  powers  to 
restrain  or  punish  American  states  in  cases  of 
wrongdoing,  we  must  ourselves  undertake 
that  task.  As  long  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
was  merely  a  policy  of  benevolent  protection 
which  Latin-American  states  could  invoke  after 
their  unv/ise  or  evil  conduct  had  brought  Euro- 
pean powers  to  the  point  of  demanding  just 
retribution,  it  was  regarded  with  favor  and  no 
objection  was  raised  to  it;  but  the  Roosevelt 
doctrine,  that  if  we  were  to  continue  to  protect 
Latin-American  states  against  European  inter- 


140  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

vention,  we  had  a  right  to  demand  that  they 
should  refrain  from  conduct  which  was  Hkely 
to  provoke  such  intervention,  was  quite  a  dif- 
ferent thing,  and  raised  a  storm  of  criticism  and 
opposition. 

The  Roosevelt  appHcation  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  was  undoubtedly  a  perfectly  logical 
step.  It  was  endorsed  by  the  Taft  administra- 
tion and  further  extended  by  the  Wilson  admin- 
istration and  made  one  of  our  most  important 
policies  in  regard  to  the  zone  of  the  Caribbean. 
President  Roosevelt  was  right  in  drawing  the 
conclusion  that  we  had  arrived  at  a  point 
where  we  had  either  to  abandon  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  or  to  extend  its  application  so  as  to 
cover  the  constantly  increasing  number  of 
disputes  arising  from  the  reckless  creation  of 
public  debts  and  loose  financial  administration. 
It  was  absurd  for  us  to  stand  quietly  by  and 
witness  the  utterly  irresponsible  creation  of 
financial  obligations  that  would  inevitably 
lead  to  European  intervention  and  then  under- 
take to  fix  the  bounds  and  limits  of  that  inter- 
vention. It  is  interesting  to  note  that  President 
Wilson  did  not  hesitate  to  carry  the  new  pohcy 
to  its  logical  conclusion,  and  that  he  went 
so  far  as  to  warn  Latin-American  countries 
against  granting  to  foreign  corporations  con- 


Imperialistic  Tendencies  141 

cessions  which,  on  account  of  their  extended 
character,  would  be  certain  to  give  rise  to  foreign 
claims  which  would,  in  turn,  give  an  excuse 
for  European  intervention.  In  discussing  our 
Latin-American  policy  shortly  after  the  begin- 
ning of  his  administration.  President  Wilson 
said:  "You  hear  of  *  concessions'  to  foreign 
capitalists  in  Latin  America.  You  do  not  hear 
of  concessions  to  foreign  capitalists  in  the 
United  States.  They  are  not  granted  conces- 
sions. They  are  invited  to  make  investments. 
The  work  is  ours,  though  they  are  welcome  to 
invest  in  it.  We  do  not  ask  them  to  supply 
the  capital  and  do  the  work.  It  is  an  invitation, 
not  a  privilege;  and  states  that  are  obliged, 
because  their  territory  does  not  lie  within  the 
main  field  of  modern  enterprise  and  action,  to 
grant  concessions  are  in  this  condition,  that 
foreign  interests  are  apt  to  dominate  their 
domestic  affairs — a  condition  of  affairs  always 
dangerous  and  apt  to  become  intolerable.  .  .  . 
What  these  states  are  going  to  seek,  therefore, 
is  an  emancipation  from  the  subordination, 
which  has  been  inevitable,  to  foreign  enterprise 
and  an  assertion  of  the  splendid  character  which, 
in  spite  of  these  difficulties,  they  have  again 
and  again  been  able  to  demonstrate.* 
These  remarks  probably  had  reference  to  the 


142  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

oil  concession  which  Pearson  and  Son  of  London 
had  arranged  with  the  president  of  Colombia. 
This  concession  is  said  to  have  covered  practi- 
cally all  of  the  oil  interests  in  Colombia,  and 
carried  with  it  the  right  to  improve  harbors 
and  dig  canals  in  the  country.  However, 
before  the  meeting  of  the  Colombian  congress 
in  November,  191 3,  which  was  expected  to 
confirm  the  concession,  Lord  Cowdray,  the 
president  of  Pearson  and  Son,  withdrew  the 
contract,  alleging  as  his  reason  the  opposition 
of  the  United  States. 

Unfortunately  President  Roosevelt's  asser- 
tion of  the  Big  Stick  policy  and  of  the  duty  of 
the  United  States  to  play  policeman  in  the 
western  hemisphere  was  accompanied  by  his 
seizure  of  the  Canal  Zone.  This  action  natur- 
ally aroused  serious  apprehensions  in  Latin 
America  and  gave  color  to  the  charge  that  the 
United  States  had  converted  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine from  a  protective  policy  into  a  policy  of 
selfish  aggression.  Colombia  felt  outraged  and 
aggrieved,  and  this  feeling  was  not  alleviated 
by  Mr.  Roosevelt's  speech  several  years  later 
to  the  students  of  the  University  of  California, 
in  which  he  boasted  of  having  taken  the  Canal 
Zone  and  said  that  if  he  had  not  taken  it  as  he 
did,  the  debate  over  the  matter  in  Congress 


Imperialistic  Tendencies  143 

would  still  be  going  on.  Before  the  close  of 
his  administration  President  Roosevelt  under- 
took to  placate  Colombia,  but  the  sop  which 
he  offered  was  indignantly  rejected.  In  Jan- 
uary, 1909,  Secretary  Root  proposed  three 
treaties,  one  between  the  United  States  and 
Panama,  one  between  the  United  States  and 
Colombia,  and  one  between  Colombia  and  Pana- 
ma. These  treaties  provided  for  the  recognition 
of  the  ^^jepublic_ofJPanama  by  Colornbia  and 
for  the  transference  to  Colombia  of  the  first 
ten  installments  of  the  annual  rental  of  ^250,000 
which  the  United  States  had  agreed  to  pay  to 
Panama  for  the  lease  of  the  Canal  Zone.  The 
treaties  were  ratified  by  the  United  States 
and  by  Panama,  but  not  by  Colombia. 

TheTaft  administration  made  repeated  efforts 
to  appease  Colombia,  resulting  in  the  formula- 
tion of  a  definite  proposition  by  Secretary  Knox 
shortly  before  the  close  of  President  Taft's 
term.  His  proposals  were  that  if  Colombia 
would  ratify  the  Root  treaties  just  referred 
to,  the  United  States  would  be  willing  to  pay 
$10,000,000  for  an  exclusive  right  of  way  for 
a  canal  by  the  Atrato  route  and  for  the  perpetual 
lease  of  the  islands  of  St.  Andrews  and  Old 
Providence  as  coaling  stations.  These  pro- 
posals were  also  rejected.     The  American  minis- 


144  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

ter,  Mr.  Du  Bois,  acting,  he  said,  on  his  own 
responsibility,  then  inquired  informally  whether 
$25,000,000  without  options  of  any  kind  would 
satisfy  Colombia.  The  answer  was  that  Colom- 
bia would  accept  nothing  but  the  arbitration 
of  the  whole  Panama  question.  Mr.  Knox,  in 
reporting  the  matter  to  the  President,  said  that 
Colombia  seemed  determined  to  treat  with 
the  incoming  Democratic  administration.  Sec- 
retary Bryan  took  up  the  negotiations  where 
Knox  dropped  them,  and  concluded  a  treaty, 
according  to  the  terms  of  which  the  United 
States  was  to  express  regret  at  what  had  oc- 
curred and  to  pay  Colombia  $25,000,000.  The 
Senate  of  the  United  States  refused  to  ratify 
this  treaty  while  Wilson  was  in  the  White  House, 
but  as  soon  as  Harding  became  president  they 
consented  to  the  payment  and  ratified  the  treaty 
with  a  few  changes  in  the  preamble. 

The  facts  stated  above  show  conclusively 
that  the  two  most  significant  developments  of 
American  policy  in  the  Caribbean  during  the 
last  twenty  years  have  been  the  establishment 
of  formal  protectorates  and  the  exercise  of 
financial  supervision  over  weak  and  disorderly 
states.  Our  protectorate^oyer  Cuba  was  clearly 
defined  in  the  so-called  Pl^tt-amfjndment,  which 
was  inserted  in  the  army  appropriation  bill  of 


Imperialistic  Tendencies  145 

March  2,  1901,  and  directed  the  President  to 
leave  control  of  the  island  of  Cuba  to  its  people 
so  soon  as  a  government  should  be  established 
under  a  constitution  which  defined  the  future 
relations  with  the  United  States  substantially 
as  follows:  (i)  That  the  government  of  Cuba 
would  never  enter  into  any  treaty  or  other  com- 
pact with  any  foreign  power  which  would  im- 
pair the  independence  of  the  island;  (2)  that 
the  said  government  would  not  contract  any 
public  debt  which  could  not  be  met  by  the 
ordinary  revenues  of  the  island;  (3)  that  the 
government  of  Cuba  would  permit  the  United 
States  to  exercise  the  right  to  intervene  for 
the  preservation  of  Cuban  independence,  and 
for  the  protection  of  life,  property,  and  in- 
dividual liberty;  (4)  that  all  acts  of  the  United 
States  in  Cuba  during  its  military  occupancy 
thereof  should  be  ratified  and  validated;  (5) 
that  the  government  of  Cuba  would  carry  out 
the  plans  already  devised  for  the  sanitation 
of  the  cities  of  the  island;  and  finally  that  the 
government  of  Cuba  would  sell  or  lease  to  the 
United  States  lands  necessary  for  coaling  or 
naval  stations  at  certain  specified  points,  to 
be  agreed  upon  with  the  President  of  the 
United  States. 

It  is  understood  that  these  articles,  with  the 


146  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

exception  of  the  fifth,  which  was  proposed  by 
General  Leonard  Wood,  were  carefully  drafted 
by  Elihu  Root,  at  that  time  Secretary  of  War, 
discussed  at  length  by  President  McKinley's 
Cabinet,  and  entrusted  to  Senator  Piatt  of 
Connecticut,  who  offered  them  as  an  amend- 
ment to  the  army  appropriation  bill.  The 
Wilson  administration,  as  already  stated,  em- 
bodied the  first  three  provisions  of  the  Piatt 
amendment  in  the  Haitian  treaty  of  1916. 
Prior  to  the  World  War,  which  has  upset  all 
calculations,  it  seemed  highly  probable  that 
the  Piatt  amendment  would  in  time  be  extended 
to  all  the  weaker  states  within  the  zone  of  the 
Caribbean.  If  the  United  States  is  to  exercise  a 
protectorate  over  such  states,  the  right  to  inter- 
vene and  the  conditions  of  intervention  should 
be  clearly  defined  and  publicly  proclaimed. 
Hitherto  whatever  action  we  have  taken  in 
Latin  America  has  been  taken  under  the 
Monroe  Doctrine — a  policy  without  legal  sanc- 
tion— ^which  an  international  court  might  not 
recognize.  Action  under  a  treaty  would  have 
the  advantage  of  legality.  In  other  words, 
the  recent  treaties  with  Caribbean  states  have 
converted  American  policy  into  law. 

The  charge  that  in  establishing  protectorates 
and    financial    supervision    over    independent 


Imperialistic  Tendencies  147 

states  we  have  violated  the  tefms  of  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  is  one  that  has  been  frequer^tly 
made.  Those  who  have  made  it  appear  to  be 
laboring  under  the  illusion  that  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  was  wholly  altruistic  in  its  aim.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  never 
been  regarded  by  the  United  States  as  in 
any  sense  a  self-denying  declaration.  President 
Monroe  said  that  we  should  consider  any  at- 
tempt on  the  part  of  the  European  powers  "to 
extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of  this  hemi- 
sphere as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety." 
The  primary  object  of  the  policy  outlined  by 
President  Monroe  was,  therefore,  the  peace  and 
safety  of  the  United  States.  The  protection  of 
Latin-American  states  against  European  inter- 
vention was  merely  a  means  of  protecting  our- 
selves. While  the  United  States  undertook  to 
prevent  the  encroachment  of  European  powers 
in  Latin  America,  it  never  for  one  moment  ad- 
mitted any  limitation  upon  the  possibility  of 
its  own  expansion  in  this  region.  The  whole 
course  of  American  history  establishes  the 
contrary  point  of  view.  Since  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  was  enunciated  we  have  annexed  at 
the  expense  of  Latin-American  states,  Texas, 
New  Mexico,  California,  and  the  Canal  Zone. 
Upon  other  occasions  we  emphatically  declined 


148  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

to  bind  ourselves  by  treaty  stipulations  with 
England  and  France  that  under  no  circumstance 
would  we  annex  the  island  of  Cuba.  Shortly 
after  the  beginning  of  his  first  term  President 
Wilson  declared  in  a  public  address  at  Mobile 
that  "the  United  States  will  never  again  seek 
one  additional  foot  of  territory  by  conquest." 
This  declaration  introduces  a  new  chapter  in 
American  diplomacy. 


VIII 
THE  NEW  PAN-AMERICANISM 


VIII 

THE  NEW  PAN-AMERICANISM 

When  President  Wilson  assumed  office  March 
4,  1913,  there  was  nothing  but  the  Huerta 
revolution,  the  full  significance  of  which  was 
not  then  appreciated,  to  suggest  to  his  mind 
the  forecast  that  before  the  close  of  his  term 
questions  of  foreign  policy  would  absorb  the 
attention  of  the  American  people  and  tax  to  the 
limit  his  own  powers  of  mind  and  body.  It 
seems  now  a  strange  fact  that  neither  in  his 
writings  nor  in  his  public  addresses  had  Presi- 
dent Wilson  ever  shown  any  marked  interest  in 
questions  of  international  law  and  diplomacy. 
He  had,  on  the  contrary,  made  a  life-long  study 
of  political  organization  and  legislative  proce- 
dure. Those  who  knew  him  had  always  thought 
that  he  was  by  nature  fitted  to  be  a  great 
parliamentary  leader  and  it  soon  appeared 
that  he  had  a  very  definite  legislative  program 
which  he  intended  to  put  through  Congress. 
The  foreign  problems  that  confronted  him  so 
suddenly  and  unexpectedly  were  doubtless  felt 

151 


152  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

to  be  annoying  distractions  from  the  work  which 
he  had  mapped  out  for  himself  and  which  was 
far  more  congenial  to  his  tastes.  As  time 
went  by,  however,  he  was  forced  to  give  more 
and  more  thought  to  our  relations  with  Latin 
America  on  the  one  hand  and  to  the  European 
war  on  the  other.  His  ideas  on  international 
problem*  at  first  cautiously  set  forth,  soon 
caught  step  with  the  rapid  march  of  events  and 
guided  the  thought  of  the  world. 

The  Mexican  situation,  which  reached  a  crisis 
a  few  days  before  Mr.  Wilson  came  into  oflEice, 
at  once  demanded  his  attention  and  led  to  the 
enunciation  of  a  general  Latin-American  policy. 
He  had  scarcely  been  in  office  a  week  when 
he  issued  a  statement  which  was  forwarded  by 
the  secretary  of  state  to  all  American  diplomatic 
officers  in  Latin  America.     In  it  he  said : 

"One  of  the  chief  objects  of  my  administra- 
tion will  be  to  cultivate  the  friendship  and 
deserve  the  confidence  of  our  sister  republics  of 
Central  and  South  America  and  to  promote  in 
every  proper  and  honorable  way  the  interests 
which  are  common  to  the  peoples  of  the  two 
continents.     ... 

"The  United  States  has  nothing  to  seek  in 
Central  and  South  America  except  the  lasting 
interests  of  the  peoples  of  the  two  continents. 


The  New  Pan-Americanism  153 

the  security  of  governments  intended  for  the 
people  and  for  no  special  group  or  interest,  and 
the  development  of  personal  and  trade  rela- 
tionships between  the  two  continents  which 
shall  redound  to  the  profit  and  advantage  of 
both,  and  interfere  with  the  rights  and  liberties 
of  neither. 

"From  these  principles  may  be  read  so  much 
of  the  future  policy  of  this  government  as  it  is 
necessary  now  to  forecast,  and  in  the  spirit  of 
these  principles  I  may,  I  hope,  be  permitted 
with  as  much  confidence  as  earnestness,  to  ex- 
tend to  the  governments  of  all  the  republics  of 
America  the  hand  of  genuine  disinterested 
friendship  and  to  pledge  my  own  honor  and  the 
honor  of  my  colleagues  to  every  enterprise  of 
peace  and  amity  that  a  fortunate  future  may 
disclose/* 

The  policy  here  outlined,  and  elaborated  a 
few  months  later  in  an  address  before  the 
Southern  Commercial  Congress  at  Mobile, 
Alabama,  has  been  termed  the  New  Pan- 
Americanism.  The  Pan-American  ideal  is  an 
old  one,  dating  back  in  fact  to  the  Panama 
Congress  of  1826.  The  object  of  this  congress 
was  not  very  definitely  stated  in  the  call,  which 
was  issued  by  Simon  Bolivar,  but  his  purpose 
was  to  secure  the  independence  and  peace  of  the 


154  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

new  Spanish  republics  through  either  a  perma- 
nent confederation  or  a  series  of  diplomatic  con- 
gresses. President  Adams  through  Henry 
Clay,  who  was  at  that  time  Secretary  of  State, 
promptly  accepted  the  invitation  to  send  dele- 
gates. The  matter  was  debated  at  such  length, 
however,  in  the  House  and  Senate  that  the 
American  delegates  did  not  reach  Panama  until 
after  the  congress  had  adjourned.  In  view  of 
the  opposition  which  the  whole  scheme  en- 
countered in  Congress,  the  instructions  to  the 
American  delegates  were  very  carefully  drawn 
and  their  powers  were  strictly  limited.  They 
were  cautioned  against  committing  their  gov- 
ernment in  any  way  to  the  establishment  of 
"an  amphictyonic  council,  invested  with  power 
fully  to  decide  controversies  between  the 
American  states  or  to  regulate  in  any  respect 
their  conduct."  They  were  also  to  oppose  the 
formation  of  an  offensive  and  defensive  alli- 
ance between  the  American  powers,  for,  as  Mr. 
Clay  pointed  out,  the  Holy  Alliance  had  aban- 
doned all  idea  of  assisting  Spain  in  the  recon- 
quest  of  her  late  colonies.  After  referring  to 
"the  avoidance  of  foreign  alliances  as  a  leading 
maxim"  of  our  foreign  policy,  Mr.  Clay  con- 
tinued: "Without,  therefore,  asserting  that  an 
exigencv  may  not  occur  in  which  an  alliance  of 


The  New  Pan-Americanism  155 

the  most  intimate  kind  between  the  United 
States  and  the  other  American  republics  would 
be  highly  proper  and  expedient,  it  may  be 
safely  said  that  the  occasion  which  would  war- 
rant a  departure  from  that  established  maxim 
ought  to  be  one  of  great  urgency,  and  that  none 
such  is  believed  now  to  exist." 

The  British  Government  sent  a  special  envoy 
to  reside  near  the  Congress  and  to  place  himself 
in  frank  and  friendly  communication  with  the 
delegates.  Canning's  private  instructions  to 
this  envoy  declared  that,  "Any  project  for  put- 
ting the  U.  S.  of  North  Ameirca  at  the  head  of 
an  American  Confederacy,  as  against  Europe, 
would  be  highly  displeasing  to  your  Govern- 
ment. It  would  be  felt  as  an  ill  return  for  the 
service  which  has  been  rendered  to  those  States,, 
and  the  dangers  which  have  been  averted  from 
them,  by  the  countenance  and  friendship,  and 
public  declarations  of  Great  Britain;  and  it 
would  probably,  at  no  distant  period,  endanger 
the  peace  both  of  America  and  of  Europe." 

The  Panama  Congress  was  without  practical 
results  and  it  was  more  than  half  a  century  be- 
fore the  scheme  for  international  coopera- 
tion on  the  part  of  American  states  was  again 
taken  up.  In  1881  Secretary  Blaine  issued 
an  invitation  to  the  American  republics  to  hold 


156  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

a  conference  at  Washington,  but  the  continu- 
ance of  the  war  between  Chile  and  Peru  caused 
an  indefinite  postponement  of  the  proposed 
conference.  Toward  the  close  of  President 
Cleveland's  first  administration  the  invitation 
was  renewed  and  the  First  International  Con- 
ference of  American  States  convened  at  Wash- 
ington in  1890.  It  happened  that  when  the 
Conference  met  Mr.  Blaine  was  again  Secretary 
of  State  and  presided  over  its  opening  sessions. 
The  most  notable  achievement  of  this  Confer- 
ence was  the  establishment  of  the  Bureau  of 
American  Republics,  now  known  as  the  Pan- 
American  Union.  The  Second  International 
Conference  of  American  States,  held  in  the  City 
^^6fJs!L!^ica^Ul,.i^oi)  arranged  for  all  American 
states  to  become  parties  to  the  Hague  Conven- 
tion of  1899  for  the  pacific  settlement  of  inter- 
national disputes  and  drafted  a  treaty  for  the 
compulsory  arbitration,  as  between  American 
states,  of  pecuniary  claims.  The  Third  Con- 
Terence,  held  at  Rio  Janeiro  in  1906,  extended 
the  above  treaty  for  another  period  of  five  years 
and  proposed  that  the  subject  of  pecuniary 
claims  be  considered  at  the  second  Hague  Con- 
ference. Added  significance  was  given  to  the 
Rio  Conference  by  the  presence  of  Secretary 
Root  who,  although  not  a  delegate,  made  it  the 


The  New  Pan-Americanism  157 

occasion  of  a  special  mission  to  South  America. 
The  series  of  notable  addresses  which  he  deliv- 
ered on  this  mission  gave  a  new  impetus  to  the 
Pan-American  movement.  The  Fourth  Con- 
ference, held  at  Buenos  Ayres  in  r2iP>  was  occu- 
pied largely  with  routine  matters.  It  extended 
the  pecuniary  claims  convention  for  an  indefi- 
nite period. 

The  conferences  above  referred  to  were  polit- 
ical or  diplomatic  in  character.  There  have 
been  held  two  Pan-American  Scientific  Con- 
gresses in  which  the  United  States  participated, 
one  at  Chile  in  1908  and  one  at  Washington, 
December,  1915,  to  January,  19 16.  A  very 
important  Pan-American  Financial  Congress 
was  held  at  Washington  in  May,  191 5.  These 
congresses  have  accomplished  a  great  deal  in  the 
way  of  promoting  friendly  feeling  as  well  as  the 
advancement  of  science  and  commerce  among 
the  republics  of  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

The  American  Institute  of  International  Law, 
organized  at  Washington  in  October,  191 2,  is  a 
body  which  is  likely  to  have  great  influence  in 
promoting  the  peace  and  welfare  of  this  hemi- 
sphere. The  Institute  is  composed  of  five  repre- 
sentatives from  the  national  society  of  interna- 
tional law  in  each  of  the  twenty-one  American 
republics.   At  a  session  held  in  the  city  of  W^ash- 


158  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

ington,  January  6,  191 6,  the  Institute  adopted  a 
Declaration  of  the  Rights  and  Duties  of  Nations. 
This  declaration,  designed  to  give  a  solid  legal  ba- 
sis to  the  new  Pan-Americanism,  was  as  follows : 

I.  Every  nation  has  the  right  to  exist  and  to 

protect  and  to  conserve  its  existence; 
but  this  right  neither  implies  the  right 
nor  justifies  the  act  of  the  state  to 
protect  itself  or  to  conserve  its  ex- 
istence by  the  commission  of  unlawful 
acts  against  innocent  and  unoffending 
states. 

II.  Every  nation  has  the  right  to  independ- 

ence in  the  sense  that  it  has  a  right 
to  the  pursuit  of  happiness  and  is  friee 
to  develop  itself  without  interfer- 
ence or  control  from  other  states, 
provided  that  in  so  doing  it  does  not 
interfere  with  or  violate  the  rights  of 
other  states. 

III.  Every  nation  is  in  law  and  before  law 

the  equal  of  every  other  nation  be- 
longing to  the  society  of  nations,  and 
all  nations  have  the  right  to  claim 
and,  according  to  the  Declaration  of 
Independence  of  the  United  States, 
**to  assume,  among  the  powers  of  the 


The  New  Pan-Americanism  1 59 

earth,  the  separate  and  equal  station 
to  which  the  laws  of  nature  and  of 
Nature's  God  entitle  them.** 

IV.  Every  nation  has  the  right  to  territory 

within  defined  boundaries,  and  to  exer- 
cise exclusive  jurisdiction  over  its  ter- 
ritory, and  all  persons  whether  native 
or  foreign  found  therein. 

V.  Every  nation  entitled  to  a  right  by  the  law 

of  nations  is  entitled  to  have  that  right 
respected  and  protected  by  all  other 
nations,  for  right  and  duty  are  correla- 
tive, and  the  right  of  one  is  the  duty 
of  all  to  observe. 

VI.  International  law  is  at  one  and  the  same 

time  both  national  and  international; 
national  in  the  sense  that  it  is  the  law 
of  the  land  and  applicable  as  such  to 
the  decision  of  all  questions  involving 
its  principles;  international  in  the 
sense  that  it  is  the  law  of  the  society  of 
nations  and  applicable  as  such  to  all 
questions  between  and  among  the 
members  of  the  society  of  nations  in- 
volving its  principles. 

This  Declaration  has  been  criticised  as  being 
too  altruistic  for  a  world  in  which  diplomacy 


l6o  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

has  been  occupied  with  selfish  aims,  yet  Mr. 
Root,  in  presenting  it  at  the  annual  meeting  of 
the  American  Society  of  International  Law, 
claimed  that  every  statement  in  it  was  "based 
upon  the  decisions  of  American  courts  and  the 
authority  of  American  publicists." 

The  Mexican  situation  put  the  principles  of 
the  new  Pan-Americanism  to  a  severe  test.  On 
February  i8,  1913,  Francisco  Madero  was 
seized  and  imprisoned  as  the  result  of  a  con- 
spiracy formed  by  one  of  his  generals,  Victoriano 
Huerta,  who  forthwith  proclaimed  himself  dic- 
tator. Four  days  later  Madero  was  mur- 
dered while  in  the  custody  of  Huerta's  troops. 
Henry  Lane  Wilson,  the  American  ambassador, 
promptly  urged  his  government  to  recognize 
Huerta,  but  President  Taft,  whose  term  was  rap- 
idly drawing  to  a  close,  took  no  action  and  left 
the  question  to  his  successor. 

President  Wilson  thus  had  a  very  disagreeable 
situation  to  face  when  he  assumed  control  of 
affairs  at  Washington.  He  refused  to  recognize 
Huerta,  whose  authority  was  contested  by  in- 
surrectionary chiefs  in  various  parts  of  the 
country.  It  was  claimed  by  the  critics  of  the 
administration  that  the  refusal  to  recognize 
Huerta  was  a  direct  violation  of  the  well-known 
American  policy  of  recognizing  de  facto  gov- 


The  New  Pan-Americanism  i6i 

emments  without  undertaking  to  pass  upon  the 
rights  involved.  It  is  perfectly  true  that  the 
United  States  has  consistently  followed  the 
policy  of  recognizing  de  facto^avempients  as 
soon  as  it  is  evident  in  each  case  that  the  new 
government  rests  on  popular  approval  and  is 
likely  to  be  permanent.  This  doctrine  of 
recognition  is  distinctively  an  American  doc- 
trine. It  was  first  laid  down  by  Thomas  Jef- 
ferson when  he  was  Secretary  of  State  as  an 
offset  to  the  European  doctrine  of  divine  right, 
and  it  was  the  natural  outgrowth  of  that  other 
Jeffersonian  doctrine  that  all  governments  de- 
rive their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the 
governed.  Huerta  could  lay  no  claim  to  au- 
thority derived  from  a  majority  or  anything  like 
a  majority  of  the  Mexican  people.  He  was  a 
self-constituted  dictator,  whose  authority  rested 
solely  on  military  force.  President  Wilson  and 
Secretary  Bryan  were  fully  justified  in  refusing 
to  recognize  his  usurpation  of  power,  though 
they  probably  made  a  mistake  in  announcing 
that  they  would  never  recognize  him  and  in  de- 
manding his  elimination  from  the  presidential 
contest.  This  announcement  made  him  deaf  to 
advice  from  Washington  and  utterly  indifferent 
to  the  destruction  of  American  life  and  property. 
The  next  step  in  the  President's  course  with 


i62  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

reference  to  Mexico  was  the  occupation  of 
Vera  Cruz.  On  April  20,  19 14,  the  President 
asked  Congress  for  authority  to  employ  the 
armed  forces  of  the  United  States  in  demanding 
redress  for  the  arbitrary  arrest  of  American 
marines  at  Vera  Cruz,  and  the  next  day  Ad- 
miral Fletcher  was  ordered  to  seize  the  custom 
house  at  that  port.  This  he  did  after  a  sharp 
fight  with  Huerta's  troops  in  which  nineteen 
Americans  were  killed  and  seventy  wounded. 
The  American  charge  d'affaires,  Nelson 
O'Shaughnessy,  was  at  once  handed  his  pass- 
ports, and  all  diplomatic  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  Mexico  were  severed. 

A  few  days  later  the  representatives  of  the 
So-called  ABC  Alliance,  Argentina,  Brazil, 
and  Chile,  tendered  their  good  offices  for  a 
peaceful  settlement  of  the  conflict  and  President 
Wilson  promptly  accepted  their  mediation. 
The  resulting  conference  at  Niagara,  May  20, 
was  not  successful  in  its  immediate  object, 
but  it  resulted  in  the  elimination  of  Huerta 
who  resigned  July  15,  1914.  On  August  20, 
General  Venustiano  Carranza,  head  of  one  of 
the  revolutionary  factions,  assumed  control 
of  affairs  at  the  capital,  but  his  authority  was 
disputed  by  General  Francisco  Villa,  another 
insurrectionary  chief.     On  Carranza 's  promise 


The  New  Pan-Americanism  163 

to  respect  the  lives  and  property  of  American 
citizens  the  United  States  forces  were  with- 
drawn from  Vera  Cruz  in  November,  1914. 

In  August,  191 5,  at  the  request  of  President 
Wilson,  the  six  ranking  representatives  of  Latin 
America  at  Washington  made  an  unsuccessful 
effort  to  reconcile  the  contending  factions  of 
Mexico.  On  their  advice,  however.  President 
Wilson  decided  in  October  to  recognize  the 
government  of  Carranza,  who  now  controlled 
three  fourths  of  the  territory  of  Mexico.  As  a 
result  of  this  action  Villa  began  a  series  of  at- 
tacks on  American  citizens  and  raids  across  the 
border,  which  in  March,  1916,  compelled  the 
President  to  send  a  punitive  expedition  into 
Mexico  and  later  to  dispatch  most  of  the  regu- 
lar army  and  large  bodies  of  militia  to  the 
border. 

The  raids  of  Villa  created  a  very  awkward 
situation.  Carranza  not  only  made  no  real 
effort  to  suppress  Villa,  but  he  vigorously  op- 
posed the  steps  taken  by  the  United  States 
to  protect  its  own  citizens  along  the  border, 
and  even  assumed  a  threatening  attitude. 
There  was  a  loud  and  persistent  demand  in 
the  United  States  for  war  against  Mexico. 
American  investments  in  land,  mines,  rubber 
plantations,   and   other  enterprises  were  very 


164  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

large,  and  these  financial  interests  were  par- 
ticularly outraged  at  the  President's  policy 
of  "watchful  waiting."  The  President  re- 
mained deaf  to  this  clamor.  No  country  had 
been  so  shamelessly  exploited  by  foreign  capital 
as  Mexico.  Furthermore,  it  was  suspected  and 
very  generally  believed  that  the  recent  revolu- 
tions had  been  financed  by  American  capital. 
President  Wilson  was  determined  to  give  the 
Mexican  people  an  opportunity  to  reorganize 
their  national  life  on  a  better  basis  and  to  lend 
them  every  assistance  in  the  task.  War  with 
Mexico  would  have  been  a  very  serious  under- 
taking and  even  a  successful  war  would  have 
meant  the  military  occupation  of  Mexico  for  an 
indefinite  period.  After  our  entrance  into  the 
World  War  many  of  those  Americans  who 
dissented  radically  from  Wilson's  Mexican 
policy  became  convinced  that  his  refusal  to 
become  involved  in  war  with  Mexico  was  a 
most  fortunate  thing  for  us. 

It  has  been  charged  that  there  was  a  lack  of 
consistency  between  the  President's  Mexican 
policy  and  his  Haitian  policy.  The  difference 
between  the  two  cases,  however,  was  that  order 
could  be  restored  in  Haiti  with  a  relatively 
small  force  of  marines,  while  any  attempt 
to  apply  force  to  Mexico  would  have  led  to  a 


The  New  Pan-Americanism  165 

long  and  bloody  conflict.  The  most  novel 
feature  of  the  President's  Mexican  policy  was 
his  acceptance  of  the  mediation  of  the  ABC 
Alliance  and  his  subsequent  consultation  with 
the  leading  representatives  of  Latin  America. 
This  action  brought  the  Pan-American  ideal 
almost  to  the  point  of  realization.  It  was 
received  with  enthusiasm  and  it  placed  our 
relations  with  Latin  America  on  a  better  footing 
than  they  had  been  for  years. 

It  was  suggested  by  more  than  one  critic  of 
American  foreign  policy  that  if  we  were  to  un- 
dertake to  set  the  world  right,  we  must  come 
before  the  bar  of  public  opinion  with  clean 
hands,  that  before  we  denounced  the  imperial- 
istic policies  of  Europe,  weshould  have  abandoned 
imperialistic  policies  at  home.  The  main  fea- 
tures of  President  Wilson's  Latin-American  pol- 
icy, if  we  may  draw  a  general  conclusion,  were 
to  pledge  American  republics  not  to  do  anything 
which  would  invite  European  intervention, 
and  to  secure  by  treaty  the  right  of  the  United 
States  to  intervene  for  the  protection  of  life, 
liberty,  and  property,  and  for  the  establishment 
of  self-government.  Such  a  policy,  unselfishly 
carried  out,  was  not  inconsistent  with  the  gen- 
eral war  aims  defined  by  President  Wilson. 


IX 

THE  FAILURE  OF  NEUTRALITY  AND 
ISOLATION 


IX 

THE  FAILURE  OF  NEUTRALITY  AND 
ISOLATION 

In  Washington's  day  the  United  States  was 
an  experiment  in  democracy.  The  vital  ques- 
tion was  not  our  duty  to  the  rest  of  the  world, 
but  whether  the  rest  of  the  world  would  let 
us  live.  The  policy  of  wisdom  was  to  keep 
aloof  from  world  politics  and  give  as  little  cause 
for  offense  as  possible  to  the  great  powers  of 
Europe.  Washington  pointed  out  that  "our 
detached  and  distant  situation"  rendered  such 
a  course  possible.  This  policy  was  justified 
by  events.  We  were  enabled  to  follow  unhin- 
dered the  bent  of  our  own  political  genius,  to 
extend  our  institutions  over  a  vast  continent 
and  to  attain  a  position  of  great  prosperity 
and  power  in  the  economic  world.  While  we 
are  still  a  young  country,  our  government  is, 
with  the  possible  exception  of  that  of  Great 
Britain,  the  oldest  and  most  stable  in  the  world, 
and  since  we  declared  ourselves  a  nation  and 
adopted  our  present  constitution  the  British 

169 


170  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

Grovernment  has  undergone  radical  changes  of  a 
democratic  character.  By  age  and  stability  we 
have  long  been  entitled  to  a  voice  and  influence 
in  the  world,  and  yet  we  have  been  singularly 
indifferent  to  our  responsibilities  as  a  member 
of  the  society  of  nations.  We  have  been  in  the 
world,  but  not  of  it. 

Our  policy  of  isolation  corresponded  with  the 
situation  as  it  existed  a  hundred  years  ago, 
but  not  with  the  situation  as  it  exists  to-day 
and  as  it  has  existed  for  some  years  past.  We 
no  longer  occupy  a  "detached  and  distant 
situation."  Steam  and  electricity,  the  cable 
and  wireless  telegraphy  have  overcome  the 
intervening  space  and  made  us  the  close  neigh- 
bors of  Europe.  The  whole  world  has  been 
drawn  together  in  a  way  that  our  forefathers 
never  dreamed  of,  and  our  commercial,  finan- 
cial, and  social  relations  with  the  rest  of  the 
world  are  intimate.  Under  such  circumstances 
political  isolation  is  an  impossibility.  It  has 
for  years  been  nothing  more  than  a  tradition, 
but  a  tradition  which  has  tied  the  hands  of 
American  diplomats  and  caused  the  American 
public  to  ignore  what  was  actually  going  on  in 
the  world.  The  Spanish  War  and  the  acquisi- 
tion of  the  Philippines  brought  us  into  the  full 
current  of  world  politics,  and  yet  we  refused 


The  Failure  of  Neutrality  and  Isolation  171 

to  recognize  the  changes  that  inevitably  fol- 
lowed. 

The  emergence  of  Japan  as  a  first-class  power, 
conscious  of  achievement  and  eager  to  enter 
on  a  great  career,  introduced  a  new  and  disturb- 
ing element  into  world  politics.  Our  diplo- 
macy, which  had  hitherto  been  comparatively 
simple,  now  became  exceedingly  complex.  For- 
merly the  United  States  was  the  only  great 
power  outside  the  European  balance.  The  exis- 
tence of  a  second  detached  power  greatly  com- 
plicated the  international  situation  and  presented 
opportunities  for  new  combinations.  We  have 
already  seen  how  Germany  undertook  to  use 
the  opportunity  presented  by  Russia's  war 
with  Japan  to  humiliate  France  and  that  the 
United  States  took  a  prominent  part  in  the 
Algeciras  Conference  for  the  purpose  of  prevent- 
ing the  threatened  overthrow  of  the  European 
balance  of  power.  Thus,  even  before  the  World 
War  began,  it  had  become  evident  to  close  ob- 
servers of  international  affairs  that  the  Euro- 
pean balance  would  soon  be  superseded  by  a 
world  balance  in  which  the  United  States  would 
be  forced  to  take  its  place. 

It  took  a  world  war,  however,  to  dispel  the 
popular  illusion  of  isolation  and  to  arouse  us  to  a 
temporary  sense  of  our  international  responsi- 


172  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

bilities.  When  the  war  began  the  President, 
following  the  traditions  of  a  hundred  years, 
issued,  as  a  matter  of  course,  a  proclamation  of 
neutrality,  and  he  thought  that  the  more  scru- 
pulously it  was  observed  the  greater  would  be  the 
opportunity  for  the  United  States  to  act  as  im- 
partial mediator  in  the  final  adjustment  of  peace 
terms.  As  the  fierceness  of  the  conflict  grew  it 
became  evident  that  the  role  of  neutral  would 
not  be  an  easy  one  to  play  and  that  the  vital 
interests  of  the  United  States  would  be  involved 
to  a  far  greater  extent  than  anyone  had  foreseen. 
y^Neutrality  in  the  modem  sense  is  essentially 
f  an  American  doctrine  and  the  result  of  our 
Vspolicy  of  isolation.  If  we  were  to  keep  out  of 
European  conflicts,  it  was  necessary  for  us  to 
pursue  a  course  of  rigid  impartiality  in  wars 
between  European  powers.  In  the  Napoleonic 
wars  we  insisted  that  neutrals  had  certain  rights 
which  belligerents  were  bound  to  respect  and 
we  fought  the  War  of  1812  with  England  in 
order  to  establish  that  principle.  Half  a 
century  later,  in  the  American  Civil  War,  we 
insisted  that  neutrals  had  certain  duties  which 
every  belligerent  had  a  right  to  expect  them  to 
perform,  and  we  forced  Great  Britain  in  the 
settlement  of  the  Alabama  Claims  to  pay  us 
damages  to  the  extent  of  $15,500,000  for  having 


The  Failure  of  Neutrality  and  Isolation  173 

failed  to  perform  her  neutral  obligations.  We 
have  thus  been  the  leading  champion  of  the 
rights  and  duties  of  neutrals,  and  tTie  principles 
for  which  we  have  contended  have  been  written 
into  the  modern  law  of  nations.  When  two 
or  three  nations  are  engaged  in  war  and  the 
rest  of  the  world  is  neutral,  there  is  usually 
very  little  difficulty  in  enforcing  neutral  rights, 
but  when  a  majority  of  the  great  powers  are 
at  war,  it  is  impossible  for  the  remaining  great 
powers,  much  less  for  the  smaller  neutrals, 
to  maintain  their  rights.  This  was  true  in  the 
Napoleonic  wars,  but  at  that  time  the  law  of 
neutrality  was  in  its  infancy  and  had  never 
been  fully  recognized  by  the  powers  at  war. 
The  failure  of  neutrality  in  the  Great  War  was 
far  more  serious,  for  the  rights  of  neutrals  had 
been  clearly  defined  and  universally  recognized. 
Notwithstanding  the  large  German  popula- 
tion in  this  country  and  the  propaganda  which 
we  now  know  that  the  German  Government  had 
systematically  carried  on  for  years  in  our  very 
midst,  the  invasion  of  Belgium  and  the  atro- 
cities committed  by  the  Germans  soon  arrayed 
opinion  on  the  side  of  the  Allies.  This  was  not 
a  departure  from  neutrality,  for  it  should  be 
remembered  that  neutrality  is  not  an  attitude 
of  mind,  but  a  legal  status.    As  long  as  our 


174  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

Government  fulfilled  its  obligations  as  defined 
by  the  law  of  nations,  no  charge  of  a  violation 
of  neutraHty  could  be  justly  made.  To  deny 
to  the  citizens  of  a  neutral  country  the  right  to 
express  their  moral  judgments  would  be  to  deny 
that  the  world  can  ever  be  governed  by  public 
opinion.  The  effort  of  the  German  propagan- 
dists to  draw  a  distinction  between  so-called 
ethical  and  legal  neutrality  was  plausible,  but 
without  real  force.  While  neutraHty  is  based  on 
the  general  principle  of  impartiality,  this  prin- 
ciple has  been  embodied  in  a  fairly  well-defined 
set  of  rules  which  may,  and  frequently  do,  in  any 
given  war,  work  to  the  advantage  of  one  bellig- 
erent and  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  other.  In 
the  Great  War  this  result  was  brought  about 
by  the  naval  superiority  of  Great  Britain. 
So  far  as  our  legal  obligations  to  Germany  were 
concerned  she  had  no  cause  for  complaint.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  our  conduct  had  been  deter- 
mined solely  by  ethical  considerations,  we  would 
have  joined  the  Allies  long  before  we  did. 

The  naval  superiority  of  Great  Britain  made 
it  comparatively  easy  for  her  to  stop  all  direct 
trade  with  the  enemy  in  articles  contraband  of 
war,  but  this  was  of  little  avail  so  long  as  Ger- 
many could  import  these  articles  through  the 
neutral  ports  of  Italy,  Holland,  and  the  Scan- 


The  Failure  of  Neutrality  and  Isolation  175 

dinavian  countries.  Under  these  circumstances 
an  ordinary  blockade  of  the  German  coast 
would  have  had  little  effect.  Therefore ,  no 
such  blockade  was  proclaimed  by  Great  Britain. 
She  adopted  other  methods  of  cutting  off  over- 
seas supplies  from  Germany.  She  enlarged  the 
lists  of  both  absolute  and  conditional  contra- 
band and  under  the  doctrine  of  continuous  voy- 
age seized  articles  on  both  lists  bound  for  Ger- 
many through  neutral  countries. 

As  to  the  right  of  a  belligerent  to  enlarge  the 
contraband  lists  there  can  be  no  doubt.  Even 
the  Declaration  of  London,  which  undertook  for 
the  first  time  to  establish  an  international  classi- 
fication of  contraband,  provided  in  Article  23 
that  "articles  and  materials  which  are  exclu- 
sively used  for  war  may  be  added  to  the  list  of 
absolute  contraband  by  means  of  a  notified 
declaration,"  and  Article  25  provided  that  the 
list  of  conditional  contraband  might  be  en- 
larged in  the  same  manner.  Under  modern 
conditions  of  warfare  it  would  seem  impossible 
to  determine  in  advance  what  articles  are  to  be 
treated  as  contraband.  During  the  Great  War 
many  articles  regarded  in  previous  wars  as  in- 
nocent became  indispensable  to  the  carrying  on 
of  the  war. 

Great  Britain's  application  of  the  doctrine  of 


176  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

continuous  voyage  was  more  open  to  dispute. 
She  assumed  that  contraband  articles  shipped 
to  neutral  countries  adjacent  to  Germany  and 
Austria  were  intended  for  them  unless  proof  to 
the  contrary  was  forthcoming,  and  she  failed  to 
draw  any  distinction  between  absolute  and  con- 
ditional contraband.  The  United  States  pro- 
tested vigorously  against  this  policy,  but  the 
force  of  its  protest  was  weakened  by  the  fact  that 
during  the  Civil  War  the  American  Government; 
had  pursued  substantially  the  same  policy  in] 
regard  to  goods  shipped  by  neutrals  to  Nassau, 
Havana,  Matamoros,  and  other  ports  adjacent 
to  the  Confederacy.  Prior  to  the  American 
Civil  War  goods  could  not  be  seized  on  any 
grounds  unless  bound  directly  for  a  belligerent 
port.  Under  the  English  doctrine  of  continuous 
voyage  as  advanced  during  the  Napoleonic  wars, 
goods  brought  from  the  French  West  Indies 
to  the  United  States  and  reshipped  to  conti- 
nental Europe  were  condemned  by  the  British 
Admiralty  Court  on  the  ground  that  notwith- 
standing the  unloading  and  reloading  at  an 
American  port  the  voyage  from  the  West  Indies 
to  Europe  was  in  effect  a  continuous  voyage, 
and  under  the  Rule  of  1756  Great  Britain  re- 
fused to  admit  the  right  of  neutral  ships  to  en- 
gage in  commerce  between  France  and  her  col- 


The  Failure  of  Neutrality  and  Isolation  177 

onies.  Great  Britain,  however,  seized  ships 
only  on  the  second  leg  of  the  voyage,  that  is, 
when  bound  directly  for  a  belligerent  port. 
During  the  American  Civil  War  the  United 
States  seized  goods  under  an  extension  of  the 
English  doctrine  on  the  first  leg  of  the  voyage, 
that  is,  while  they  were  in  transit  from  one 
neutral  port  to  another  neutral  port,  on  the 
ground  that  they  were  to  be  subsequently 
shipped  in  another  vessel  to  a  Confederate 
port.  Great  Britain  adopted  and  applied  the 
American  doctrine  during  the  Boer  War.  The 
doctrine  of  continuous  voyage,  as  applied  by  the 
United  States  and  England,  was  strongly  con- 
demned by  most  of  the  continental  writers  on 
international  law.  The  Declaration  of  London 
adopted  a  compromise  by  providing  that  abso- 
lute contraband  might  be  seized  when  bound 
through  third  countries,  but  that  conditional 
contraband  was  not  liable  to  capture  under  such 
circumstances.  As  the  Declaration  of  London 
was  not  ratified  by  the  British  Government  this 
distinction  was  ignored,  and  conditional  as 
well  as  absolute  contraband  was  seized  when 
bound  for  Germany  through  neutral  countries. 
While  Great  Britain  may  be  charged  with 
having  unwarrantably  extended  the  application 
of  certain  rules  of  international  law  and  may 


178  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

have  rendered  herself  liable  to  pecuniary  dam- 
ages, she  displayed  in  all  her  measures  a  scrupu- 
lous regard  for  human  life.  Her  declaration 
that  "The  whole  of  the  North  Sea  must  be 
considered  a  military  area,"  was  explained  as  an 
act  of  retaliation  against  Germany  for  having 
scattered  floating  mines  on  the  high  seas  in  the 
path  of  British  commerce.  She  did  not  under- 
take to  exclude  neutral  vessels  from  the  North 
Sea,  but  merely  notified  them  that  certain  areas 
had  been  mined  and  warned  them  not  to  enter 
without  receiving  sailing  directions  from  the 
British  squadron. 

The  German  decree  of  February  4,  191 5,  es- 
tablishing a  submarine  blockade  or  "war  zone'* 
around  the  British  Isles,  on  the  other  hand,  was 
absolutely  without  legal  justification.  It  did 
not  fulfill  the  requirements  of  a  valid  blockade, 
because  it  cut  off  only  a  very  small  percentage 
of  British  commerce,  and  the  first  requirement 
of  a  blockade  is  that  it  must  be  effective.  The 
decree  was  aimed  directly  at  enemy  merchant 
vessels  and  indirectly  at  the  ships  of  neutrals.  It 
utterly  ignored  the  well-recognized  right  of 
neutral  passengers  to  travel  on  merchant  vessels 
of  belHgerents.  The  second  decree  announcing 
unrestricted  submarine  warfare  after  February 
I,  1917,  was  directed  against  neutral  as  well  as 


The  Failure  of  Neutrality  and  Isolation  179 

enemy  ships.  It  undertook  to  exclude  all 
neutral  ships  from  a  wide  zone  extending  far 
out  on  the  high  seas,  irrespective  of  their  mis- 
sion or  the  character  of  their  cargo.  It  was  an 
utter  defiance  of  all  law. 

The  citizens  of  neutral  countries  have  always 
had  the  right  to  travel  on  the  merchant  vessels 
of  belligerents,  subject,  of  course,  to  the  risk  of 
capture  and  detention.  The  act  of  the  German 
ambassador  in  inserting  an  advertisement  in  a 
New  York  paper  warning  Americans  not  to 
take  passage  on  the  Lusitania^  when  the  Presi- 
dent had  publicly  asserted  that  they  had  a  per- 
fect right  to  travel  on  belligerent  ships,  was  an 
insolent  and  unparalleled  violation  of  diplo- 
matic usage  and  would  have  justified  his  instant 
dismissal.  Some  action  would  probably  have 
been  taken  by  the  State  Department  had  not 
the  incident  been  overshadowed  by  the  carrying 
out  of  the  threat  and  the  actual  destruction  of 
the  Lusitania. 

The  destruction  of  enemy  prizes  at  sea  is 
recognized  by  international  law  under  excep- 
tional circumstances  and  subject  to  certain 
definite  restrictions,  but  an  unHmited  right 
of  destruction  even  of  enemy  merchant  vessels 
had  never  been  claimed  by  any  authority  on 
international  law  or  by  any  government  prior 


'  l8o  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

to  the  German  decree.  The  destruction  of 
neutral  prizes,  though  practised  by  some  gov- 
ernments, has  not  been  so  generally  acquiesced 
in,  and  when  resorted  to  has  been  attended  by 
an  even  more  rigid  observance  of  the  rules  de- 
signed to  safeguard  human  life.  Article  48  of 
the  Declaration  of  London  provided  that,  **A 
captured  neutral  vessel  is  not  to  be  destroyed 
by  the  captor,  but  must  be  taken  into  such 
port  as  is  proper  in  order  to  determine  there 
the  rights  as  regards  the  validity  of  the  cap- 
ture." Unfortunately  Article  49  largely  nega- 
tived this  statement  by  leaving  the  whole  matter 
to  the  discretion  of  the  captor.  It  is  as  follows: 
"As  an  exception,  a  neutral  vessel  captured  by  a 
belligerent  ship,  and  which  would  be  liable  to 
condemnation,  may  be  destroyed  if  the  ob- 
servance of  Article  48  would  involve  danger  to 
the  ship  of  war  or  to  the  success  of  the  operations 
in  which  she  is  at  the  time  engaged.'*  The  next 
article  provided  the  following  safeguards:  "Be- 
fore the  destruction  the  persons  on  board  must 
be  placed  in  safety,  and  all  the  ship's  papers 
and  other  documents  which  those  interested 
consider  relevant  for  the  decision  as  to  the 
validity  of  the  capture  must  be  taken  on  board 
the  ship  of  war." 
The  Declaration  of  London  was  freely  criti- 


The  Failure  of  Neutrality  and  Isolation  i8i 

cised  for  recognizing  an  unlimited  discretionary 
right  on  the  part  of  a  captor  to  destroy  a  neutral 
prize.  Under  all  the  circumstances  the  main 
grievance  against  Germany  was  not  that  she 
destroyed  prizes  at  sea,  but  that  she  utterly 
ignored  the  restrictions  imposed  upon  this 
right  and  the  rules  designed  to  safeguard  human 
life. 

Germany  sought  to  justify  her  submarine 
policy  on  the  ground  (i)  that  the  American  man- 
ufacture and  sale  of  munitions  of  war  was  one- 
sided and  therefore  unneutral,  and  (2)  that  the 
United  States  had  practically  acquiesced  in 
what  she  considered  the  unlawful  efforts  of 
Great  Britain  to  cut  off  the  food  supply  of 
Germany.  The  subject  of  the  munitions  trade 
was  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  United 
States  by  Germany  in  a  note  of  April  4,  191 5. 
While  not  denying  the  legality  of  the  trade 
in  munitions  under  ordinary  circumstances 
the  contentions  of  the  German  Government  were 
that  the  situation  in  the  present  war  differed 
from  that  of  any  previous  war;  that  the  recog- 
nition of  the  trade  in  the  past  had  sprung  from 
the  necessity  of  protecting  existing  industries, 
while  in  the  present  war  an  entirely  new  indus- 
try had  been  created  in  the  United  State*;  and 
it  concluded  with  the  following  statement  which 


l82  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

was  the  real  point  of  the  note:  "This  industry  is 
actually  delivering  goods  to  the  enemies  of 
Germany.  The  theoretical  willingness  to  sup- 
ply Germany  also,  if  shipments  were  possible, 
does  not  alter  the  case.  If  it  is  the  will  of  the 
American  people  that  there  should  be  a  true 
neutrality,  the  United  States  will  find  means  of 
preventing  this  one-sided  supply  of  arms  or  at 
least  of  utilizing  it  to  protect  legitimate  trade 
with  Germany,  especially  that  in  food  stuffs." 
To  this  note  Secretary  Bryan  replied  that  "Any 
change  in  its  own  laws  of  neutrality  during  the 
progress  of  the  war  which  would  affect  unequally 
the  relations  of  the  United  States  with  the  na- 
tions at  war  would  be  an  unjustifiable  departure 
from  the  principle  of  strict  neutrality." 

Two  months  later  the  discussion  was  re- 
newed by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government. 
The  Austrian  note  did  not  question  the  inten- 
tion of  the  United  States  to  conform  to  the 
letter  of  the  law,  but  complained  that  we  were 
not  carrying  out  its  spirit,  and  suggested  that  a 
threat  to  withhold  food  stuffs  and  raw  materials 
from  the  Allies  would  be  sufficient  to  protect 
legitimate  commerce  between  the  United  States 
and  the  Central  Powers.  To  this  note  Secretary 
Lansing  replied  at  length.  He  held:  (i)  that 
the  United  States  was  under  no  obligation  to 


The  Failure  of  Neutrality  and  Isolation  183 

change  or  modify  the  rules  of  international 
usage  on  account  of  special  conditions.  (2) 
He  rejected  what  he  construed  to  be  the  con- 
tention of  the  Austrian  Government  that  "the 
advantages  gained  to  a  belligerent  by  its  su- 
periority on  the  sea  should  be  equalized  by 
the  neutral  powers  by  the  establishment  of  a 
system  of  non-intercourse  with  the  victor/* 
(3)  He  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Germany  had  during  the  years 
preceding  the  present  European  war  produced 
"a  great  surplus  of  arms  and  ammunition  which 
they  sold  throughout  the  world  and  especially 
to  belligerents.  Never  during  that  period 
did  either  of  them  suggest  or  apply  the  principle 
now  advocated  by  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government.**  (4)  "But,  in  addition  to  the 
question  of  principle,  there  is  a  practical  and 
substantial  reason  why  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  has  from  the  foundation  of  the 
Republic  to  the  present  time  advocated  and 
practised  unrestricted  trade  in  arms  and  mili- 
tary supplies.  It  has  never  been  the  policy 
of  this  country  to  maintain  in  time  of  peace  a 
large  military  establishment  or  stores  of  arms 
and  ammunition  sufficient  to  repel  invasion 
by  a  well-equipped  and  powerful  enemy.  It  has 
desired  to  remain  at  peace  with  all  nations  and 


184  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

to  avoid  any  appearance  of  menacing  such  peace 
by  the  threat  of  its  armies  and  navies.  In  con- 
sequence of  this  standing  policy  the  United 
States  would,  in  the  event  of  attack  by  a  foreign 
p)ower,  be  at  the  outset  of  the  war  seriously,  if 
not  fatally,  embarrassed  by  the  lack  of  arms 
and  ammunition  and  by  the  means  to  produce 
them  in  sufficient  quantities  to  supply  the  re- 
quirements of  national  defense.  The  United 
States  has  always  depended  upon  the  right  and 
power  to  purchase  arms  and  ammunition  from 
neutral  nationa  in  case  of  foreign  attack.  This 
right,  which  it  claims  for  itself,  it  cannot  deny 
to  others." 

The  German  and  Austrian  authorities  were 
fully  aware  that  their  arguments  had  no  basis 
in  international  law  or  practice.  Indeed,  their 
notes  were  probably  designed  to  influence  public 
opinion  and  help  the  German  propagandists 
in  this  country  who  were  making  a  desperate 
effort  to  get  Congress  to  place  an  embargo  on 
the  export  of  munitions.  Having  failed  in  this 
attempt,  an  extensive  conspiracy  was  formed 
to  break  up  the  trade  in  munitions  by  a  resort 
to  criminal  methods.  Numerous  explosions 
occurred  in  munition  plants  destroying  many 
lives  and  millions  of  dollars'  worth  of  property, 
and  bombs  were  placed  in  a  number  of  ships 


The  Failure  of  Neutrality  and  Isolation  185 

engaged  in  carrying  supplies  to  the  Allies. 
The  Austrian  ambassador  and  the  German 
military  and  naval  attaches  at  Washington  were 
involved  in  these  activities  and  their  recall  was 
promptly  demanded  by  Secretary  Lansing. 

The  violations  of  international  law  by  Ger- 
many were  so  flagrant,  her  methods  of  waging 
war  so  barbarous,  the  activities  of  her  diplomats 
so  devoid  of  honor,  and  her  solemn  pledges 
were  so  ruthlessly  broken  that  the  technical 
discussion  of  the  rules  of  maritime  law  was  com- 
pletely overshadowed  by  the  higher  moral  issues 
involved  in  the  contest.  AH  further  eff'orts  to 
maintain  neutrality  finally  became  intolerable 
even  to  President  Wilson,  who  had  exercised 
patience  until  patience  ceased  to  be  a  virtue. 
Having  failed  in  his  efforts  to  persuade  Congress 
to  authorize  the  arming  of  merchantmen,  the 
President  finally  concluded,  in  view  of  Ger- 
many's threat  to  treat  armed  guards  as  pirates, 
that  armed  neutrality  was  impracticable.  He 
accepted  the  only  alternative  and  on  April 
2,  1917,  went  before  Congress  to  ask  for  a  formal 
declaration  of  war  against  Germany. 

Had  Germany  observed  the  rules  of  inter- 
national law,  the  United  States  would  probably 
have  remained  neutral  notwithstanding  the 
imminent  danger  of  the  overthrow  of  France 


l86  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

and  the  possible  invasion  of  England.  The 
upsetting  of  the  European  balance  would 
eventually  have  led  to  a  conflict  between  Ger- 
many and  the  United  States.  The  violation  of 
American  rights  forced  us  to  go  to  war,  but 
having  once  entered  the  war,  we  fought  not 
merely  for  the  vindication  of  American  rights, 
but  for  the  establishment  of  human  freedom 
and  the  recognition  of  human  rights  throughout 
the  world.  In  his  war  address  President  Wilson 
said:  "Neutrality  is  no  longer  feasible  or 
desirable  where  the  peace  of  the  world  is  in- 
volved and  the  freedom  of  its  peoples,  and  the 
menace  to  that  peace  and  freedom  lies  in  the 
existence  of  autocratic  Governments  backed 
by  organized  force  which  is  controlled  wholly 
by  their  will,  not  by  the  will  of  their  people. 
We  have  seen  the  last  of  neutrality  in  such 
circumstances."  Having  once  abandoned  neu- 
trality and  isolation  we  are  not  likely  to  re- 
main neutral'  again  in  any  war  which  involves 
the  balance  of  power  in  the  world  or  the  des- 
tinies of  the  major  portion  of  mankind.  Neu- 
trality and  isolation  were  correlative.  They 
were  both  based  on  the  view  that  we  were  a 
remote  and  distant  people  and  had  no  intimate 
concern  with  what  was  going  on  in  the  great 
world  across  the  seas. 


The  Failure  of  Neutrality  and  Isolation  187 

The  failure  of  neutrality  and  the  abandon- 
ment of  isolation  marked  a  radical,  though  in- 
evitable, change  in  our  attitude  toward  world 
politics.  President  Wilson  did  not  propose, 
however,  to  abandon  the  great  principles  for 
which  we  as  a  nation  had  stood,  but  rather  to 
extend  them  and  give  them  a  world-wide  appli- 
cation. In  his  address  to  the  Senate  on  Janu- 
ary 22,  1917,  he  said: 

"I  am  proposing,  as  it  were,  that  the  nations 
should  with  one  accord  adopt  the  doctrine  of 
President  Monroe  as  the  doctrine  of  the  world; 
that  no  nation  should  seek  to  extend  its  polity 
over  any  other  nation  or  people,  but  that  every 
people  should  be  left  free  to  determine  its  own 
polity,  its  own  way  of  development,  unhindered, 
unthreatened,  unafraid,  the  little  along  with  the 
great  and  powerful. 

"I  am  proposing  that  all  nations  henceforth 
avoid  entangling  alliances  which  would  draw 
them  into  competitions  of  power,  catch  them 
in  a  net  of  intrigue  and  selfish  rivalry,  and 
disturb  their  own  affairs  with  influences  in- 
truded from  without.  There  is  no  entangling 
alliance  in  a  concert  of  power." 

In  other  words,  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  stripped 
of  its  imperialistic  tendencies,  was  to  be  inter- 
nationalized, and  the  American  policy  of  isola- 


l88  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

tion,  in  the  sense  of  avoiding  secret  alliances, 
was  to  become  a  fundamental  principle  of  the 
new  international  order.  If  the  United  States 
was  to  go  into  a  league  of  nations,  every  member 
of  the  league  must  stand  on  its  own  footing. 
We  were  not  to  be  made  a  buffer  between  al- 
liances and  ententes. 


X 

THE  WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES] 


X 

THE  WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

The  advent  of  the  United  States  into  the  family 
of  nations  nearly  a  century  and  a  half  ago  was 
an  event  of  worldwide  significance.  Our  revo- 
lutionary ancestors  set  up  a  government  founded 
on  a  new  principle,  happily  phrased  by  Jefferson 
in  the  statement  that  governments  derive  their 
just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the  governed. 
This  principle  threatened,  although  remotely, 
the  existence  of  the  aristocratic  governments 
of  the  Old  World  which  were  still  based  on  the 
doctrine  of  divine  right.  The  entrance  of  the 
United  States  into  the  World  War  was  an  event 
of  equal  significance  because  it  gave  an  Amer- 
ican president,  who  was  thoroughly  grounded 
in  the  political  philosophy  of  the  Virginia  Bill  of 
Rights,  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  and 
the  writings  of  the  founders  of  the  Republic, 
an  opportunity  to  proclaim  to  the  world  the 
things  for  which  America  has  always  stood.  In 
this  connection  H.  W.  V.  Temperley  in  "A 
History  of  the  Peace  Conference  of  Paris** 
(vol.  I,  page  173)  says:  "The  utterances  of  Pres- 
191 


192  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

ident  Wilson  have  a  unique  significance,  not  only 
because  they  were  taken  as  the  legal  basis  of  the 
Peace  negotiations,  but  because  they  form  a 
definite  and  coherent  body  of  political  doctrine. 
This  doctrine,  though  developed  and  expanded 
in  view  of  the  tremendous  changes  produced 
by  the  war,  was  not  formed  or  even  altered  by 
them.  His  ideas,  like  those  of  no  other  great 
statesman  of  the  war,  are  capable  of  being 
worked  out  as  a  complete  political  philosophy. 
A  peculiar  interest,  therefore,  attaches  to  his 
pre-war  speeches,  for  they  contain  the  germs  of 
his  political  faith  and  were  not  influenced  by 
the  terrifying  portents  of  to-day.  The  tenets  in 
themselves  were  few  and  simple,  but  their  con- 
sequences, when  developed  by  the  war,  were 
such  as  to  produce  the  most  far-reaching  results. 
It  is  not  possible  or  necessary  to  discuss  how  far 
these  tenets  were  accepted  by  the  American 
people  as  a  whole,  for,  as  the  utterances  of  their 
legal  representative  at  a  supreme  moment  of 
world  history,  they  will  always  retain  their 
value." 

The  principal  features  of  Wilson's  political 
philosophy  were  revealed  in  his  policy  toward 
Latin  America  before  he  had  any  idea  of  inter- 
vening in  the  European  situation.  At  the  out- 
set of  his  administration  he  declared  that  the 


The  War  Aims  of  the  United  States     193 

United  States  would  "never  again  seek  one 
additional  foot  of  territory  by  conquest."  In 
December,  1915,  he  declared:  "From  the  first 
we  have  made  common  cause  with  all  partisans 
of  liberty  on  this  side  of  the  sea  and  .  .  . 
have  set  America  aside  as  a  whole  for  the  uses 
of  independent  nations  and  political  freemen." 
A  few  weeks  later  he  proposed  that  the  nations 
of  America  should  unite  "in  guaranteeing  to 
each  other  absolute  political  independence  and 
territorial  integrity."  This  proposal  was  act- 
ually embodied  in  a  treaty,  but  this  plan  for  an 
American  league  of  nations  did  not  meet  with 
the  approval  of  the  other  states,  who  probably 
feared  that  the  United  States  would  occupy  too 
dominant  a  position  in  such  a  league.  President 
Wilson's  refusal  to  recognize  the  despotic  power 
of  Huerta,  while  expressing  sympathy  for  the 
people  of  Mexico,  was  the  first  apphcation  of  the 
policy  which  later  so  successfully  drove  a  wedge 
in  between  the  Kaiser  and  the  German  people. 
His  refusal  to  invade  Mexico  and  his  determina- 
tion to  give  the  people  of  that  country  a  chance 
to  work  out  their  own  salvation  gave  evidence 
to  the  world  of  the  unselfishness  and  sincerity 
of  his  policies,  and  paved  the  way  for  the  moral 
leadership  which  he  later  exercised  over  the 
peoples  of  Europe. 


194  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

President  Wilson's  insistence  on  neutrality  in 
"thought,  word,  and  deed,"  the  expression  "too 
proud  to  fight,"  and  his  statement  in  regard  to 
the  war.  May  27,  1916,  that  "with  its  causes 
and  objects  we  are  not  concerned,"  caused  deep 
offense  to  many  of  his  countrymen  and  were 
received  with  ridicule  by  others  at  home  and 
abroad.  His  reasons  for  remaining  neutral 
were  best  stated  in  the  speech  accepting  his 
second  nomination  for  the  presidency,  Septem- 
ber 2,  1916:  "We  have  been  neutral  not  only 
because  it  was  the  fixed  and  traditional  policy 
of  the  United  States  to  stand  aloof  from  the 
politics  of  Europe  and  because  we  had  had  no 
part  either  of  action  or  of  policy  in  the  influences 
which  brought  on  the  present  war,  but  also  be- 
cause it  was  manifestly  our  duty  to  prevent,  if 
it  were  possible,  the  indefinite  extension  of  the 
fires  of  hate  and  desolation  kindled  by  that 
terrible  conflict  and  seek  to  serve  mankind  by 
reserving  our  strength  and  our  resources  for  the 
anxious  and  diflScult  days  of  restoration  and 
healing  which  must  follow,  when  peace  will  have 
to  build  its  house  anew.*' 

Other  speeches  made  during  the  year  1916 
show,  however,  that  he  was  being  gradually 
forced  to  the  conclusion  that  "peace  is  not 
always  within  the  choice  of  the  nation"  and  that 


The  War  Aims  of  the  United  States     195 

we  must  be  **  ready  to  fight  for  our  rights  when 
those  rights  are  coincident  with  the  rights  of 
man  and  humanity." 

After  the  German  peace  proposals  of  Decem- 
ber 12,  1916,  President  Wilson  called  on  all  the 
belligerents  to  state  publicly  what  they  were 
fighting  for.  This  demand  caused  a  searching 
of  hearts  everywhere,  led  to  a  restatement  of 
aims  on  the  part  of  the  Allies,  and  threw  the 
Central  Governments  on  the  defensive.  In 
formulating  their  replies  the  Allies  were  some- 
what embarrassed  by  the  secret  treaties  relating 
to  Russia  and  Italy,  which  were  later  made 
public  by  the  Bolsheviki.  In  March,  191 5, 
England  and  France  had  made  an  agreement 
with  Russia  by  which  she  was  to  get  Constanti- 
nople, the  aim  of  her  policy  since  the  days  of 
Peter  the  Great.  By  the  secret  Treaty  of  Lon- 
don, signed  April  26,  191 5,  England,  France,  and 
Russia  had  promised  Italy  that  she  should  re- 
ceive the  Trentino  and  Southern  Tyrol,  includ- 
ing in  its  population  more  than  250,000  Germans. 
Italy  was  also  promised  Trieste  and  the  Istrian 
peninsula,  the  boundary  running  just  west  of 
Fiume,  over  which  city,  it  should  be  remem- 
bered, she  acquired  no  claim  under  this  treaty. 
Italy  was  also  to  receive  about  half  of  Dalmatia, 
including  towns  over  half  of  whose  population 


196  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

were  Jugo-Slavs.  To  President  Wilson's  note 
the  Allies  had  to  reply,  therefore,  in  somewhat 
general  terms.  Their  territorial  demands  were : 
"The  restitution  of  provinces  formerly  torn 
from  the  Allies  by  force  or  against  the  wish  of 
their  inhabitants;  the  liberation  of  the  Italians, 
as  also  of  the  Slavs,  Roumanes,  and  Czecho- 
slovaks from  foreign  domination,  the  setting 
free  of  the  populations  subject  to  the  bloody 
tyranny  of  the  Turks;  and  the  turning  out  of 
Europe  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  as  decidedly 
foreign  to  Western  civilization."  The  German 
reply  contained  no  statement  of  territorial 
claims  and  gave  no  pledge  even  as  to  the  future 
status  of  Belgium. 

In  reporting  the  results  of  this  interchange  of 
views  to  the  Senate,  January  22, 1917,  President 
Wilson  delivered  the  first  of  that  series  of  ad- 
dresses on  the  essentials  of  a  just  and  lasting 
peace  which  made  him  the  recognized  spokes- 
man of  the  liberal  element  in  all  countries  and 
gained  for  him  a  moral  leadership  that  was  with- 
out parallel  in  the  history  of  the  world.  "In 
every  discussion  of  the  peace  that  must  end  this 
war,"  he  declared,  "it  is  taken  for  granted  that 
that  peace  must  be  followed  by  some  definite 
concert  of  power  which  will  make  it  virtually 
impossible  that  any  such  catastrophe  should 


The  War  Aims  of  the  United  States     197 

ever  overwhelm  us  again.  Every  lover  of  man- 
kind, every  sane  and  thoughtful  man  must  take 
that  for  granted."  In  fact,  there  was  no  dissent 
from  this  statement.  Most  of  our  leading  men, 
including  Taft,  Roosevelt,  and  Lodge,  were 
committed  to  the  idea  of  a  league  of  nations  for 
the  maintenance  of  law  and  international  peace. 
The  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  which  had 
branches  in  all  the  Allied  countries,  had  done  a 
great  work  in  popularizing  this  idea.  The 
President  came  before  the  Senate,  he  said,  "as 
the  council  associated  with  me  in  the  final  de- 
termination of  our  international  obligations,"  to 
formulate  the  conditions  upon  which  he  would 
feel  justified  in  asking  the  American  people  to 
give  "formal  and  solemn  adherence  to  a  League 
for  Peace."  He  disclaimed  any  right  to  a  voice 
in  determining  what  the  terms  of  peace  should 
be,  but  he  did  claim  a  right  to  "have  a  voice  in 
determining  whether  they  shall  be  made  lasting 
or  not  by  the  guarantees  of  a  universal  cove- 
nant." First  of  all,  the  peace  must  be  a  "peace 
without  victory,"  for  "only  a  peace  between 
equals  can  last."  And,  he  added,  "there  is  a 
deeper  thing  involved  than  even  equality  of 
right  among  organized  nations.  No  peace  can 
last,  or  ought  to  last,  which  does  not  recognize 
and  accept  the  principle  that  governments  de- 


198  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

rive  all  their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the 
governed,  and  that  no  right  anywhere  exists  to 
hand  peoples  about  from  sovereignty  to  sov- 
ereignty as  if  they  were  property."  He  cited 
Poland  as  an  example,  declaring  that  statesmen 
everywhere  were  agreed  that  she  should  be 
"united,  independent,  and  autonomous." 

He  declared  that  every  great  people  "should 
be  assured  a  direct  outlet  to  the  sea,"  and  that 
"  no  nation  should  be  shut  away  from  free  access 
to  the  open  paths  of  the  world's  commerce." 
He  added:  "The  freedom  of  the  seas  is  the  sine 
qua  non  of  peace,  equality,  and  cooperation." 
This  problem,  he  said,  was  closely  connected 
with  the  Hmitation  of  naval  armaments.  "The 
question  of  armaments,  whether  on  land  or  sea, 
is  the  most  immediately  and  intensely  practical 
question  connected  with  the  future  fortunes  of 
nations  and  of  mankind." 

The  Russian  revolution,  which  came  in 
March,  19 17,  and  resulted  in  the  overthrow  of 
the  Czar's  government,  cleared  the  political 
atmosphere  for  the  time  being,  and  enabled 
President  Wilson  in  his  address  to  Congress  on 
April  2  to  proclaim  a  war  of  democracy  against 
autocracy.  The  new  Russian  government  re- 
pudiated all  imperialistic  aims  and  adopted  the 
formula:  "Self-determination,  no  annexations. 


The  War  Aims  of  the  United  States     199 

no  indemnities."  Poland  was  given  her  freedom 
and  the  demand  for  Constantinople  was  aban- 
doned. The  Allies  were  thus  relieved  from  one 
of  their  most  embarrassing  secret  treaties. 

Even  after  America  entered  the  war,  President 
Wilson  continued  to  advance  the  same  ideas 
as  to  the  ultimate  conditions  of  peace.  His 
attitude  remained  essentially  different  from  that 
of  the  Allies,  who  were  hampered  by  secret 
treaties  wholly  at  variance  with  the  President's 
aims.  In  his  war  address  he  declared  that  we 
had  "no  quarrel  with  the  German  people.  We 
have  no  feeling  towards  them  but  one  of  sym- 
pathy and  friendship.  It  was  not  upon  their 
impulse  that  their  government  acted  in  enter- 
ing this  war."  Prussian  autocracy  was  the  ob- 
ject of  his  attack.  "We  are  now  about  to  ac- 
cept gauge  of  battle  with  this  natural  foe  to 
liberty  and  shall,  if  necessary,  spend  the  whole 
force  of  the  nation  to  check  and  nullify  its  pre- 
tensions and  its  power.  We  are  glad,  now  that 
we  see  the  facts  with  no  veil  of  false  pretense 
about  them,  to  fight  thus  for  the  ultimate  peace 
of  the  world  and  for  the  liberation  of  its  peoples, 
the  German  peoples  included:  for  the  rights  of 
nations  great  and  small  and  the  privilege  of  men 
everywhere  to  choose  their  way  of  life  and  of 
obedience.     The  world  must  be  made  safe  for 


200  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

democracy.  Its  peace  must  be  planted  upon 
the  tested  foundations  of  political  liberty.  We 
have  no  selfish  ends  to  serve.  We  desire  no 
conquest,  no  dominion.  We  seek  no  indemni- 
ties for  ourselves,  no  material  compensation  for 
the  sacrifices  we  shall  freely  make.  We  are  but 
one  of  the  champions  of  the  rights  of  mankind. 
We  shall  be  satisfied  when  those  rights  have 
been  made  as  secure  as  the  faith  and  the  freedom 
of  nations  can  make  them." 

About  the  time  that  the  United  States  de- 
clared war,  Austria  and  Germany  began  another 
so-called  "peace  offensive."  Overtures  were 
made  by  Austria  to  France  in  March,  and  in 
August  the  Pope  made  a  direct  appeal  to  the 
Powers.  This  move  was  unmasked  by  Presi- 
dent Wilson  in  a  public  address  at  the  Washing- 
ton Monument,  June  14,  1917.  "The  military 
masters  under  whom  Germany  is  bleeding,"  he 
declared,  "see  very  clearly  to  what  point  fate 
has  brought  them:  if  they  fall  back  or  are  forced 
back  an  inch,  their  power  abroad  and  at  home 
will  fall  to  pieces.  It  is  their  power  at  home  of 
which  they  are  thinking  now  more  than  of  their 
power  abroad.  It  is  that  power  which  is  trem- 
bling under  their  very  feet.  Deep  fear  has 
entered  their  hearts.  They  have  but  one 
chance  to  perpetuate  their  military  power,  or 


The  War  Aims  of  the  United  States     201 

even  their  controUing  poHtical  influence.  If 
they  can  secure  peace  now,  with  the  immense 
advantage  still  in  their  hands,  they  will  have 
justified  themselves  before  the  German  people. 
They  will  have  gained  by  force  what  they  prom- 
ised to  gain  by  it — an  immense  expansion  of 
German  power  and  an  immense  enlargement  of 
German  industrial  and  commercial  opportuni- 
ties. Their  prestige  will  be  secure,  and  with 
their  prestige  their  political  power.  If  they  fail, 
their  people  will  thrust  them  aside.  A  govern- 
ment accountable  to  the  people  themselves  will 
be  set  up  in  Germany,  as  has  been  the  case  in 
England,  the  United  States,  and  France — in  all 
great  countries  of  modern  times  except  Ger- 
many. If  they  succeed  they  are  safe,  and  Ger- 
many and  the  world  are  undone.  If  they  fail, 
Germany  is  saved  and  the  world  will  be  at  peace. 
If  they  succeed,  America  will  fall  within  the 
menace,  and  we,  and  all  the  rest  of  the  world, 
must  remain  armed,  as  they  will  remain,  and 
must  make  ready  for  the  next  step  in  their 
aggression.  If  they  fail,  the  world  may  unite 
for  peace  and  Germany  may  be  of  the  union." 
The  task  of  replying  to  the  Pope  was  left  by 
the  Allied  governments  to  Wilson,  who  was  not 
hampered  by  secret  treaties.  In  this  remark- 
able document  he  drove  still  further  the  wedge 


202  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

between  the  German  people  and  the  Kaiser. 
"The  American  people  have  suffered  intolerable 
wrongs  at  the  hands  of  the  Imperial  German 
Government,  but  they  desire  no  reprisal  upon 
the  German  people  who  have  themselves  suf- 
fered all  things  in  this  war  which  they  did  not 
choose.  They  believe  that  peace  should  rest 
upon  the  rights  of  peoples,  not  the  rights  of 
Governments — the  rights  of  peoples  great  or 
small,  weak  or  powerful — their  equal  right  to 
freedom  and  security  and  self-government  and 
to  a  participation  upon  fair  terms  in  the  econ- 
omic opportunities  of  the  world,  the  German 
people  of  course  included  if  they  will  accept 
equality  and  not  seek  domination." 

In  conclusion  he  said:  "We  cannot  take  the 
word  of  the  present  rulers  of  Germany  as  a 
guarantee  of  anything  that  is  to  endure,  unless 
explicitly  supported  by  such  conclusive  evidence 
of  the  will  and  purpose  of  the  German  people 
themselves  as  the  other  peoples  of  the  world 
would  be  justified  in  accepting.  Without  such 
guarantees,  treaties  of  settlement,  agreements 
for  disarmament,  covenants  to  set  up  arbitration 
in  the  place  of  force,  territorial  adjustments, 
reconstitutions  of  small  nations,  if  made  with 
,the  German  Government,  no  man,  no  nation 
&uld  now  depend  on.     We  must  await  some 


The  War  Aims  of  the  United  States     203 

new  evidence  of  the  purposes  of  the  great 
peoples  of  the  Central  Powers.  God  grant  it 
may  be  given  soon  and  in  a  way  to  restore  the 
confidence  of  all  peoples  everywhere  in  the 
faith  of  nations  and  the  possibility  of  covenanted 
peace." 

Early  in  November,  1917,  the  Kerensky  Gov- 
ernment was  overthrown  in  Russia  and  the 
Bolsheviki  came  into  power.  They  at  once 
proposed  a  general  armistice  and  called  upon  all 
the  belligerents  to  enter  into  peace  negotiations. 
The  Central  Powers  accepted  the  invitation,  and 
early  in  December  negotiations  began  at  Brest- 
Litovsk.  The  Russian  peace  proposals  were: 
the  evacuation  of  occupied  territories,  self- 
determination  for  nationalities  not  hitherto  in- 
dependent, no  war  indemnities  or  economic 
boycotts,  and  the  settlement  of  colonial  ques- 
tions in  accordance  with  the  above  principles. 
The  Austrian  minister.  Count  Czernin,  replied 
for  the  Central  Powers,  accepting  more  of  the 
Russian  program  than  had  been  expected, 
but  rejecting  the  principle  of  a  free  plebiscite  for 
national  groups  not  hitherto  independent,  and 
conditioning  the  whole  on  the  acceptance  by  the 
Allies  of  the  offer  of  general  peace.  The  con- 
ference called  on  the  Allies  for  an  answer  by 
January  4.     No  direct  reply  was  made  to  this 


204  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

demand,  but  the  Russian  proposals  had  made  a 
profound  impression  on  the  laboring  classes  in 
all  countries,  and  both  Lloyd  George  and  Presi- 
dent Wilson  felt  called  on  to  define  more  clearly 
the  war  aims  of  the  Allies. 

In  a  speech  delivered  January  5,  1918,  Lloyd 
George  made  the  first  comprehensive  and  au- 
thoritative statement  of  British  war  aims.  He 
had  consulted  the  labor  leaders  and  Viscount 
Grey  and  Mr.  Asquith,  as  well  as  some  of  the 
representatives  of  the  overseas  dominions,  and 
he  was  speaking,  he  said,  for  "the  nation  and 
the  Empire  as  a  whole."  He  explained  first 
what  the  British  were  not  fighting  for.  He  dis- 
claimed any  idea  of  overthrowing  the  German 
Government,  although  he  considered  military 
autocracy  "a  dangerous  aijachronism";  they 
were  not  fighting  to  destroy  Austria-Hungary, 
but  genuine  self-government  must  be  granted 
to  "those  Austro-Hungarian  nationalities  who 
have  long  desired  it";  they  were  not  fighting  "to 
deprive  Turkey  of  its  capital  or  of  the  rich  and 
renowned  lands  of  Thrace,  which  are  predomi- 
nantly Turkish  in  race,"  but  the  passage  between 
the  Mediterranean  and  the  Black  Sea  must  be 
"internationalized  and  neutralized."  The  posi- 
tive statement  of  aims  included  the  complete 
restoration  of  Belgium,  the  return  of  Alsace- 


The  War  Aims  of  the  United  States     205 

Lorraine  to  France,  rectification  of  the  ItaHan 
boundary,  the  independence  of  Poland,  the 
restoration  of  Serbia,  Montenegro,  and  the 
occupied  parts  of  France,  Italy,  and  Rumania, 
and  a  disposition  of  the  German  colonies  with 
*' primary  regard  to  the  wishes  and  interests  of 
the  native  inhabitants  of  such  colonies."  He 
insisted  on  reparation  for  injuries  done  in  viola- 
tion of  international  law,  but  disclaimed  a  de- 
mand for  war  indemnity.  In  conclusion  he 
declared  the  following  conditions  to  be  essential 
to  a  lasting  peace :  "  First,  the  sanctity  of  treaties 
must  be  reestablished;  secondly,  a  territorial 
settlement  must  be  secured,  based  on  the  right 
of  self-determination  or  the  consent  of  the 
governed;  and  lastly,  we  must  seek,  by  the 
creation  of  some  international  organization,  to 
limit  the  burden  of  armaments  and  diminish  the 
probability  of  war." 

On  January  8,  1918,  three  days  after  Lloyd 
George's  speech.  President  Wilson  appeared 
before  both  Houses  of  Congress  and  delivered 
the  most  important  of  all  his  addresses  on  war 
aims.    It  contained  the  famous  Fourteen  Points : 

I.  Open  covenants  of  peace,  openly  arrived  at, 
after  which  there  shall  be  no  private 
international  understandings  of  any 
kind,    but    diplomacy    shall    proceed 


2o6  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

always  frankly  and  in  the  public 
view. 

II.  Absolute  freedom  of  navigation  upon  the 

seas,  outside  territorial  waters,  alike 
in  peace  and  in  war,  except  as  the 
seas  may  be  closed  in  whole  or  in 
part  by  international  action  for  the  en- 
forcement of  international  covenants. 

III.  The  removal,   so  far  as   possible,   of  all 

economic  barriers  and  the  establish- 
ment of  an  equality  of  trade  conditions 
among  all  the  nations  consenting  to 
the  peace  and  associating  themselves 
for  its  maintenance. 

IV.  Adequate    guarantees    given    and    taken 

that  national  armaments  will  be  re- 
duced to  the  lowest  point  consistent 
with  domestic  safety. 

V.  A   free,   open-minded    and   absolutely  im- 

partial adjustment  of  all  colonial 
claims,  based  upon  a  strict  observance 
of  the  principle  that  in  determining 
all  such  questions  of  sovereignty  the 
interests  of  the  populations  concerned 
must  have  equal  weight  with  the 
equitable  claims  of  the  Government 
whose  title  is  to  be  determined. 

VI.  The  evacuation  of  all  Russian  territory 


The  War  Aims  of  the  United  States     207 

and  such  a  settlement  of  all  questions 
affecting  Russia  as  will  secure  the  best 
and  freest  cooperation  of  the  other 
nations  of  the  world  in  obtaining  for 
her  an  unhampered  and  unembar- 
rassed opportunity  for  the  independent 
determination  of  her  own  political 
development  and  national  policy  and 
assure  her  of  a  sincere  welcome  into 
the  society  of  free  nations  under  insti- 
tutions of  her  own  choosing;  and,  more 
than  a  welcome,  assistance  also  of 
every  kind  that  she  may  need  and 
may  herself  desire.  The  treatment 
accorded  Russia  by  her  sister  nations 
will  be  the  acid  test  of  their  good  will, 
of  their  comprehension  of  her  needs  as 
distinguished  from  their  own  interests 
and  of  their  intelligent  and  unselfish 
sympathy. 
VII.  Belgium,  the  whole  world  will  agree, 
must  be  evacuated  and  restored,  with- 
out any  attempt  to  limit  the  sov- 
ereignty which  she  enjoys  in  common 
with  all  other  free  nations.  No  other 
single  act  will  serve  as  this  will  serve 
to  restore  confidence  among  the  na- 
tions  in   the   laws   which   they   have 


2o8  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

themselves  set  and  determined  for 
the  government  of  their  relations  with 
one  another.  Without  this  healing  act 
the  whole  structure  and  validity  of  in- 
ternational law  is  forever  impaired. 

VIII.  All    French    territory   should    be   freed 

and  the  invaded  portions  restored, 
and  the  wrong  done  to  France  by 
Prussia  in  1871  in  the  matter  of 
Alsace-Lorraine,  which  has  unsettled 
the  peace  of  the  world  for  nearly  fifty 
years,  should  be  righted,  in  order  that 
peace  may  once  more  be  made  secure 
in  the  interest  of  all. 

IX.  A  readjustment  of  the  frontiers  of  Italy 

should  be  effected  along  clearly  recog- 
nizable lines  of  nationahty. 

X.  The    peoples    of  Austria-Hungary,   whose 

place  among  the  nations  we  wish  to  see 
safeguarded  and  assured,  should  be 
accorded  the  freest  opportunity  of 
autonomous  development. 
XL  Rumania,  Serbia,  and  Montenegro  should 
be  evacuated:  occupied  territories  re- 
stored; Serbia  accorded  free  and  secure 
access  to  the  sea;  and  the  relations  of 
the  several  Balkan  states  to  one  an- 
other determined  by  friendly  counsel 


The  War  Aims  of  the  United  States     209 

along  historically  estabHshed  lines  of 
allegiance  and  nationaHty;  and  inter- 
national guarantees  of  the  political 
and  economic  independence  and  terri- 
torial integrity  of  the  several  Balkan 
states  should  be  entered  into. 

XII.  The   Turkish    portions    of   the    present 

Ottoman  Empire  should  be  assured  a 
secure  sovereignty,  but  the  other  na- 
tionahties  which  are  now  under  Turkish 
rule  should  be  assured  an  undoubted 
security  of  life  and  an  absolutely  un- 
molested opportunity  of  autonomous 
development,  and  the  Dardanelles 
should  be  permanently  opened  as  a 
free  passage  to  the  ships  and  com- 
merce of  all  nations  under  interna- 
tional guarantees. 

XIII.  An  independent  Polish  state  should  be 

erected  which  should  include  the  terri- 
tories inhabited  by  indisputably  Polish 
populations,  which  should  be  assured 
a  free  and  secure  access  to  the  sea,  and 
whose  political  and  economic  inde- 
pendence and  territorial  integrity 
should  be  guaranteed  by  international 
covenant. 

XIV.  A  general  association  of  nations  must 


2IO  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

be  formed  under  specific  covenants  for 
the  purpose  of  affording  mutual  guar- 
antees of  political  independence  and 
territorial  integrity  to  great  and  small 
states  alike. 
In  February  negotiations  at  Brest-Litovsk 
were  broken  off  as  a  result  of  the  excessive  de- 
mands of  the  Germans  and  the  armistice  was 
declared  at  an  end.  The  Germans  quickly 
overran  Poland  and  the  Baltic  provinces  and 
occupied  Ukraine  under  a  treaty  which  vir- 
tually placed  the  material  resources  of  that 
country  at  the  disposal  of  the  Central  Powers. 
In  an  address  at  Baltimore,  April  6,  the  anniver- 
sary of  our  entrance  into  the  war,  President 
Wilson  denounced  the  insincerity  and  perfidy  of 
the  German  rulers,  who,  he  said,  were  "enjoying 
in  Russia  a  cheap  triumph  in  which  no  brave 
or  gallant  nation  can  long  take  pride."  He  con- 
cluded with  these  strong  words:  "Germany  has 
once  more  said  that  force,  and  force  alone,  shall 
decide  whether  justice  and  peace  shall  reign  in 
the  affairs  of  men,  whether  right  as  America 
conceives  it  or  dominion  as  she  conceives  it  shall 
determine  the  destinies  of  mankind.  There  is, 
therefore,  but  one  response  possible  from  us: 
Force,  force  to  the  utmost,  force  without  stint 
or  limit,  the  righteous  and  triumphant  force 


The  War  Aims  of  the  United  States     211 

which  shall  make  right  the  law  of  the  world  and 
cast  every  selfish  dominion  down  in  the  dust." 

Between  the  addresses  of  January  8  and  the 
Armistice,  the  President  delivered  other  ad- 
dresses in  which  he  elaborated  some  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  Fourteen  Points.  Of  special  signifi- 
cance were  his  speeches  of  February  11,  July  4, 
and  September  27.  In  the  last  his  mind  cen- 
tered on  the  League  of  Nations.  "There  can 
be  no  leagues  or  alliances  or  special  covenants 
and  understandings  within  the  general  and 
common  family  of  the  League  of  Nations,"  he 
declared,  and  "there  can  be  no  special  selfish 
economic  combinations  within  the  League,  and 
no  employment  of  any  form  of  economic  boycott 
or  exclusion,  except  as  the  power  of  economic 
penalty,  by  exclusion  from  the  markets  of  the 
world,  may  be  vested  in  the  League  of  Nations 
itself  as  a  means  of  discipline  and  control."  In 
conclusion  he  said  that  the  United  States  was 
prepared  "to  assume  its  full  share  of  responsibil- 
ity for  the  maintenance  of  the  common  cove- 
nants and  understandings  upon  which  peace 
must  henceforth  rest." 

We  now  know  from  the  published  memoirs  of 
German  and  Austrian  statesmen  that  President 
Wilson's  speeches  made  a  profound  impression 
on  the  peoples  of  Central  Europe.     His  utter- 


212  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

ances  in  behalf  of  the  oppressed  nationalities,  not 
only  Belgium,  Serbia,  and  Poland,  but  also  the 
Czecho-Slovaks  and  the  Jugo-Slavs,  became 
stronger  and  more  frequent  during  the  spring 
and  summer  of  191 8,  and  solidified  the  opposi- 
tion to  Germany  at  a  critical  period  of  the  war. 
On  September  3  he  recognized  the  Czecho- 
slovak National  Council  as  a  belligerent  govern- 
ment. This  meant  the  break-up  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Empire,  which  had  not  been  con- 
templated at  an  earlier  period,  but,  as  he  stated 
in  his  reply  to  the  Austrian  request  for  an  armis- 
tice in  October,  conditions  had  changed  since 
the  announcement  of  the  Fourteen  Points,  and 
these  peoples  would  no  longer  be  satisfied  with 
mere  autonomy. 

As  a  result  of  the  Russian  collapse  and  the 
negotiations  at  Brest-Litovsk,  the  Germans 
withdrew  their  divisions  from  the  eastern  front 
and  staked  everything  on  the  great  western 
drive  of  March,  191 8.  When  this  movement 
was  finally  checked  and  the  Allied  advance  be- 
gan, the  German  military  leaders  knew  that  the 
game  was  up,  but  they  did  not  have  the  courage 
to  face  the  facts,  for  an  acknowledgment  of  de- 
feat meant  the  overthrow  of  the  old  system  of. 
government  based  on  military  success.  They 
waited   in  vain  for  some   mihtary  advantage 


The  War  Aims  of  the  United  States     213 

which  would  give  them  an  opportunity  to  open 
negotiations  without  openly  acknowledging  de- 
feat. Finally  the  state  of  demoralization  at 
Headquarters  became  so  complete  that  there 
was  no  alternative  but  to  ask  for  an  immediate 
armistice.  In  order  to  pave  the  way  for  this 
step,  the  ministry  resigned  October  i,  and 
Prince  Max  of  Baden  was  called  on  to  form  a 
new  government.  On  the  4th  he  dispatched  a 
note  to  President  Wilson  through  the  Swiss 
Government,  requesting  him  to  call  a  peace  con- 
ference and  stating  that  the  German  Govern- 
ment "accepts  the  program  set  forth  by  the 
President  of  the  United  States  in  his  message  to 
Congress  of  the  8th  January,  1918,  and  in  his 
later  pronouncements,  especially  his  speech  of 
the  27th  September,  as  a  basis  for  peace  ne- 
gotiations." 

In  reply  the  President  asked  for  a  clearer 
understanding  on  three  points:  (i)  Did  the  Im- 
perial Chancellor  mean  that  the  German  Govern- 
ment accepted  the  terms  laid  down  in  the 
President's  addresses  referred  to,  and  "that  its 
object  in  entering  into  discussion  would  be  only 
to  agree  upon  the  practical  details  of  their 
application?"  (2)  The  President  would  not  feel 
at  liberty  to  propose  a  cessation  of  arms  to  the 
Allied  Governments  so  long  as  the  armies  of  the 


214  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

Central  Powers  were  upon  their  soil.  (3)  The 
President  asked  whether  the  Chancellor  was 
speaking  for  the  constituted  authorities  of  the 
Empire  who  had  so  far  conducted  the  war. 

The  German  reply  of  October  12  was  satis- 
factory on  the  first  point.  With  respect  to  the 
withdrawal  of  their  troops  from  occupied  terri- 
tory they  proposed  a  mixed  commission  to 
arrange  the  details.  On  the  third  point  it  was 
stated  that  the  new  government  had  been 
formed  in  agreement  with  the  great  majority 
of  the  Reichstag.  Having  accomplished  this 
much,  the  President's  next  step  was  skilfully 
taken.  He  replied  that  the  process  of  evacua- 
tion and  the  conditions  of  an  armistice  were 
matters  which  must  be  left  to  the  judgment  of 
the  military  advisers  of  the  United  States  and 
the  Allied  Governments,  but  that  he  would  not 
agree  to  any  arrangement  which  did  not  provide 
"absolutely  satisfactory  safeguards  and  guaran- 
tees of  the  maintenance  of  the  present  military 
supremacy  of  the  armies  of  the  United  States 
and  of  the  Allies  in  the  field."  Referring  next 
to  submarine  warfare,  he  declared  that  the 
United  States  and  the  Allied  Governments 
could  not  consider  an  armistice  "so  long  as  the 
armed  forces  of  Germany  continue  the  illegal  and 
inhumane  practices  which  they  persist  in."     In 


The  War  Aims  of  the  United  States     215 

conclusion  he  referred  to  a  clause  contained  in 
his  speech  of  July  4,  now  accepted  by  the  Ger- 
man Government  as  one  of  the  conditions  of 
peace,  namely,  "The  destruction  of  every  arbi- 
trary power  an5rwhere  that  can  separately,  se- 
cretly, and  of  its  single  choice  disturb  the  peace 
of  the  world."  He  added:  "The  power  which 
has  hitherto  controlled  the  German  nation  is  of 
the  sort  here  described.  It  is  within  the  choice 
of  the  German  nation  to  alter  it."  He  de- 
manded that  the  United  States  and  the  AUied 
Governments  "should  know  beyond  a  perad- 
venture"  with  whom  they  were  dealing. 

In  reply  the  Chancellor  assured  the  President 
that  a  bill  had  been  introduced  in  the  Reichstag 
to  alter  the  constitution  of  the  Empire  so  as  to 
give  the  representatives  of  the  people  the  right 
to  decide  for  war  or  peace,  but  the  President  was 
not  satisfied  that  there  had  been  any  real  change. 
"It  may  be  that  future  wars  have  been  brought 
under  the  control  of  the  German  people,  but  the 
present  war  has  not  been;  and  it  is  with  the 
present  war  that  we  are  deahng."  He  was  not 
willing  to  accept  any  armistice  which  did  not 
make  a  renewal  of  hostilities  on  the  part  of  Ger- 
many impossible.  If,  he  concluded,  the  United 
States  "must  deal  with  the  military  masters  and 
the  monarchical  autocrats  of  Germany  now,  or 


2i6  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

if  it  is  likely  to  have  to  deal  with  them  later  in 
regard  to  the  international  obligations  of  the 
German  Empire,  it  must  demand  not  peace 
negotiations  but  surrender.  Nothing  can  be 
gained  by  leaving  this  essential  thing  unsaid." 
This  note  was  written  October  23.  Four  days 
later  the  Chancellor  replied:  **The  President 
knows  the  deep-rooted  changes  which  have 
taken  place  and  are  still  taking  place  in  Ger- 
man constitutional  life.  The  peace  negotiations 
will  be  conducted  by  a  People's  Government,  in 
whose  hands  the  decisive  legal  power  rests  in 
accordance  with  the  Constitution,  and  to  which 
the  Military  Power  will  also  be  subject.  The 
German  Government  now  awaits  the  proposals 
for  an  armistice  which  will  introduce  a  peace  of 
justice  such  as  the  President  in  his  manifesta- 
tions has  described." 

The  terms  of  the  Armistice  were  drawn  up 
by  the  Interallied  Council  at  Versailles  and 
completed  by  November  5.  They  were  much 
more  severe  than  the  public  had  expected  them 
to  be.  Germany  was  required  immediately  to 
evacuate  Belgium,  France,  Alsace-Lorraine,  and 
Luxemburg;  to  withdraw  her  armies  from  the 
entire  territory  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine, 
and  from  Russia,  Austria-Hungary,  Rumania, 
and  Turkey;  she  was  to  surrender  enormous 


The  War  Aims  of  the  United  States     217 

quantities  of  heavy  artillery  and  airplanes,  all 
her  submarines,  and  most  of  her  battljeships, 
cruisers,  and  destroyers.  This  was  practically 
unconditional  surrender.  Contrary  to  the  gen- 
eral belief  at  the  time,  it  is  now  known  that 
Foch  and  Haig  considered  these  terms  too  se- 
vere and  feared  that  Germany  would  not  accept 
them.  They  wanted  an  armistice  that  Germany 
would  accept.  General  Bliss,  on  the  other 
hand,  wanted  to  demand  "the  complete  dis- 
armament and  demobilization  of  the  military 
and  naval  forces  of  the  enemy."  In  America 
there  was  much  criticism  of  the  President  for 
being  wilHng  to  negotiate  with  Germany  at 
all.  "On  to  Berlin"  was  a  popular  cry,  and  it 
was  thought  that  the  President  was  preventing 
a  complete  military  triumph.  On  October  10 
Senator  Lodge  declared  in  the  Senate:  "The 
Republican  party  stands  for  unconditional  sur- 
render and  complete  victory,  just  as  Grant 
stood.  My  own  belief  is  that  the  American 
people  mean  to  have  an  unconditional  surrender. 
They  mean  to  have  a  dictated,  not  a  negotiated 
peace." 

After  reviewing  the  Armistice  negotiations 
Andre  Tardieu,  a  member  of  the  French  Cabinet 
and  delegate  to  the  Peace  Conference,  says: 
"What  remains  of  the  fiction,  believed  by  so 


2i8  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

many,  of  an  armistice  secretly  determined  upon 
by  an  American  dictator;  submitted  to  by  the 
European  governments :  imposed  by  their  weak- 
ness upon  the  victorious  armies,  despite  the 
opposition  of  the  generals  ?  The  Armistice  was 
discussed  in  the  open  light  of  day.  President 
Wilson  only  consented  to  communicate  it  to  his 
associates  on  the  triple  condition  that  its  prin- 
ciple be  approved  by  the  military  authorities 
and  its  clauses  would  be  drawn  up  by  them; 
that  it  be  imposed  upon  the  enemy  and  not 
discussed  with  him;  that  it  be  such  as  to  pre- 
vent all  resumption  of  hostilities  and  assure  the 
submission  of  the  vanquished  to  the  terms  of 
peace.  So  it  was  that  the  discussion  went 
on  with  Berlin  till  October  23,  and  in  Paris 
from  that  date  till  November  5.  It  was  to  the 
Commander-in-Chief  [Foch]  that  final  decision 
was  left  not  only  on  the  principle  of  the  Armis- 
tice but  upon  its  application.  He  it  was  who 
drew  up  the  text.  And  it  was  his  draft  that 
was  adopted.  The  action  of  the  governments 
was  limited  to  endorsing  it  and  making  it  more 
severe.  That  is  the  truth: — it  is  perhaps  less 
picturesque  but  certainly  more  in  accord  with 
common  sense." 

The  terms  of  the  Armistice  were  delivered  to 
the  Germans  by  Marshal  Foch  November  7, 


The  War  Aims  of  the  United  States     219 

and  they  were  given  seventy-two  hours  to  accept 
or  reject  them.  Meanwhile  Germany's  allies 
were  rapidly  deserting  her.  Bulgaria  surren- 
dered September  30,  and  on  October  30  Turkey 
signed  an  armistice.  Finally  on  November  4, 
the  rapidly  disintegrating  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy  also  signed  an  armistice.  On  Octo- 
ber 28  there  had  been  a  naval  mutiny  at  Kiel 
which  spread  rapidly  to  the  other  ports.  On 
the  31st  the  Emperor  departed  for  Army  Head- 
quarters, leaving  Berlin  on  the  verge  of  revolu- 
tion. On  the  7th  of  November  the  Social 
Democrats  demanded  the  abdication  of  the 
Emperor  and  the  Crown  Prince.  On  the  9th 
Prince  Max  resigned  the  Chancellorship,  and  the 
Kaiser  abdicated  and  ignominiously  fled  across 
the  border  into  Holland.  On  the  i  ith  at  5  a.  m. 
the  Armistice  was  signed  by  the  German  dele- 
gates and  Marshal  Foch,  and  it  went  into  effect 
at  1 1  o'clock  that  day. 

In  two  particulars  the  Wilson  principles  had 
been  modified  by  the  Allies.  In  the  American 
note  to  Germany  of  November  5  Secretary 
Lansing  stated  that  the  President  had  submitted 
his  correspondence  with  the  German  authorities 
to  the  Allied  Governments  and  that  he  had  re- 
ceived in  reply  the  following  memorandum: 
"The  Allied  Governments  have  given  careful 


220  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

consideration  to  the  correspondence  which  has 
passed  between  the  President  of  the  United 
States  and  the  German  Government.  Subject  to 
the  qualifications  which  follow,  they  declare  their 
willingness  to  make  peace  with  the  Government 
of  Germany  on  the  terms  of  peace  laid  down  in 
the  President's  Address  to  Congressof  January  8, 
1918,  and  the  principles  of  settlement  enunciated 
in  his  subsequent  Addresses.  They  must  point 
out,  however,  that  Clause  2,  relating  to  what  is 
usually  described  as  the  freedom  of  the  seas,  is 
open  to  various  interpretations,  some  of  which 
they  could  not  accept.  They  must  therefore 
reserve  to  themselves  complete  freedom  on  this 
subject  when  they  enter  the  Peace  Conference. 
Further,  in  the  conditions  of  peace  laid  down  in 
his  Address  to  Congress  of  January  8,  1918,  the 
President  declared  that  the  invaded  territories 
Jtiust  be  restored  as  well  as  evacuated  and  freed, 
and  the  AUied  Governments  feel  that  no  doubt 
ought  to  be  allowed  to  exist  as  to  what  this  pro- 
vision implies.  By  it  they  understand  that 
compensation  will  be  made  by  Germany  for  all 
damage  done  to  the  civilian  population  of  the 
Allies  and  their  property  by  the  aggression  of 
Germany  by  land,  by  sea,  and  from  the  air." 
In  transmitting  this  memorandum  Secretary 
Lansing  stated  that  he  was  instructed  by  the 


The  War  Aims  of  the  United  States     221 

President  to  say  that  he  agreed  with  this  inter- 
pretation. 

With  these  modifications  the  Wilson  princi- 
ples were  accepted  by  all  parties  as  the  legal 
basis  of  the  peace  negotiations. 


XI 

THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES 


XI 

THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES 

It  was  agreed  that  the  Peace  Conference  should 
meet  at  Paris,  and  President  Wilson  considered 
the  issues  involved  of  such  magnitude  that  he 
decided  to  head  the  American  delegation  him- 
self. Great  Britain,  France,  and  Italy  were  to 
be  represented  by  their  premiers,  and  it  was 
fitting  that  the  United  States  should  be  repre- 
sented by  its  most  responsible  leader,  who,  fur- 
thermore, had  been  the  chief  spokesrnan  of  the 
Allies  and  had  formulated  the  principles  upon 
which  the  peace  was  to  be  made.  But  the  de- 
cision of  the  President  to  go  to  Paris  was  with- 
out precedent  in  our  history  and,  therefore,  it 
met  with  criticism  and  opposition.  When  he 
announced  the  names  of  the  other  members  of 
the  delegation,  the  criticism  became  even  more 
outspoken  and  severe.  They  were  Secretary 
of  State  Lansing,  Henry  White,  former  am- 
bassador to  France,  Colonel  Edward  M.  House, 
and  General  Tasker  H.  Bliss.  There  had  been 
a  widespread  demand  for  a  non-partisan  peace 
commission,  and  many  people  thought  that  the 

225 


226  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

President  should  have  taken  Root,  or  Roosevelt, 
or  Taft.  Mr.  White  was  a  Republican  but  he 
had  never  been  active  in  party  affairs  or  in  any 
sense  a  leader.  In  the  Senate  there  was  deep 
resentment  that  the  President  had  not  selected 
any  members  of  that  body  to  accompany  him. 
President  McKinley  had  appointed  three  sena- 
tors as  members  of  the  commission  of  five  that 
negotiated  the  treaty  of  peace  at  the  close  of  the 
Spanish  War.  With  that  exception,  senators 
had  never  taken  part  directly  in  the  negotiation 
of  a  treaty.  The  delegation  was  attended  by  a 
large  group  of  experts  on  military,  economic, 
geographical,  ethnological,  and  legal  matters, 
some  of  whom  were  men  of  great  ability,  and  in 
their  selection  no  party  lines  were  drawn. 

But  just  before  the  signing  of  the  Armistice, 
the  President  had  suffered  a  serious  political 
defeat  at  home.  There  had  been  severe  criti- 
cism of  Democratic  leadership  in  Congress  and 
growing  dissatisfaction  with  some  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Cabinet.  In  response  to  the  appeals 
of  Democratic  Congressmen,  the  President  is- 
sued a  statement  from  the  White  House  on  Octo- 
ber 25,  asking  the  people,  if  they  approved  of 
his  leadership  and  wished  him  to  continue  to 
be  their  "unembarrassed  spokesman  in  affairs  at 
home  and  abroad,"  to  vote  for  the  Democratic 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  227 

candidates  for  Congress.  He  acknowledged  that 
the  Republicans  in  Congress  had  loyally  sup- 
ported his  war  measures,  but  he  declared  that 
they  were  hostile  to  the  administration  and 
that  the  time  was  too  critical  for  divided  leader- 
ship. This  statement  created  a  storm  of  criti- 
cism, and  did  more  than  any  other  act  in  his 
administration  to  turn  the  tide  of  public  opinion 
against  the  President.  The  elections  resulted 
in  a  Republican  majority  of  thirty-nine  in  the 
House  and  two  in  the  Senate.  The  President 
had  followed  the  practice  of  European  premiers 
in  appealing  to  the  people,  but  under  our  con- 
stitutional system  he  could  not  very  well  resign. 
Had  he  not  issued  his  appeal,  the  election  would 
have  been  regarded  as  a  repudiation  of  the 
Democratic  Congress,  but  not  necessarily  as  a 
repudiation  of  the  President.  The  situation 
was  most  unfortunate,  but  the  President  made 
no  comments  and  soon  after  announced  his  in- 
tention of  going  to  Paris.  In  December  Lloyd 
George  went  to  the  country,  and  on  pledging 
himself  to  make  Germany  pay  for  the  war  and 
to  hang  the  Kaiser,  he  was  returned  by  a  sub- 
stantial majority.  These  pledges  were  un- 
necessary and  had  a  most  unfortunate  influence 
on  the  subsequent  negotiations  at  Paris. 

The  President  sailed  for  France  December  4, 


228  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

leaving  a  divided  country  behind  him.  His 
enemies  promptly  seized  the  opportunity  to 
assail  him.  Senator  Sherman  introduced  a 
resolution  declaring  the  presidency  vacant  be- 
cause the  President  had  left  the  territory  of  the 
United  States,  and  Senator  Knox  offered  an- 
other resolution  declaring  that  the  Conference 
should  confine  itself  solely  to  the  restoration  of 
peace,  and  that  the  proposed  league  of  nations 
should  be  reserved  for  consideration  at  some 
future  time. 

While  his  enemies  in  the  Senate  were  busily 
organizing  all  the  forces  of  opposition  against 
him,  the  President  was  welcomed  by  the  war- 
weary  peoples  of  Europe  with  demonstrations 
of  genuine  enthusiasm  such  as  had  been  the  lot 
of  few  men  in  history  to  receive.  Sovereigns 
and  heads  of  States  bestowed  the  highest  honors 
upon  him,  while  great  crowds  of  working  men 
gathered  at  the  railroad  stations  in  order  to  get 
a  ghmpse  of  the  man  who  had  led  the  crusade 
for  a  peace  that  would  end  war  and  establish 
justice  as  the  rule  of  conduct  between  the  na- 
tions of  the  world,  great  and  small  nations  alike. 

No  mortal  man  could  have  fulfilled  the  hopes 
and  expectations  that  centered  in  Wilson  when 
he  landed  on  the  shores  of  France  in  December, 
191 8.     The  Armistice  had  been  signed  on  the 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  229 

basis  of  his  ideals,  and  the  peoples  of  Europe 
confidently   expected   to  see  those   ideals   em- 
bodied in  the  treaty  of  peace.     He  still  held  the 
moral  leadership  of  the  world,  but  the  war  was 
over,  the  German  menace  ended,  and  national 
rivalries  and  jealousies  were  beginning  to  reap- 
pear, even  among  those  nations  who  had  so 
recently  fought  and  bled   side   by  side.     This 
change  was  to  be  revealed  when  the  Conference 
met.     There  was  no  sign  of  it  in  the  plaudits  of 
the  multitudes  who  welcomed  the  President  in 
France,  in  England,  and  in  Italy.     He  returned 
on  January  7,  191 9,  from  Italy  to  Paris,  where 
delegates  to  the  Conference  from  all  the  coun- 
tries which  had  been  at  war  with  Germany  were 
gathering. 

The  first  session  of  the  Peace  Conference  was 
held  January  18.  The  main  work  of  the  Con- 
ference was  carried  on  by  the  Supreme  Council, 
constituted  at  this  meeting  and  composed  of  the 
two  ranking  delegates  of  each  of  the  five  great 
powers.  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy,  the  United 
States,  and  Japan.  The  decisions  which  this 
Council  arrived  at,  with  the  aid  of  the  large 
groups  of  technical  advisers  which  accompanied 
the  delegations  of  the  great  powers,  were  re- 
ported to  the  Conference  in  plenary  session  from 
time  to  time  and  ratified.     The  Supreme  Coun- 


'^230  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

cil  was,  however,  gradually  superseded  by  the 
"Big  Four,"  Wilson,  Lloyd  George,  Clemen- 
ceau,  and  Orlando,  while  the  "Five,"  composed 
of  ministers  of  foreign  affairs,  handled  much  of 
the  routine  business,  and  made  some  important 
decisions,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  *'  Four." 
According  to  statistics  compiled  by  Tardieu,  the 
Council  of  Ten  held  seventy-two  sessions,  the 
"Five"  held  thirty-nine,  and  the  "Four"  held 
one  hundred  and  forty-five.  As  one  of  the 
American  experts  puts  it:  "The  'Ten'  fell  into 
the  background,  the  *Five'  never  emerged  from 
obscurity,  the  *Four'  ruled  the  Conference  in 
the  culminating  period  when  its  decisions  took 
shape." 

At  the  plenary  session  of  January  25,  Presi- 
dent Wilson  made  a  notable  speech  in  which  he 
proposed  the  creation  of  a  league  of  nations, 
and  a  resolution  to  organize  such  a  league  and 
make  it  an  integral  part  of  the  general  treaty 
was  unanimously  adopted.  A  commission  to 
draft  a  constitution  for  the  League  was  ap- 
pointed with  President  Wilson  as  chairman.  On 
February  14  the  first  draft  of  the  Covenant  of 
the  League  was  presented  by  him  to  the  Con- 
ference, and  on  the  following  day  he  sailed  for 
the  United  States  in  order  to  consider  the  bills 
passed  by  Congress  before  the  expiration  of  the 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  23 1 

session  on  March  4.  The  first  draft  of  the 
Covenant  was  hastily  prepared,  and  it  went 
back  to  the  commission  for  revision.  As  soon 
as  the  text  was  made  known  in  the  United 
States,  opposition  to  the  Covenant  was  ex- 
pressed in  the  Senate.  During  the  President's 
brief  visit  to  Washington,  he  gave  a  dinner  at 
the  White  House  to  members  of  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  and  of  the 
House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  for  the 
purpose  of  explaining  to  them  the  terms  of  the 
Covenant.  There  was  no  official  report  of  what 
occurred  at  this  dinner,  but  it  was  stated  that 
some  of  the  senators  objected  to  the  Covenant 
on  the  ground  that  it  was  contrary  to  our  tra- 
ditional policies  and  inconsistent  with  our  Con- 
stitution and  form  of  government.  On  March 
4,  the  day  before  the  President  left  New  York 
to  resume  his  duties  at  the  Conference,  Senators 
Lodge  and  Knox  issued  a  round  robin,  signed  by 
thirty-seven  senators,  declaring  that  they  would 
not  vote  for  the  Covenant  in  the  form  proposed, 
and  that  consideration  of  the  League  of  Nations 
should  be  postponed  until  peace  had  been  con- 
cluded with  Germany.  That  same  night  the 
President  made  a  speech  at  the  Metropolitan 
Opera  House  in  New  York  City  in  which,  after 
explaining  and  defining  the  Covenant,  he  said: 


232  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

**When  that  treaty  comes  back  gentlemen  on 
this  side  will  find  the  Covenant  not  only  in  it, 
but  so  many  threads  of  the  treaty  tied  to  the 
Covenant  that  you  cannot  dissect  the  Covenant 
from  the  treaty  without  destroying  the  whole 
vital  structure."  In  this  same  address  he  also 
said:  "The  first  thing  I  am  going  to  tell  the 
\  people  on  the  other  side  of  the  water  is  that  an 
overwhelming  majority  of  the  American  people 
is  in  favour  of  the  League  of  Nations.  I  know 
that  this  is  true.  I  have  had  unmistakable  in- 
timations of  it  from  all  parts  of  the  country, 
and  the  voice  rings  true  in  every  case."  The 
President  was  evidently  quite  confident  that 
public  sentiment  would  compel  the  Senate  to 
ratify  the  peace  treaty,  including  the  Covenant 
of  the  League.  A  nation-wide  propaganda  was 
being  carried  on  by  the  League  to  Enforce 
Peace  and  other  organizations,  and  public  senti- 
ment for  the  League  appeared  to  be  overwhelm- 
ing. The  President  took  back  to  Paris  with 
him  various  suggestions  of  changes  in  the 
Covenant,  and  later  ex-President  Taft,  Elihu 
Root,  and  Charles  E.  Hughes  proposed  amend- 
ments which  were  forwarded  to  him  and 
carefully  considered  by  the  commission.  Some 
of  these  suggestions,  such  as  the  reservation  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the  right  of  with- 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  233 

drawal  from  the  League,  were  embodied  in  the 
final  draft. 

When  the  President  returned  to  Paris  he  found 
that  Secretary  Lansing  and  Colonel  House  had 
consented  to  the  separation  of  the  League  from 
the  treaty  of  peace.  He  immediately  reversed 
this  decision,  but  the  final  adoption  of  the 
Covenant  was  delayed  by  the  demand  of  Japan 
that  a  clause  be  inserted  establishing  "the  prin- 
ciple of  equality  of  nations  and  just  treatment 
of  their  nationals,"  which  would  have  brought 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  League  the  status 
of  Japan's  subjects  in  California  and  in  the  Brit- 
ish dominions.  France  urged  the  inclusion  of  a 
provision  creating  a  permanent  General  Staff  to 
direct  the  military  operations  of  the  League,  and 
Belgium  insisted  that  Brussels  rather  than  Gen- 
eva should  be  the  seat  of  the  League.  Mean- 
while other  national  aspirations  were  also 
brought  forward  which  delayed  the  general 
treaty  of  peace.  France  wanted  the  entire  left 
bank  of  the  Rhine;  Italy  put  forth  a  claim  to 
Fiume;  and  Japan,  relying  on  secret  agree- 
ments with  England,  France,  and  Italy,  in- 
sisted on  her  claims  to  Shantung.  No  eco- 
nomic settlement  had  as  yet  been  agreed  upon, 
and  the  question  of  reparations  was  threaten- 
ing the  disruption  of  the  Conference. 


234  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

The  most  difficult  problem  that  the  Confer- 
ence had  to  solve  was  the  establishment  of  a  new 
Franco-German  frontier.  There  was  no  ques- 
tion about  Alsace-Lorraine.  That  had  been 
disposed  of  by  the  Fourteen  Points,  and  Ger- 
many had  acquiesced  in  its  return  to  France  in 
the  pre-Armistice  agreement.  But  no  sooner 
was  the  Armistice  signed  than  Foch  addressed  a 
note  to  Clemenceau,  setting  forth  the  necessity 
of  making  the  Rhine  the  western  frontier  of 
Germany.  The  Left  Bank,  extending  from 
Alsace-Lorraine  to  the  Dutch  frontier,  embraced 
about  io,ocK)  square  miles  and  5,5oo,cxx>  people. 
The  debate  on  this  question  continued  at  inter- 
vals for  six  months  and  at  times  became  very 
acrimonious.  The  French  representatives  did 
not  demand  the  direct  annexation  of  the  Left 
Bank,  but  they  proposed  an  independent  or 
autonomous  Rhineland  and  French,  or  inter- 
Allied,  occupation  of  the  Rhine  for  an  indefinite 
period,  or  at  least  until  the  full  execution  by 
Germany  of  the  financial  clauses  of  the  treaty. 
Both  the  British  and  American  delegates  op- 
posed the  French  proposals.  Lloyd  George 
repeatedly  said:  "We  must  not  create  another 
Alsace-Lorraine.'*  He  also  remarked  on  one 
occasion:  "The  strongest  impression  made 
upon  me  by  my  first  visit  to  Paris  was  the  statue 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  235 

of  Strasburg  veiled  in  mourning.  Do  not  let 
us  make  it  possible  for  Germany  to  erect  a 
similar  statue." 

This  discussion  was  being  carried  on  with 
great  earnestness  and  intensity  of  feeling  when 
Wilson  returned  to  Paris  March  14.  That  very 
afternoon  he  met  Lloyd  George  and  Clemenceau. 
The  French  argument  was  set  forth  again  at 
length  and  with  great  skill.  The  fact  was  again 
pointed  out  that  the  destruction  of  the  German 
fleet  had  relieved  England  from  all  fear  of  Ger- 
man invasion,  and  that  the  Atlantic  Ocean  lay 
between  Germany  and  the  United  States,  while 
France,  which  had  suffered  two  German  inva- 
sions in  half  a  century,  had  no  safeguard  but 
the  League  of  Nations,  which  she  did  not  deem 
as  good  a  guarantee  as  the  Rhine  bridges. 
Finally  Wilson  and  Lloyd  George  offered  the 
guarantee  treaties,  and  Clemenceau  agreed  to 
take  the  proposal  under  consideration.  Three 
days  later  he  came  back  with  a  counter  proposi- 
tion and  a  compromise  was  reached.  France 
gave  up  her  demand  for  a  separate  Rhineland, 
but  secured  occupation  of  the  Left  Bank,  in- 
cluding the  bridge-heads,  for  a  period  of  fifteen 
years  as  a  guarantee  of  the  execution  of  the 
treaty.  In  return  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  pledged  themselves  to  come  to  the  im- 


236  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

mediate  aid  of  France,  in  case  of  an  unprovoked 
attack,  by  an  agreement  which  was  to  be  bind- 
ing only  if  ratified  by  both  countries.  This 
treaty  the  United  States  Senate  refused  to 
ratify.  Foch  was  opposed  to  this  compromise, 
and  adopted  a  course  of  action  which  was  very 
embarrassing  to  Clemenceau.  Fierce  attacks 
on  the  French  Government  and  on  the  repre- 
sentatives of  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States,  inspired  by  him,  appeared  in  the  papers. 
When  the  treaty  was  finally  completed,  he  even 
went  so  far  as  to  refuse  to  transmit  the  note 
summoning  the  German  delegates  to  Versailles 
to  receive  it.  Wilson  and  Lloyd  George  finally 
protested  so  vigorously  to  Clemenceau  that 
Foch  had  to  give  way. 

In  view  of  the  promises  of  Clemenceau  and 
Lloyd  George  that  Germany  should  pay  the 
cost  of  the  war,  the  question  of  reparations  was 
an  exceedingly  dijfficult  one  to  adjust.  Presi- 
dent Wilson  stoutly  opposed  the  inclusion  of 
war  costs  as  contrary  to  the  pre-Armistice 
agreement,  and  Lloyd  George  and  Clemenceau 
finally  had  to  give  in.  The  entire  American 
delegation  and  their  corps  of  experts  endeavored 
to  limit  the  charges  imposed  on  Germany  rigidly 
to  reparation  for  damage  done  to  civilians  in 
the  occupied  areas  and  on  land  and  sea.     Lloyd 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  237- 

George,  remembering  the  promises  which  he  had 
made  prior  to  the  December  elections,  insisted 
that  pensions  paid  by  the  Allied  governments 
should  be  included  as  damage  done  to  the  civil- 
ian population.  This  claim  was  utterly  illogi- 
cal, for  pensions  fall  properly  into  the  category 
of  military  expenses,  but  it  was  pressed  with 
such  skill  and  determination  by  Lloyd  George 
and  General  Smuts  that  President  Wilson  finally 
gave  his  assent. 

From  the  first  the  American  delegates  and 
experts  were  in  favor  of  fixing  definitely  the 
amount  that  Germany  was  to  pay  in  the  way  of 
reparations  and  settling  this  question  once  for 
all.  They  hoped  to  agree  upon  a  sum  which 
it  was  within  Germany's  power  to  pay.  But 
Clemenceau  and  Lloyd  George  had  made  such 
extravagant  promises  to  their  people  that  they 
were  afraid  to  announce  at  this  time  a  sum 
which  would  necessarily  be  much  less  than 
the  people  expected.  They,  therefore,  insisted 
that  the  question  should  be  left  open  to  be  deter- 
mined later  by  a  Reparations  Commission. 
They  declared  that  any  other  course  would 
mean  the  .immediate  overthrow  of  their  govern- 
ments and  the  reorganization  of  the  British  and 
French  delegations.  President  Wilson  did  not 
care  to  put  himself  in  the  position  of  appearing 


238  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

to  precipitate  a  political  crisis  in  either  country, 
so  he  finally  gave  way  on  this  point  also.  These 
concessions  proved  to  be  the  most  serious  mis- 
takes that  he  made  at  Paris,  for  they  did  more 
than  anything  else  to  undermine  the  faith  of 
liberals  everywhere  in  him. 

The  Italian  delegation  advanced  a  claim  to 
Fiume  which  was  inconsistent  both  with  the 
Treaty  of  London  and  the  Fourteen  Points. 
When  disagreement  over  this  question  had  been 
delaying  for  weeks  the  settlement  of  other  mat- 
ters. President  Wilson  finally  made  a  public 
statement  of  his  position  which  was  virtually  an 
appeal  to  the  Italian  people  over  the  heads  of 
their  delegation.  The  entire  delegation  with- 
drew from  the  Conference  and  went  home,  but 
Premier  Orlando  received  an  almost  unanimous 
vote  of  confidence  from  his  parliament,  and  he 
was  supported  by  an  overwhelming  tide  of  pub- 
lic sentiment  throughout  Italy.  This  was  the 
first  indication  of  Wilson's  loss  of  prestige  with 
the  peoples  of  Europe. 

As  already  stated,  the  Japanese  had  insisted 
on  the  insertion  in  the  Covenant  of  the  League 
of  the  principle  of  racial  equality.  It  is  very 
doubtful  whether  they  ever  expected  to  succeed 
in  this.  The  probability  is  that  they  advanced 
this  principle  in  order  to  compel  concessions  on 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  239 

other  points.  Japan's  main  demand  was  that 
the  German  leases  and  concessions  in  the  Chi- 
nese province  of  Shantung  should  be  definitely 
confirmed  to  her  by  the  treaty.  Two  weeks 
after  the  outbreak  of  the  World  War,  Japan 
had  addressed  an  ultimatum  to  Germany  to  the 
effect  that  she  immediately  withdraw  all  Ger- 
man vessels  from  Chinese  and  Japanese  waters 
and  deliver  not  later  than  September  15  "to 
the  Imperial  Japanese  authorities  without  con- 
dition or  compensation  the  entire  leased  terri- 
tory of  Kiao-chau  with  a  view  to  the  eventual 
restoration  of  the  same  to  China."  In  a  state- 
ment issued  to  the  press  Count  Okuma  said: 
"As  Premier  of  Japan,  I  have  stated  and  I  now 
again  state  to  the  people  of  America  and  all  the 
world  that  Japan  has  no  ulterior  motive  or  de- 
sire to  secure  more  territory,  no  thought  of 
depriving  China  or  any  other  peoples  of  any- 
thing which  they  now  possess." 

The  Germans  had  spent  about  $100,000,000 
in  improving  Tsing-tau,  the  principal  city  of 
Kiao-chau,  and  they  had  no  intention  of  surren- 
dering. After  a  siege  of  two  months  the  city 
was  captured  by  the  Japanese  army  and  navy, 
assisted  by  a  small  force  of  British  troops.  This 
was  the  first  act  in  the  drama.  On  Janu- 
ary 8,  1915,  Japan  suddenly  presented  to  the 


240  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

Chinese  government  the  now  famous  Twenty- 
one  Demands,  deliberately  misrepresenting  to 
the  United  States  and  other  powers  the  nature 
of  these  demands.  Among  other  things,  Japan 
demanded  not  only  that  China  should  assent 
to  any  agreement  in  regard  to  Shantung  that 
Japan  and  Germany  might  reach  at  the  con- 
clusion of  the  war,  but  that  she  should  also 
grant  to  her  greater  rights  and  concessions  in 
Shantung  than  Germany  had  enjoyed.  China 
was  finally  forced  to  agree  to  these  demands. 

Japan's  next  step  was  to  acquire  from  the 
Allies  the  assurance  that  they  would  support 
her  claims  to  Shantung  and  to  the  islands  in 
the  Pacific  north  of  the  equator  on  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  war.  This  she  did  in  secret  agree- 
ments signed  in  February  and  March,  191 7, 
with  England,  France,  Italy,  and  Russia.  Eng- 
land agreed  to  support  Japan's  claim  on  condi- 
tion that  Japan  would  support  her  claims  to 
the  Pacific  islands  south  of  the  equator.  France 
signed  on  condition  that  Japan  would  use  her 
influence  on  China  to  break  relations  with 
Germany  and  place  at  the  disposal  of  the  Allies 
the  German  ships  interned  in  Chinese  ports. 
The  Allies  were  evidently  uneasy  about  Japan, 
and  were  willing  to  do  anything  that  was  neces- 
sary to  satisfy  her.     This   uncertainty  about 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  241 

Japan  may  also  be  the  explanation  of  the 
Lansing-Ishii  agreement  signed  November  2, 
1917,  in  which  the  United  States  recognized  the 
"special  interests"  of  Japan  in  China. 

The  secret  treaties  of  the  Allies  relating  to 
the  Japanese  claims  were  not  revealed  until  the 
disposition  of  the  German  islands  in  the  Pacific 
was  under  discussion  at  the  Peace  Conference. 
When  informed  by  Baron  Makino  that  the  is- 
lands north  of  the  equator  had  been  pledged  to 
Japan  by  agreements  signed  two  years  before, 
President  Wilson  inquired  whether  there  were 
other  secret  agreements,  and  was  informed  that 
the  German  rights  in  Shantung  had  also  been 
promised  to  Japan.  As  the  other  powers  were 
pledged  to  support  Japan's  claims,  President 
Wilson  found  himself  in  a  very  embarrassing 
situation,  especially  as  he  had  also  to  oppose 
Japan's  demand  that  a  clause  recognizing  ra- 
cial equality  be  inserted  in  the  Covenant  of  the 
League.  This  was  a  moral  claim  that  Japan 
urged  with  great  strategic  effect.  In  pushing 
her  claims  to  Shantung  she  ignored  all  moral 
considerations  and  relied  entirely  upon  her  legal 
status,  secured  (i)  by  the  secret  treaties  with 
the  Allies,  (2)  by  the  treaty  of  191 5  with  China, 
and  (3)  by  right  of  conquest.  When  charged 
with   having   coerced   China   into   signing   the 


242  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

treaty  of  191 5,  Japan  replied  with  truth  that 
most  of  the  important  treaties  with  China  had 
been  extorted  by  force.  Japan  declared,  how- 
ever, that  she  had  no  intention  of  holding  Shan- 
tung permanently,  but  that  she  would  restore 
the  province  in  full  sovereignty  to  China,  re- 
taining only  the  economic  privileges  transferred 
from  Germany.  In  view  of  this  oral  promise, 
President  Wilson  finally  acquiesced  in  the  recog- 
nition of  Japan's  legal  status  in  Shantung. 

On  May  7  the  completed  treaty  was  presented 
to  the  German  delegates  who  had  been  sum- 
moned to  Versailles  to  receive  it.  When  the 
text  was  made  public  in  Berlin  there  was  an 
indignant  outcry  against  the  alleged  injustice 
of  certain  provisions  which  were  held  to  be  in- 
consistent with  the  pledges  given  by  President 
Wilson  in  the  pre-Armistice  negotiations,  and 
the  Germans  made  repeated  efforts  to  draw  the 
Allies  into  a  general  discussion  of  principles. 
They  were,  however,  finally  given  to  understand 
that  they  must  accept  or  reject  the  treaty  as  it 
stood,  and  on  June  28  it  was  signed  in  the  Hall 
of  Mirrors  at  Versailles — the  same  hall  in  which 
William  I  had  been  crowned  Emperor  of  Ger- 
many forty-eight  years  before. 

The  next  day  President  Wilson  sailed  for  the 
United  States,  and  on  July  10  personally  pre- 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  243 

sented  the  treaty  to  the  Senate  with  an  earnest 
appeal  for  prompt  ratification.  The  Committee 
on  Foreign  Relations,  to  which  the  treaty  was 
referred,  proceeded  with  great  deliberation,  and 
on  July  3 1  began  a  series  of  public  hearings  which 
lasted  until  September  12.  The  Committee 
called  before  it  Secretary  Lansing  and  several  of 
the  technical  advisors  to  the  American  delega- 
tion, including  B.  M.  Baruch,  economic  adviser, 
Norman  H.  Davis,  financial  adviser,  and  David 
Hunter  Miller,  legal  adviser.  The  Committee 
also  called  before  it  a  number  of  American  citi- 
zens who  had  had  no  official  connection  with  the 
negotiations  but  who  wished  to  speak  in  behalf 
of  foreign  groups,  including  Thomas  F.  Millard 
for  China,  Joseph  W.  Folk  for  Egypt,  Dudley 
Field  Malone  for  India,  and  a  large  delegation 
of  Americans  of  Irish  descent,  who  opposed 
the  League  of  Nations  on  the  ground  that  it 
would  stand  in  the  way  of  Ireland's  aspiration 
for  independence.  The  rival  claims  of  Jugo- 
slavs and  Italians  to  Fiume,  the  demand  of 
Albania  for  self-determination,  the  claims  of 
Greece  to  Thrace,  and  arguments  for  and  against 
the  separation  of  Austria  and  Hungary  were  all 
presented  at  great  length  to  the  Committee. 
On  August  19  the  President  received  the  Com- 
mittee at  the  White  House,  and  after  submit- 


244  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

ting  a  written  statement  on  certain  features 
of  the  Covenant,  he  was  questioned  by  members 
of  the  Committee  and  a  general  discussion 
followed. 

Meanwhile,  the  treaty  was  being  openly  de- 
bated in  the  Senate.  The  President  had  been 
an  advocate  of  publicity  in  diplomacy  as  well 
as  in  other  things,  and  the  Senate  now  under- 
took to  use  his  own  weapon  against  him  by  a 
public  attack  on  the  treaty.  Although  the 
opposition  to  the  treaty  was  started  in  the 
Senate  by  Lodge,  Borah,  Johnson,  Sherman, 
Reed,  and  Poindexter,  it  was  not  confined  to 
that  body.  Throughout  the  country  there  were 
persons  of  liberal  views  who  favored  the 
League  of  Nations  but  objected  to  the  severe 
terms  imposed  on  Germany,  and  charged  the 
President  with  having  proved  false  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  Fourteen  Points.  There  were 
others  who  did  not  object  to  a  severe  peace,  but 
who  were  bound  fast  by  the  tradition  of  isolation 
and  thought  membership  in  the  League  of  Na- 
tions would  involve  the  sacrifice  of  national 
sovereignty.  The  main  object  of  attack  was 
Article  X,  which  guaranteed  the  territorial 
integrity  and  political  independence  of  all  the 
members  of  the  League.  President  Wilson 
stated  to  the  Senate  Committee  that  he  regarded 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  245 

Article  X  as  "the  very  backbone  of  the  whole 
Covenant,"  and  that  "without  it  the  League 
would  be  hardly  more  than  an  influential  de- 
bating society."  The  opponents  of  the  League 
declared  that  this  article  would  embroil  the 
United  States  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Europe, 
and  that  it  deprived  Congress  of  its  constitu- 
tional right  to  declare  war. 

In  the  Senate  there  were  three  groups;  the 
small  number  of  "irreconcilables"  who  opposed 
the  ratification  of  the  treaty  in  any  form;  a 
larger  group  who  favored  ratification  without 
amendments,  but  who  finally  expressed  their 
willingness  to  accept  "interpretative  reserva- 
tions"; and  a  large  group  composed  mainly  of 
Republicans  who  favored  the  ratification  of 
the  treaty  only  on  condition  that  there  should 
be  attached  to  it  reservations  safeguarding  what 
they  declared  to  be  the  fundamental  rights  and 
interests  of  the  United  States.  This  group 
differed  among  themselves  as  to  the  character  of 
the  reservations  that  were  necessary,  and  some 
of  them  became  known  as  "mild  reservation- 
ists." 

It  is  probable  that  at  the  outset  only  the  small 
group  of  "irreconcilables"  hoped  or  intended  to 
bring  about  the  defeat  of  the  treaty,  but  as  the 
debate   proceeded   and  the  opposition  to  the 


246  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

treaty  received  more  and  more  popular  support, 
the  reservationists  determined  to  defeat  the 
treaty  altogether  rather  than  to  accept  any  com- 
promise. The  Republican  leaders  were  quick 
to  realize  that  the  tide  of  pubHc  opinion  had 
turned  and  was  now  running  strongly  against 
the  President.  They  determined,  therefore,  to 
ruin  him  at  all  hazards,  and  thus  to  bring  about 
the  election  of  a  Republican  president. 

When  President  Wilson  realized  that  the 
treaty  was  really  in  danger  of  defeat,  he  deter- 
mined to  go  on  an  extended  tour  of  the  country 
for  the  purpose  of  explaining  the  treaty  to  the 
people  and  bringing  pressure  to  bear  on  the 
Senate.  Beginning  at  Columbus,  Ohio,  on 
September  4,  he  proceeded  through  the  northern 
tier  of  states  to  the  Pacific  coast,  then  visited 
California  and  returned  through  Colorado. 
He  addressed  large  audiences  who  received  him 
with  great  enthusiasm.  He  was  ''trailed"  by 
Senator  Hiram  Johnson,  who  was  sent  out  by 
the  opposition  in  the  Senate  to  present  the 
other  side.  Johnson  also  attracted  large 
crowds.  On  the  return  trip,  while  delivering 
an  address  at  Wichita,  Kansas,  September  26, 
the  President  showed  signs  of  a  nervous  break- 
down and  returned  immediately  to  Washington. 
He  was  able  to  walk  from  the  train  to  his  auto- 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  247 

mobile,  but  a  few  days  later  he  was  partially 
paralyzed.  The  full  extent  and  seriousness  of 
his  illness  was  carefully  concealed  from  the 
pubHc.  He  was  confined  to  the  White  House 
for  five  months,  and  had  to  abandon  all  efforts 
in  behalf  of  the  treaty. 

On  September  10  the  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations  reported  the  treaty  to  the  Senate 
with  a  number  of  amendments  and  reservations. 
The  Committee  declared  that  the  League  was 
an  alHance,  and  that  it  would  "breed  wars  in- 
stead of  securing  peace."  They  also  declared 
that  the  Covenant  demanded  "sacrifices  of 
American  independence  and  sovereignty  which 
would  in  no  way  promote  the  world's  peace," 
and  that  the  amendments  and  reservations 
which  they  proposed  were  intended  "to  guard 
American  rights  and  American  sovereignty." 
The  following  day  the  minority  members  of 
the  Committee  submitted  a  report  opposing 
both  amendments  and  reservations.  A  few 
days  later  Senator  McCumber  presented  a  third 
report  representing  the  views  of  the  "mild 
reservationists."  It  objected  to  the  phraseol- 
ogy of  the  Committee's  reservations  as  un- 
necessarily severe  and  recommended  substitute 
reservations.  The  treaty  then  became  the 
regular  order  in  the  Senate  and  was  read  section 


248  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

by  section  and  debated  each  day  for  over  two 
months.  The  amendments  of  the  text  of  the 
treaty  were  all  rejected  by  substantial  major- 
ities for  the  reason  that  their  adoption  would 
have  made  it  necessary  to  resubmit  the  treaty 
not  only  to  the  Allies  but  also  to  Germany. 
The  majority  of  the  senators  were  opposed  to 
such  a  course.  The  Committee,  therefore, 
decided  to  substitute  reservations  for  amend- 
ments, and  Senator  Lodge  finally  submitted, 
on  behalf  of  the  Committee,  fourteen  reserva- 
tions preceded  by  a  preamble,  which  de- 
clared that  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  was 
not  to  take  effect  or  bind  the  United  States  until 
these  reservations  had  been  accepted  as  a  con- 
dition of  ratification  by  at  least  three  of  the  four 
principal  Allied  and  associated  powers,  namely, 
Great  Britain,  France,  Italy,  and  Japan. 

The  first  reservation  provided  that  in  case  of 
withdrawal  from  the  League  the  United  States 
should  be  the  sole  judge  as  to  whether  its  inter- 
national obligations  under  the  Covenant  had 
been  fulfilled.  This  reservation  was  adopted  by 
a  vote  of  50  to  35. 

The  second  reservation  declared  that  the 
United  States  assumed  no  obligation  to  preserve 
the  territorial  integrity  or  political  independence 
of  any  other  country  or  to  interfere  in  contro- 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  249 

versies  between  nations  under  the  provisions  of 
Article  X  "or  to  employ  the  military  or  naval 
forces  of  the  United  States  under  any  article  of 
the  treaty  for  any  purpose,  unless  in  any  particu- 
lar case  the  Congress,  which,  under  the  Consti- 
tution, has  the  sole  power  to  declare  war  or 
authorize  the  employment  of  the  military  or 
naval  forces  of  the  United  States,  shall  by  act  or 
joint  resolution  so  provide."  This  reservation 
was  adopted  by  a  vote  of  46  to  33. 

Reservation  Number  3,  providing  that  no 
mandate  under  the  treaty  should  be  accepted  by 
the  United  States  except  by  action  of  Congress, 
was  adopted  by  a  vote  of  52  to  31. 

Number  4,  excluding  domestic  questions  from 
consideration  by  the  Council  or  the  Assembly 
of  the  League,  was  adopted  by  a  vote  of  59  to  26. 

Number  5,  declaring  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
"to  be  wholly  outside  the  jurisdiction  of  said 
League  of  Nations  and  entirely  unaffected  by 
any  provision  contained  in  said  treaty  of  peace 
with  Germany,"  and  reserving  to  the  United 
States  the  sole  right  to  interpret  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  was  adopted  by  a  vote  of  55  to  34. 

Number  6,  withholding  the  assent  of  the 
United  States  from  the  provisions  of  the  treaty 
relating  to  Shantung  and  reserving  full  liberty 
of  action  with  respect  to  any  controversy  which 


25©  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

might  arise  under  said  articles  between  China 
and  Japan,  was  adopted  by  a  vote  of  53  to  41. 

Number  7,  reserving  to  Congress  the  right  to 
provide  by  law  for  the  appointment  of  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  United  States  in  the  Assembly 
and  Council  of  the  League  and  members  of 
commissions,  committees  or  courts  under  the 
League,  and  requiring  the  confirmation  of  all 
by  the  Senate,  was  adopted  by  a  vote  of  53  to 
40. 

Number  8,  declaring  that  the  Reparations 
Commission  should  not  be  understood  as  having 
the  right  to  regulate  or  interfere  with  exports 
from  the  United  States  to  Germany  or  from 
Germany  to  the  United  States  without  an  act 
or  joint  resolution  of  Congress,  was  adopted  by 
a  vote  of  54  to  40. 

Number  9,  declaring  that  the  United  States 
should  not  be  under  any  obligation  to  contribute 
to  any  of  the  expenses  of  the  League  without  an 
act  of  Congress,  was  adopted  by  a  vote  of  56  to 

39. 

Number  10,  providing  that  if  the  United 
States  should  at  any  time  adopt  any  plan  for  the 
limitation  of  armaments  proposed  by  the  Coun- 
cil of  the  League,  it  reserved  "the  right  to  in- 
crease such  armaments  without  the  consent  of 
the   Council   whenever  the   United    States   is 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  251 

threatened  with  invasion  or  engaged  in  war," 
was  adopted  by  a  vote  of  56  to  39. 

Number  11,  reserving  the  right  of  the  United 
States  to  permit  the  nationals  of  a  Covenant- 
breaking  State  residing  within  the  United  States 
to  continue  their  commercial,  financial,  and 
personal  relations  with  the  nationals  of  the 
United  States,  was  adopted  by  a  vote  of  53  to  41. 

Number  12,  relating  to  the  very  complicated 
question  of  private  debts,  property  rights  and 
interests  of  American  citizens,  was  adopted  by 
a  vote  of  52  to  41. 

Number  13,  withholding  the  assent  of  the 
United  States  from  the  entire  section  of  the 
treaty  relating  to  international  labor  organiza- 
tion until  Congress  should  decide  to  participate, 
was  adopted  by  a  vote  of  54  to  35. 

Number  14  declared  that  the  United  States 
would  not  be  bound  by  any  action  of  the  Coun- 
cil or  Assembly  in  which  any  member  of  the 
League  and  its  self-governing  dominions  or 
colonies  should  cast  in  the  aggregate  more  than 
one  vote.  This  reservation  was  adopted  by  a 
vote  of  55  to  38. 

A  number  of  other  reservations  were  offered 
and  rejected.  Under  the  rules  of  the  Senate, 
amendments  and  reservations  to  a  tre:ity  may 
be  adopted  by  a  majority  vote,  while  a  treaty 


252  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

can  be  ratified  Dniy  by  a  two-thirds  vote.  A 
number  of  senators  who  were  opposed  to  the 
treaty  voted  for  the  Lodge  reservations  in  order 
to  insure  its  defeat.  When  the  vote  on  the 
treaty  with  the  reservations  was  taken  Novem- 
ber 19,  it  stood  39  for  and  55  against.  A 
motion  to  reconsider  the  vote  was  then  adopted, 
and  Senator  Hitchcock,  the  Democratic  leader, 
proposed  five  reservations  covering  the  right  of 
withdrawal,  domestic  questions,  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  the  right  of  Congress  to  decide  on  the 
employment  of  the  naval  and  military  forces 
of  the  United  States  in  any  case  arising  under 
Article  X,  and  restrictions  on  the  voting  powers 
of  self-governing  colonies  or  dominions.  These 
reservations  were  rejected,  the  vote  being  41 
to  50.  Another  vote  was  then  taken  on  the 
treaty  with  the  Lodge  reservations,  the  result 
being  41  for  and  51  against.  Senator  Under- 
wood then  offered  a  resolution  to  ratify  the 
treaty  without  reservations  of  any  kind.  The 
vote  on  this  resolution  was  38  for  and  53  against. 
It  was  now  evident  that  there  was  little  pros- 
pect of  securing  the  ratification  of  the  treaty 
without  compromise.  On  January  8,  1920,  a 
letter  from  the  President  was  read  at  the  Jack- 
son Day  dinner  in  Washington,  in  which  he  re- 
fused to  accept  the  decision  of  the  Senate  as 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  253 

final  and  said:  "There  can  be  no  reasonable 
objection  to  interpretations  accompanying  the 
act  of  ratification  itself.  But  when  the  treaty  is 
acted  upon,  I  must  know  whether  it  means  that 
we  have  ratified  or  rejected  it.  We  cannot  re- 
write this  treaty.  We  must  take  it  without 
changes  which  alter  its  meaning,  or  leave  it, 
and  then,  after  the  rest  of  the  world  has  signed 
it,  we  must  face  the  unthinkable  task  of  making 
another  and  separate  kind  of  treaty  with  Ger- 
many." In  conclusion  he  declared :  "  If  there  is 
any  doubt  as  to  what  the  people  of  the  country 
think  on  this  vital  matter,  the  clear  and  single 
way  out  is  to  submit  it  for  determination  at  the 
next  election  to  the  voters  of  the  nation,  to  give 
the  next  election  the  form  of  a  great  and  solemn 
referendum,  a  referendum  as  to  the  part  the 
United  States  is  to  play  in  completing  the  settle- 
ments of  the  war  and  in  the  prevention  in  the 
future  of  such  outrages  as  Germany  attempted 
to  perpetrate." 

During  the  last  week  of  January  a  compromise 
was  discussed  by  an  informal  by-partisan  com- 
mittee, and  the  President  wrote  a  letter  saying 
he  would  accept  the  Hitchcock  reservations, 
but  Lodge  refused  to  accept  any  compromise. 
On  February  9  the  Senate  again  referred  the 
treaty  to  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations 


254  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

with  instructions  to  report  it  back  immediately 
with  the  reservations  previously  adopted.  After 
several  weeks  of  fruitless  debate  a  fifteenth 
reservation,  expressing  sympathy  for  Ireland, 
was  added  to  the  others,  by  a  vote  of  38  to  36, 
It  was  as  follows:  *'In  consenting  to  the  ratifica- 
tion of  the  treaty  with  Germany  the  Unitecl 
States  adheres  to  the  principle  of  self-determin- 
ation and  to  the  resolution  of  sympathy  with 
the  aspirations  of  the  Irish  people  for  a  govern- 
ment of  their  own  choice  adopted  by  the  Senate 
June  6,  1919,  and  declares  that  when  such  gov- 
ernment is  obtained  by  Ireland,  a  consumma- 
tion it  is  hoped  is  at  hand,  it  should  promptly  be 
admitted  as  a  member  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions." 

With  a  few  changes  in  the  resolutions  pre- 
viously adopted  and  an  important  change  in  the 
preamble,  the  ratifying  resolution  was  finally 
put  to  the  vote  March  19,  1920.  The  result 
was  49  votes  for  and  35  against.  On  the  fol- 
lowing day  the  secretary  of  the  Senate  was  in- 
structed by  a  formal  resolution  to  return  the 
treaty  to  the  President  and  to  inform  him  that 
the  Senate  had  failed  to  ratify  it. 

The  treaty  thus  became  the  leading  issue  in 
the  presidential  campaign,  but  unfortunately  it 
was  not  the  only  issue.     The  election  proved 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  255 

to  be  a  referendum  on  the  Wilson  administra- 
tion as  a  whole  rather  than  on  the  treaty.  The 
Republican  candidate,  Senator  Harding,  at- 
tacked the  Wilson  administration  for  its  arbi- 
trary and  unconstitutional  methods  and  advo^ 
cated  a  return  to  "normalcy."  He  denounced 
the  Wilson  League  as  an  attempt  to  set  up  a 
super-government,  but  said  he  favored  an  asso- 
ciation of  nations  and  an  international  court. 
Governor  Cox,  the  Democratic  candidate,  came 
out  strongly  for  the  treaty,  particularly  during 
the  latter  part  of  his  campaign.  The  result 
was  an  overwhelming  victory  for  Harding. 
President  Wilson  had  been  too  ill  to  take  any 
part  in  the  campaign.  His  administration  had 
been  the  chief  issue,  and  the  people  had,  cer- 
tainly for  the  time  being,  repudiated  it.  He 
accepted  the  result  philosophically  and  re- 
frained from  comments,  content,  apparently, 
to  leave  the  part  he  had  played  in  world  affairs 
to  the  verdict  of  history.  In  December,  1920, 
the  Nobel  Peace  Prize  was  awarded  to  him  as  a 
foreign  recognition  of  the  services  he  had  ren- 
dered to  humanity. 


XII 
THE  WASHINGTON  CONFERENCE 


XII 

THE  WASHINGTON  CONFERENCE 

After  the  rejection  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles 
by  the  Senate,  President  Wilson  withdrew  as 
far  as  possible  from  participation  in  European 
affairs,  and  after  the  election  of  Harding  he  let 
it  be  known  th^t  he  would  do  nothing  to  em- 
barrass the  incoming  administration.  The  pub- 
lic had  been  led  to  believe  that  when  Harding 
became  President  there  would  be  a  complete 
reversal  of  our  foreign  policy  all  along  the  Hne, 
but  such  was  not  to  be  the  case.  The  new  ad- 
ministration continued  unchanged  the  Wilson 
policy  toward  Mexico  and  toward  Russia,  and 
before  many  months  had  passed  was  seeking 
from  Congress  the  authority,  withheld  from 
Wilson,  to  appoint  a  member  on  the  Reparations 
Commission.  On  the  question  of  our  rights  in 
mandated  areas,  Secretary  Hughes  adopted  in 
whole  the  arguments  which  had  been  advanced 
by  Secretary  Colby  in  his  note  to  Great  Britain 
of  November  20,  1920,  in  regard  to  the  oil  re- 
sources of  Mesopotamia.  By  the  San  Remo 
agreement  of  April  25,  1920,  Great  Britain  and 
259 


26o  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

France  had  agreed  upon  a  division  of  the  oil 
output  of  Mesopotamia  by  which  France  was  to 
be  allowed  25  per  cent,  and  Great  Britain  75 
per  cent.  The  British  Government  had  inti- 
mated that  the  United  States,  having  declined 
to  join  the  League  of  Nations,  had  no  voice  in 
the  matter.  On  this  point  Secretary  Colby 
took  sharp  issue  in  the  following  statement: 
"Such  powers  as  the  Allied  and  Associated  na- 
tions may  enjoy  or  wield,  in  the  determination 
of  the  governmental  status  of  the  mandated 
areas,  accrued  to  them  as  a  direct  result  of  the 
war  against  the  Central  Powers.  The  United 
States,  as  a  participant  in  that  conflict  and  as  a 
contributor  to  its  successful  issue,  cannot  con- 
sider any  of  the  Associated  Powers,  the  smallest 
not  less  than  herself,  debarred  from  the  dis- 
cussion of  any  of  its  consequences,  or  from  par- 
ticipation in  the  rights  and  privileges  secured 
under  the  mandates  provided  for  in  the  treaties 
of  peace." 

Japan  likewise  assumed  that  we  had  nothing 
to  do  with  the  disposition  of  the  former  German 
islands  in  the  Pacific.  When  the  Supreme 
Council  at  Paris  decided  to  give  Japan  a  man- 
date over  the  islands  north  of  the  equator. 
President  Wilson  reserved  for  future  considera- 
tion the  final  disposition  of  the  island  of  Yap, 


The  Washington  Conference  261 

which  lies  between  Guam  and  the  Philippines, 
and  is  one  of  the  most  important  cable  stations 
in  the  Pacific.  The  entire  question  of  cable 
communications  was  reserved  for  a  special  con- 
ference which  met  at  Washington  in  the  autumn 
of  1920,  but  this  conference  adjourned  about  the 
middle  of  December  without  having  reached  any 
final  conclusions,  and  the  status  of  Yap  became 
the  subject  of  a  very  sharp  correspondence  be- 
tween the  American  and  Japanese  governments. 
When  Hughes  became  Secretary  of  State,  he 
restated  the  American  position  in  a  note  of 
April  2,  1 92 1,  as  follows: 

"It  will  not  be  questioned  that  the  right  to 
dispose  of  the  overseas  possessions  of  Germany 
was  acquired  only  through  the  victory  of  the 
Allied  and  Associated  Powers,  and  it  is  also  be- 
lieved that  there  is  no  disposition  on  the  part  of 
the  Japanese  Government  to  deny  the  partici- 
pation of  the  United  States  in  that  victory.  It 
would  seem  to  follow  necessarily  that  the  right 
accruing  to  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers 
through  the  common  victory  is  shared  by  the 
United  States  and  that  there  could  be  no  valid 
or  effective  disposition  of  the  overseas  posses- 
sions of  Germany,  now  under  consideration, 
without  the  assent  of  the  United  States." 

The  discussion  between  the  two  governments 


262  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

was  still  in  progress  when  the  Washington  Con- 
ference convened,  and  at  the  close  of  the  Con- 
ference it  was  announced  that  an  agreement  had 
been  reached  which  would  be  embodied  in  a 
treaty.  The  United  States  recognized  Japan's 
mandate  over  the  islands  north  of  the  equator 
on  the  condition  that  the  United  States  should 
have  full  cable  rights  on  the  island  of  Yap,  and 
that  its  citizens  should  enjoy  certain  rights  of 
residence  on  the  island.  The  agreeement  also 
covered  radio  telegraphic  service. 

During  the  presidential  campaign  Harding's 
position  on  the  League  of  Nations  had  been  so 
equivocal  that  the  public  knew  not  what  to 
expect,  but  when  Hughes  and  Hoover  were 
appointed  members  of  the  Cabinet,  it  was  gen- 
erally expected  that  the  new  administration 
would  go  into  the  League  with  reservations. 
This  expectation  was  not  to  be  fulfilled,  however, 
for  the  President  persistently  ignored  the  exist- 
ence of  the  League,  and  took  no  notice  of  the 
establishment  of  the  permanent  Court  of  Inter- 
national Justice  provided  for  in  Article  14  of 
the  Covenant.  Meanwhile  Elihu  Root,  who  as 
Secretary  of  State  had  instructed  our  delegates 
to  the  Hague  Conference  of  1907  to  propose  the 
establishment  of  such  a  court,  had  been  invited 
by  the  Council  of  the  League  to  be  one  of  a 


The  Washington  Conference  263 

commission  of  distinguished  jurists  to  draft  the 
statute  establishing  the  court.  This  service  he 
performed  with  conspicuous  ability.  As  an- 
other evidence  of  Europe's  unwillingness  to 
leave  us  out,  when  the  court  was  organized  John 
Bassett  Moore,  America's  most  distinguished 
authority  on  international  law,  was  elected  one 
of  the  judges. 

Meanwhile  a  technical  state  of  war  with  Ger- 
many existed  and  American  troops  were  still  on 
the  Rhine.  On  July  2,  1921,  Congress  passed  a 
joint  resolution  declaring  the  war  at  an  end,  but 
undertaking  to  reserve  to  the  United  States 
"all  rights,  privileges,  indemnities,  reparations 
or  advantages"  to  which  it  was  entitled  under 
the  terms  of  the  Armistice,  or  by  reason  of  its 
participation  in  the  war,  or  which  had  been 
stipulated  for  its  benefit  in  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles, or  to  which  it  was  entitled  as  one  of  the 
Principal  Allied  and  Associated  Powers,  or  to 
which  it  was  entitled  by  virtue  of  any  act  or 
acts  of  Congress.  On  August  25  the  United 
States  Government,  through  its  commissioner 
to  Germany,  signed  at  Berlin  a  separate  treaty 
of  peace  with  Germany,  reserving  in  detail  the 
rights  referred  to  in  the  joint  resolution  of  Con- 
gress. About  the  same  time  a  similar  treaty 
was  signed  with  Austria,  and  the  two  treaties 


264  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

were  ratified  by  the  Senate  of  the  United  States 
October  18.  The  proclamation  of  peace  pro- 
duced no  immediate  results  of  any  importance. 
American  troops  continued  on  the  Rhine,  and 
there  was  no  apparent  increase  in  trade,  which 
had  been  carried  on  before  the  signing  of  the 
treaty  by  special  licenses. 

If  mankind  is  capable  of  learning  any  lessons 
from  history,  the  events  leading  up  to  the  World 
War  should  have  exploded  the  fallacy  that  the 
way  to  preserve  peace  is  to  prepare  for  war. 
Competition  in  armament,  whether  on  land  or 
sea,  inevitably  leads  to  war,  and  it  can  lead  to 
nothing  else.  And  yet,  after  the  terrible  lessons 
of  the  recent  war,  the  race  for  armaments 
continued  with  increased  momentum.  France, 
Russia,  and  Poland  maintained  huge  armies, 
while  the  United  States  and  Japan  entered  upon 
the  most  extensive  naval  construction  pro- 
grams in  the  history  of  the  world.  Great 
Britain,  burdened  with  debt,  was  making  every 
effort  to  keep  pace  with  the  United  States. 

This  naval  rivalry  between  powers  which  had 
so  lately  been  united  in  the  war  against  Ger- 
many, led  thoughtful  people  to  consider  the 
probable  outcome  and  to  ask  against  whom 
these  powers  were  arming.  We  had  no  quarrel 
with  England,  but  England  was  the  ally  of  Ja- 


The  Washington  Conference  265 

pan,  and  relations  between  Japan  and  the 
United  States  in  the  Pacific  and  in  Eastern  Asia 
were  far  from  reassuring.  The  question  of  the 
continuance  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  was 
-discussed  at  the  British  Imperial  Conference, 
which  met  at  London  in  the  early  summer  of 
1921 .  The  original  purpose  of  this  compact  was 
to  check  the  Russian  advance  in  Manchuria. 
It  was  renewed  in  revised  form  in  1905  against 
Germany,  and  again  renewed  in  191 1  against 
Germany  for  a  period  of  ten  years.  With  the 
removal  of  the  German  menace,  what  reasons 
were  there  for  Great  Britain  to  continue  the 
aUiance?  It  bore  too  much  the  aspect  of  a 
combination  against  the  United  States,  and 
was  of  course  the  main  reason  for  the  naval 
program  which  we  had  adopted.  So  long  as 
there  were  only  three  navies  of  importance  in 
the  world  and  two  of  them  united  in  a  defensive 
alliance,  it  behooved  us  to  safeguard  our  posi- 
tion as  a  sea  power. 

One  of  the  main  objects  of  the  formation  of 
the  League  of  Nations  was  to  bring  about  a 
limitation  of  armaments  on  land  and  sea,  and  a 
commission  was  organized  under  the  League  to 
consider  this  question,  but  this  commission  could 
not  take  any  steps  toward  the  limitation  of 
navies  sc  long  as  a  great  naval  power  like  the 


266  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

United  States  refused  to  cooperate  with  the 
League  of  Nations  or  even  to  recognize  its  exist- 
ence. As  President  Harding  had  promised  the 
American  people  some  substitute  for  the  League 
of  Nations,  he  decided,  soon  after  coming  into 
office,  to  convene  an  international  conference  to 
consider  the  limitation  of  armament  on  land  and 
sea.  By  the  time  the  Conference  convened  it 
was  evident  that  no  agreement  was  possible  on 
the  subject  of  land  armament.  It  was  recog- 
nized from  the  first  that  the  mere  proposal  to 
limit  navies  would  be  utterly  futile  unless  effec- 
tive steps  could  be  taken  to  remove  some  of  the 
causes  of  international  conflict  which  make 
navies  necessary.  Therefore  the  formal  invita- 
tion to  the  Conference  extended  to  the  govern- 
ments of  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy  and  Japan, 
August  II,  1921,  linked  the  subject  of  Limitation 
of  Armament  with  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern 
Questions.  The  European  powers  accepted  the 
invitation  without  much  enthusiasm,  but  Ja- 
pan's answer  was  held  back  for  some  time.  She 
was  reluctant  to  have  the  powers  review  the 
course  she  had  pursued  in  China  and  Siberia 
while  they  were  at  war  with  Germany.  After 
agreeing  to  attend  the  Conference,  Japan  en- 
deavored to  confine  the  program  to  as 
narrow  limits  as  possible,  and  she  soon  entered 


The  Washington  Conference  267 

into  negotiations  with  China  over  the  Shantung 
question  with  the  hope  of  arriving  at  a  settle-* 
ment  which  would  prevent  that  question  from 
coming  before  the  Conference.  Invitations  to 
the  Conference  were  later  sent  to  the  govern- 
ments of  Belgium,  the  Netherlands,  Portugal 
and  China.  Portugal  was  interested  because  of 
her  settlement  at  Macao,  the  oldest  European 
settlement  in  China.  Holland  of  course  is  one 
of  the  great  colonial  powers  of  the  Pacific. 
While  Belgium  has  no  territorial  interests  in  the 
Orient,  she  has  for  years  been  interested  in 
Chinese  financial  matters. 
'  The  Washington  Conference  convened  in 
plenary  session  November  12, 1921,  in  Memorial 
Continental  Hall.  Seats  were  reserved  on  the 
main  floor  for  press  representatives,  and  the 
galleries  were  reserved  for  officials  and  those  in- 
dividuals who  were  fortunate  enough  to  secure 
tickets  of  admission.  The  question  of  open 
diplomacy  which  had  been  much  discussed,  was 
settled  at  the  first  session  by  Secretary  Hughes, 
who,  in  his  introductory  speech,  boldly  laid  the 
American  proposals  for  the  limitation  of  navies 
before  the  Conference.  There  were  in  all  seven 
plenary  sessions,  but  the  subsequent  sessions 
did  little  more  than  confirm  agreements  that 
had  already  been  reached  in  committee.    The 


268  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

real  work  of  the  Conference  was  carried  on  by 
committees,  and  from  the  meetings  of  these 
committees  the  public  and  press  representatives 
were  as  a  matter  of  course  excluded.  There 
were  two  principal  committees,  one  on  the 
Limitation  of  Armament,  and  the  other  on 
Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  Questions.  There 
were  various  sub-committees,  in  the  work  of 
which  technical  delegates  participated.  Min- 
utes were  kept  of  the  meetings  of  the  two  prin- 
cipal committees,  and  after  each  meeting  a 
communique  was  prepared  for  the  press.  In 
fact,  the  demand  for  publicity  defeated  to  a 
large  extent  its  own  ends.  So  much  matter  was 
given  to  the  press  that  when  it  was  published  in 
full  very  few  people  had  time  to  read  it.  As  a 
general  rule,  the  less  real  information  there  was 
to  give  out,  the  longer  were  the  communiques. 
Experienced  correspondents  maintained  that 
decisions  on  delicate  questions  were  made  with 
as  much  secrecy  in  Washington  as  at  Paris. 

The  plan  of  the  United  States  for  the  limita- 
tion of  armament  presented  by  Secretary 
Hughes  at  the  first  session  proposed  (i)  that 
all  programs  for  the  construction  of  capital 
ships,  either  actual  or  projected,  be  abandoned; 
(2)  that  a  large  number  of  battleships  of  older 
types  still  in  commission  be  scrapped;  and  (3) 


The  Washington  Conference  269 

that  the  allowance  of  auxiliary  combatant  craft, 
such  as  cruisers,  destroyers,  submarines,  and 
airplane  carriers,  be  in  proportion  to  the  ton- 
nage of  capital  ships.  These  proposals,  it  was 
claimed,  would  leave  the  powers  under  consider- 
ation in  the  same  relative  positions.  Under 
this  plan  the  United  States  would  be  allowed 
500,000  tons  of  capital  ships,  Great  Britain 
500,000  tons,  and  Japan  300,000  tons. 

Japan  objected  to  the  5-5-3  ratio  proposed  by 
Secretary  Hughes,  and  urged  a  10-10-7  ratio  as 
more  in  accord  with  existing  strength.  The 
American  proposal  included  the  scrapping  of  the 
Mutsuy  the  pride  of  the  Japanese  navy,  which 
had  been  launched  but  not  quite  completed. 
The  sacrifices  voluntarily  proposed  by  the 
United  States  for  its  navy  were  much  greater 
than  those  which  England  or  Japan  were  called 
upon  to  make,  and  in  this  lay  the  strength  of  the 
American  position.  The  Japanese  refused,  how- 
ever, to  give  up  the  MutsUj  and  they  were  finally 
permitted  to  retain  it,  but  in  order  to  preserve 
the  5-5-3  ratio,  it  was  necessary  to  increase  the 
tonnage  allowance  of  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain.  In  the  treaty  as  finally  agreed 
upon,  Japan  was  allowed  315,000  tons  of  capital 
ships  and  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
each  525,000  tons. 


270  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

In  his  address  at  the  opening  session.  Secre- 
tary Hughes  said :  "  In  view  of  the  extraordinary 
conditions  due  to  the  World  War  affecting  the 
existing  strength  of  the  navies  of  France  and 
Italy,  it  is  not  thought  to  be  necessary  to  discuss 
at  this  stage  of  the  proceedings  the  tonnage 
allowance  of  these  nations,  but  the  United 
States  proposes  that  this  subject  be  reserved 
for  the  later  consideration  of  the  Conference." 
This  somewhat  blunt,  matter-of-fact  way  of 
stating  the  case  gave  unexpected  offense  to  the 
French  delegation.  During  the  next  four  or 
five  weeks,  while  Great  Britain,  the  United 
States,  and  Japan  were  discussing  the  case  of 
the  Mutsu  and  the  question  of  fortifications  in 
the  Pacific,  the  French  delegates  were  cherishing 
their  resentment  at  being  treated  as  the  repre- 
sentatives of  a  second-class  power.  Hughes's 
failure  to  regard  the  susceptibiHties  of  a  great 
nation  like  France  undoubtedly  had  a  good  deal 
to  do  with  the  upsetting  of  that  part  of  the  naval 
program  relating  to  subsidiary  craft  and  sub- 
marines. 

When,  after  the  agreement  on  the  5-5-3  ratio, 
the  question  of  the  allowance  of  capital  ship 
tonnage  for  France  and  Italy  was  taken  up  in 
committee,  the  other  powers  were  wholly  un- 
prepared for  France's  demand  of  350,000  tons 


The  Washington  Conference  271 

of  capital  ships.  According  to  Hughes's  figures 
based  on  existing  strength,  she  was  entitled  to 
I75,cxx)  tons.  It  is  not  probable  that  the 
French  delegates  intended  to  insist  on  such  a 
large  tonnage.  It  is  more  likely  that  they  put 
forth  this  proposal  in  the  committee  in  order 
to  give  the  other  delegates  to  understand  that 
France  could  not  be  ignored  or  dictated  to  with 
impunity  and  in  order  to  pave  the  way  for  their 
submarine  proposal.  Unfortunately  the  French 
demands  were  given  to  the  press  throiigh  some 
misunderstanding  and  caused  an  outburst  of 
criticism  in  the  British  and  American  papers. 
In  the  committee  the  relations  between  the  Brit- 
ish and  French  delegates  became  very  bitter 
over  the  refusal  of  the  latter  to  abandon  the 
submarine,  or  even  agree  to  a  moderate  pro- 
posal as  to  submarine  tormage.  On  December 
16  Secretary  Hughes  cabled  an  appeal,  over  the 
heads  of  the  French  delegation,  to  Briand,  who 
had  returned  to  Paris.  As  a  result,  the  French 
finally  agreed  to  accept  the  1.75  ratio  for  capital 
ships,  but  refused  to  place  any  reasonable  limits 
upon  cruisers,  destroyers,  submarines,  or  air- 
craft. Italy  accepted  the  same  ratio  as  France. 
Thus  an  important  part  of  the  Hughes  pro- 
gram failed.  As  a  result,  the  treaty  leaves 
the   contracting   parties    free   to   direct   their 


272  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

energies,  if  they  so  desire,  to  the  comparatively 
new  fields  of  submarine  and  aerial  warfare.  As 
is  well  known,  many  eminent  naval  authorities, 
such  as  Sir  Percy  Scott  in  England  and  Admiral 
Sims  in  this  country,  believe  that  the  capital 
ship  is  an  obsolete  type,  and  that  the  warfare 
of  the  future  will  be  carried  on  by  submarines, 
aircraft,  and  lighter  surface  ships.  The  unfor- 
tunate feature  of  the  situation  created  by  the 
naval  treaty  is,  therefore,  that  those  who  regard 
the  capital  ship  as  obsolete  will  now  have  an 
opportunity  to  bring  forward  and  press  their 
submarine  and  aircraft  programs.  There  is  no 
limitation  upon  the  building  of  cruisers,  pro- 
vided they  do  not  exceed  10,000  tons  displace- 
ment or  carry  guns  "with  a  calibre  exceeding 
eight  inches. 

By  Article  19  of  the  naval  treaty  the  United 
States,  Great  Britain,  and  Japan  agreed  to  main- 
tain the  status  quo  as  regards  fortifications  and 
naval  bases  in  the  islands  of  the  Pacific  with 
certain  exceptions,  notably  the  Hawaiian  Is- 
lands, AustraHa,  and  New  Zealand.  This  agree- 
ment relieves  Japan  of  all  fear  of  attack  from  us, 
and  let  us  hope  that  it  may  prove  as  beneficent 
and  as  enduring  as  the  agreement  of  1817  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  for 
disarmament  on  the  Great  Lakes. 


The  Washington  Conference  273 

The  5-5-3  ratio  puts  the  navies  of  Great  Bri- 
tain, the  United  States,  and  Japan,  for  the 
present  at  least,  on  a  strictly  defensive  basis. 
Each  navy  is  strong  enough  to  defend  its  home 
territory,  but  no  one  of  them  will  be  able  to 
attack  the  home  territory  of  the  others.  Of 
course  it  is  possible  that  the  development  of 
aircraft  and  submarines,  together  with  cruisers 
and  other  surface  craft,  may  eventually  alter 
the  situation.  Hitherto  navies  have  existed 
for  two  purposes:  national  defense  and  the  en- 
forcement of  foreign  poHcies.  The  new  treaty 
means  that  as  long  as  it  lasts  the  navies  of  the 
ratifying  powers  can  be  used  for  defense  only 
and  not  for  the  enforcement  of  their  policies  in 
distant  quarters  of  the  globe.  In  other  words, 
when  disputes  arise,  British  policies  will  pre- 
vail in  the  British  area,  American  policies 
in  the  American  area,  and  Japanese  poli- 
cies in  the  Japanese  area.  Having  agreed  to 
place  ourselves  in  a  position  in  which  we  can- 
not attack  Japan,  the  only  pressure  we  can 
bring  to  bear  upon  her  in  China  or  elsewhere 
is  moral  pressure.  Through  what  was  con- 
sidered by  some  a  grave  strategical  error,  the 
naval  treaty  was  completed  before  any  settle- 
ment of  the  Chinese  and  Siberian  questions  had 
been  reached. 


^4  From  Isolation  to  Leadership , 

The  French  insistence  on  the  practically  un- 
limited right  to  build  submarines  caused  much 
hard  feeling  in  England.  The  British  delegates 
had  proposed  the  total  abolition  of  submarines, 
and  this  proposal  had  been  ably  supported  by 
the  arguments  of  Mr.  Balfour  and  Lord  Lee. 
Unfortunately  the  United  States  delegation 
stood  for  the  submarine,  proposing  merely  cer- 
tain limits  upon  its  use.  The  five  naval  powers 
finally  signed  a  treaty  reafiirming  the  old  rules 
of  international  law  in  regard  to  the  search  and 
seizure  of  merchant  vessels,  and  declaring  that 
**any  person  in  the  service  of  any  Power  who 
shall  violate  any  of  those  rules,  whether  or  not 
such  person  is  under  orders  of  a  governmental 
superior,  shall  be  deemed  to  have  violated  the 
laws  of  war  and  shall  be  liable  to  trial  and  pun- 
ishment as  if  for  an  act  of  piracy  and  may  be 
brought  to  trial  before  the  civil  or  military 
authorities  of  any  Power  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  which  he  may  be  found."  By  the  same 
treaty  the  signatory  powers  solemnly  bound 
themselves  to  prohibit  the  use  in  war  of  poison- 
ous gases. 

The  attempt  to  limit  by  treaty  the  use  of  the 
submarine  and  to  prohibit  altogether  the  use  of 
gastes  appears  to  many  to  be  utterly  futile.  Af- 
ter the  experience  of  the  late  war,  no  nation 


The  Washington  Conference  275 

would  readily  trust  the  good  faith  of  another  in 
these  matters.  Each  party  to  a  war  would 
probably  feel  justified  in  being  prepared  to  use 
the  submarine  and  poison  gases,  contrary  to 
law,  in  case  the  other  party  should  do  so.  We 
would  thus  have  the  same  old  dispute  as  in  the 
late  war  in  regard  to  floating  mines  as  to  which 
party  first  resorted  to  the  outlawed  practice. 
What  is  the  use  in  solemnly  declaring  that  a 
submarine  shall  not  attack  a  merchant  vessel, 
and  that  the  commander  of  a  submarine  who 
violates  this  law  shall  be  treated  as  a  pirate, 
when  the  contracting  parties  found  it  utterly 
impossible  to  agree  among  themselves  upon  a 
definition  of  a  merchant  vessel  ? 

But  the  reader  may  ask,  what  is  the  use  in 
signing  any  treaty  if  nations  are  so  devoid  of 
good  faith?  The  answer  is  that  the  vast  ma- 
jority of  treaties  are  faithfully  kept  in  time  of 
peace,  but  that  very  few  treaties  are  fully  ob- 
served in  time  of  war.  Had  these  five  powers 
signed  a  treaty  pledging  themselves  not  to  build 
or  maintain  submarines  of  any  kind  or  descrip- 
tion, we  would  have  every  reason  to  expect 
them  to  live  up  to  it.  But  when  a  nation  is 
engaged  in  war  and  has  a  large  flotilla  of  sub- 
marines which  it  has  agreed  to  use  only  for  cer- 
tain purposes,  there  is  apt  to  come  a  time  when 


276  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

the  temptation  to  use  them  for  wholly  different 
purposes  will  be  overwhelming.  > 

The  Committee  on  Pacific  and  Far  Eastern 
Questions  held  its  first  meeting  November  16. 
This  committee  was  primarily  concerned  with 
the  very  delicate  situation  created  by  the  ag- 
gressive action  and  expansion  of  Japan  during 
the  past  twenty  years.  In  1905,  by  the  Treaty 
of  Portsmouth,  Japan  succeeded  to  the  Russian 
rights  in  southern  Manchuria;  in  1910  she  an- 
nexed Korea;  in  191 1,  during  the  Chinese  Revo- 
lution, she  stationed  troops  at  Hankow  and  later 
constructed  permanent  barracks;  in  1914,  after 
the  defeat  of  the  Germans  at  Kiao-chau,  she 
took  over  all  the  German  interests  in  the  Shan- 
tung peninsula;  in  191 5  she  presented  the 
Twenty-one  Demands  to  China  and  coerced  that 
power  into  granting  most  of  them;  and  in  1 91 8, 
in  conjunction  with  the  United  States,  Great 
Britain,  and  France,  she  landed  a  military  force 
in  the  Maritime  Province  of  Siberia  for  the 
definite  purpose  of  rescuing  the  Czecho-Slovak 
troops  who  had  made  their  way  to  that  province 
and  of  guarding  the  military  stores  at  Vladivos- 
tok. The  other  powers  had  all  withdrawn  their 
contingents,  but  Japan  had  increased  her  force 
from  one  division  to  more  than  70,000  troops. 
The  eastern  coast  of  Asia  was  thus  in  the  firm 


The  Washington  Conference  277 

grip  of  Japan,  and  she  had  secured  concessions 
from  China  which  seriously  impaired  the  in- 
dependence of  that  country. 

It  was  commonly  supposed  that  the  United 
States  delegation  had  prepared  a  program  on 
the  Far  Eastern  question,  and  that  this  would 
be  presented  in  the  same  way  that  Hughes  had 
presented  the  naval  program.  If  this  was  the 
intention  there  was  a  sudden  change  of  plan, 
for  between  one  and  two  o'clock  at  night  the 
Chinese  delegates  were  aroused  from  their 
slumbers  and  informed  that  there  would  be  an 
opportunity  for  them  to  present  China's  case 
before  the  committee  at  eleven  o'clock  that 
morning.  They  at  once  went  to  work  with 
their  advisers,  and  a  few  minutes  before  the 
appointed  hour  they  completed  the  drafting  of 
the  Ten  Points,  which  Minister  Sze  read  before 
the  committee.  These  Points  constituted  a 
Chinese  declaration  of  independence,  and  set 
forth  a  series  of  general  principles  to  be  applied 
in  the  determination  of  questions  relating  to 
China.  Several  days  later  the  committee 
adopted  four  resolutions,  presented  by  Mr. 
Root,  covering  in  part  some  of  the  Chinese  prin- 
ciples. By  these  resolutions  the  powers  agreed 
to  respect  the  independence  and  territorial  in- 
tegrity of  China,  to  give  China  the  fullest  op- 


278  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

portunity  to  develop  and  maintain  an  effective 
and  stable  government,  to  recognize  the  princi- 
ple of  equality  for  the  commerce  and  industry 
of  all  nations  throughout  the  territory  of  China, 
and  to  refrain  from  taking  advantage  of  present 
conditions  in  order  to  seek  special  rights  or 
privileges.  This  somewhat  vague  and  general 
declaration  of  principles  appeared  to  be  all  that 
China  was  likely  to  get.  Had  Mr.  Hughes  pre- 
sented a  Far  Eastern  program  and  gotten 
nothing  more  than  this,  it  would  have  been  a 
serious  blow  to  the  prestige  of  the  United  States. 
That  is  probably  why  he  decided  at  the  last 
moment  to  let  China  present  her  own  case. 
At  the  fourth  plenary  session  of  the  Confer- 
ence the  treaty  relating  to  the  Pacific  islands, 
generally  known  as  the  Four-Power  Treaty, 
was  presented  by  Senator  Lodge.  By  the  terms 
of  this  treaty,  the  United  States,  Great  Britain, 
France,  and  Japan  agreed  "to  respect  their 
rights  in  relation  to  their  insular  possessions  and 
insular  dominions  in  the  region  of  the  Pacific 
Ocean,"  and  in  case  of  any  dispute  arising  out 
of  any  Pacific  question  to  refer  the  matter  to  a 
joint  conference  for  consideration  and  adjust- 
ment. This  article  appeared  harmless  enough, 
but  Article  2  seemed  to  lay  the  foundations  of 
an  alliance  between  these  powers.    It  was  as 


The  Washington  Conference  279 

follows;  "If  the  said  rights  are  threatened  by 
the  aggressive  action  of  any  other  Power,  the 
High  Contracting  Parties  shall  communicate 
with  one  another  fully  and  frankly  in  order  to 
arrive  at  an  understanding  as  to  the  most 
efficient  measures  to  be  taken,  jointly  or  sepa- 
rately, to  meet  the  exigencies  of  the  particular 
situation."  This  treaty  is  to  remain  in  force 
for  ten  years,  after  which  it  may  be  terminated 
by  any  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  on 
twelve  months'  notice.  It  supersedes  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance  which,  it  expressly  provided, 
should  terminate  onthe  exchange  of  ratifications. 
In  presenting  the  treaty.  Senator  Lodge  as- 
sured his  hearers  that  "no  military  or  naval  sanc- 
tion lurks  anywhere  in  the  background  or  un- 
der cover  of  these  plain  and  direct  clauses," 
and  Secretary  Hughes  in  closing  the  discus- 
sion declared  that  it  would  probably  not  be 
possible  to  find  in  all  history  "an  international 
document  couched  in  more  simple  or  even 
briefer  terms,"  but  he  added,  "we  are  again 
reminded  that  the  great  things  are  the  simple 
ones."  In  view  of  these  statements  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Conference  and  the  public  generally 
were  completely  flabbergasted  some  days  later 
when  Secretary  Hughes  and  the  President  gave 
out   contradictory   statements    as   to  whether 


28o  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

the  treaty  included  the  Japanese  homeland. 
Hughes  stated  to  the  correspondents  that  it 
did,  the  President  said  it  did  not.  Whereupon 
some  wag  remarked  that  at  Paris  President  Wil- 
son did  not  let  the  American  delegation  know 
what  he  did,  while  at  Washington  the  dele- 
gates did  not  let  President  Harding  know  what 
they  were  doing.  In  deference  to  the  Presi- 
dent's views  and  to  criticisms  of  the  treaty  in 
the  Japanese  press  a  supplementary  treaty  was 
later  signed  expressly  declaring  that  the  term 
"insular  possessions  and  insular  dominions" 
did  not  include  the  Japanese  homeland. 

Meanwhile  the  Shantung  question  was  being 
discussed  by  China  and  Japan  outside  of  the 
Conference,  but  with  representatives  of  the 
British  and  American  governments  sitting  as 
observers  ready  to  use  their  good  offices  if  called 
on.  The  reason  for  not  bringing  the  question 
before  the  Conference  was  that  Great  Britain, 
France,  and  Italy  were  parties  to  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles,  which  gave  Japan  a  legal  title  to  the 
German  leases  in  Shantung.  The  restoration 
of  the  province  to  China  was  vital  to  a  satisfac- 
tory adjustment  of  Chinese  affairs  generally. 
Japan,  however,  was  in  no  hurry  to  reach  an 
agreement  with  China,  wishing  for  strategical 
purposes  to   keep  the  matter  in  suspense  to 


The  Washington  Conference  281 

the  last,  if  not  to  avoid  a  settlement  until  after 
the  adjournment  of  the  Conference  and  con- 
tinue negotiations  under  more  favorable  con- 
ditions at  Peking  or  Tokio. 

By  Christmas  it  seemed  that  the  Conferenc« 
had  accomplished  about  all  that  was  possible, 
and  that  it  would  adjourn  as  soon  as  the  agree- 
ments already  reached  could  be  put  into  treaty 
form  and  signed.  At  the  end  of  the  first  week 
in  January  it  looked  as  if  the  Chinese  and  Japan- 
ese had  reached  a  deadlock,  and  that  the  Con- 
ference would  adjourn  without  a  satisfactory 
adjustment  of  any  of  the  Chinese  problems. 
Mr.  Balfour  and  other  important  delegates  had 
angaged  return  passage,  and  all  indications 
pointed  to  an  early  dissolution  of  the  Confer- 
ence. But  the  unexpected  happened.  At  an 
informal  gathering  of  Administration  leaders  at 
the  White  House  on  Saturday  night,  January  7, 
stock  was  taken  of  the  work  of  the  Conference, 
and  some  of  the  senators  present  expressed  the 
opinion  that  if  it  adjourned  without  doing  more 
for  China,  there  would  be  little  hope  of  getting 
the  treaties  ratified.  As  a  result  Secretary 
Hughes  persuaded  the  British  and  Japanese 
delegates  to  cancel  their  saihngs,  and  with 
characteristic  energy  and  determination  took 
personal  charge  of  the  Far  Eastern  situation. 


282  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

which  up  to  this  time  had  been  left  mainly  to 
Mr.  Root.  After  a  little  pressure  had  been 
brought  to  bear  on  the  Chinese  by  President 
Harding,  and  probably  on  the  Japanese  by 
Mr.  Balfour,  Secretary  Hughes  was  finally  able 
to  announce  at  the  plenary  session  of  February 
I  that  China  and  Japan  had  reached  an  agree- 
ment as  to  the  terms  on  which  Shantung  was 
to  be  restored.  At  the  same  session  the 
agreements  in  regard  to  China  reached  by  the 
Committee  on  Far  Eastern  Affairs  were  an- 
nounced. These  agreements  were  finally  em- 
bodied in  two  treaties,  one  deaHng  with  the 
tariff  and  the  other  with  the  open  door,  and  a 
series  of  ten  resolutions. 

Since  the  middle  of  the  last  century  Chinese 
tariffs  have  been  regulated  by  treaties  with 
foreign  powers,  the  customs  service  organized 
and  administered  by  foreigners,  and  the  receipts 
mortgaged  to  meet  the  interest  on  foreign  loans. 
China  has  never  been  permitted  to  levy  duties 
in  excess  of  5  per  cent.,  and,  in  fact,  as  a  result 
of  the  methods  of  valuation  the  duties  have  not 
averaged  above  3^  per  cent.  This  has  been  an 
unjust  state  of  affairs,  and  has  deprived  the 
Chinese  Government  of  what  would  naturally 
be  one  of  its  main  sources  of  revenue.  By  the 
new  agreement  there  is  to  be  an  immediate  re- 


The  Washington  Conference  283 

vision  of  tariff  valuations  so  as  to  make  the  5 
per  cent,  effective.  China  is  also  to  be  allowed 
to  levy  a  surtax  on  certain  articles,  mainly 
luxuries,  which  will  yield  an  additional  revenue. 
It  is  estimated  that  the  total  annual  increase  in 
revenue  derived  from  maritime  customs  will 
be  about  ^150,000,000  silver.  It  is  claimed  by 
some,  with  a  certain  degree  of  truth,  that  any 
increase  in  Chinese  customs  duties  will  be  im- 
mediately covered  by  liens  to  secure  new  loans, 
and  that  putting  money  into  the  Chinese  treas- 
ury just  now  is  Hke  pouring  it  into  a  rat  hole. 
As  soon  as  China  is  able  to  estabHsh  a  stable  and 
honest  government,  she  should,  without  ques- 
tion, be  reUeved  of  all  treaty  restrictions  on  her 
tariffs. 

The  Conference  also  took  certain  steps  to 
restore  to  China  other  sovereign  rights  long  im- 
paired by  the  encroachments  of  foreign  powers. 
A  commission  is  to  be  appointed  to  investigate 
the  administration  of  justice  with  a  view  to  the 
ultimate  extinction  of  extraterritorial  rights  now 
enjoyed  by  foreigners.  The  powers  also  agreed 
to  abandon  not  later  than  January  i,  1923, 
their  existing  postal  agencies  in  China,  provided 
an  efficient  Chinese  postal  service  be  maintained. 
The  system  of  foreign  post  offices  in  China  has 
been  the  subject  of  great  abuses,  as  through 


284  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

these  agencies  goods  of  various  kinds,  including 
opium  and  other  drugs,  have  been  smuggled 
into  China.  The  powers  further  made  a  general 
promise  to  aid  the  Chinese  Government  in  the 
unification  of  railways  into  a  general  system 
under  Chinese  control.  They  also  agreed  to 
restore  to  China  all  radio  stations  other  than 
those  regulated  by  treaty  or  maintained  by 
foreign  governments  within  their  legation  limits. 

In  the  treaty  relating  to  the  open  door,  the 
Contracting  Powers  other  than  China  pledged 
themselves  to  the  following  principles: 

"(i)  To  respect  the  sovereignty,  the  inde- 
pendence, and  the  territorial  and  administrative 
integrity  of  China; 

"(2)  To  provide  the  fullest  and  most  unem- 
barrassed opportunity  to  China  to  develop  and 
maintain  for  herself  an  effective  and  stable 
government; 

"(3)  To  use  their  influence  for  the  purpose  of 
effectually  establishing  and  maintaining  the 
principle  of  equal  opportunity  for  the  commerce 
and  industry  of  all  nations  throughout  the  terri- 
tory of  China; 

"(4)  To  refrain  from  taking  advantage  of 
conditions  in  China  in  order  to  seek  special 
rights  or  privileges  which  would  abridge  the 
rights  of  subjects  or  citizens  of  friendly  States, 


The  Washington  Conference  285 

and  from  countenancing  action  inimical  to  the 
security  of  such  States." 

China  on  her  part  accepted  fully  the  principle 
of  the  open  door,  and  pledged  herself  for  the 
first  time  to  respect  it.  Pledges  to  respect  the 
open  door  in  China  have  been  made  by  foreign 
powers  upon  various  occasions  in  the  past  and 
broken  as  often  as  made.  The  expression 
"equal  opportunity  for  the  commerce  and  in- 
dustry of  all  nations  "  is  not  new.  It  occurs  in 
the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  of  1902,  in  the 
Root-Takahira  agreement  of  1908,  and  in  nu- 
merous other  documents.  In  recent  years,  how- 
ever, the  United  States  has  been  the  only  power 
which  has  tried  to  preserve  the  open  door  in 
China.  Most  of  the  other  powers  have  regarded 
the  Chinese  situation  as  hopeless,  and  have  be- 
lieved that  the  only  solution  was  to  let  foreign 
powers  come  in  and  divide  and  rule  the  territory 
of  the  empire.  In  view  of  the  new  treaty  the  open 
door  is  no  longer  merely  an  American  policy,  but 
an  international  policy,  and  responsibility  for  its 
enforcement  rests  not  on  the  United  States 
alone  but  on  all  nine  parties  to  the  treaty. 

The  agenda  or  program  of  the  Conference 
oflFered  as  one  of  the  subjects  to  be  considered 
the  status  of  existing  commitments  in  China. 
When  Secretary  Hughes  brought  this  subject 


286  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

up  before  the  Far  Eastern  Committee,  Japan 
entered  an  emphatic  objection  to  its  considera- 
tion, and  the  matter  was  dropped  immediately 
without  argument.  The  treaty,  therefore,  is 
not  retroactive,  for  it  recognizes  the  status  quo 
in  Manchuria  and  to  a  less  extent  in  other  parts 
of  China.  The  saving  clause  of  the  new  agree- 
ment is,  however,  a  resolution  providing  for 
the  establishment  of  an  international  board  of 
reference,  to  which  questions  arising  in  regard 
to  the  open  door  may  be  referred. 

Will  Japan  respect  the  pledges  she  has  made 
and  live  up  to  the  spirit  of  her  promises  ?  If  she 
does,  the  Washington  Conference  will  prove  to 
be  a  great  success.  If,  on  the  contrary,  Japan 
does  not  intend  to  live  up  to  her  pledges  or  in- 
tends to  fulfill  them  only  in  part,  her  position 
in  Asia  has  been  greatly  strengthened.  She  is 
more  firmly  intrenched  in  Manchuria  than  ever. 
She  holds  the  Maritime  Province  of  Siberia 
under  a  promise  to  get  out,  which  she  has  re- 
peatedly made  and  repeatedly  broken,  as  was 
plainly  stated  by  Secretary  Hughes  before  the 
full  Committee  on  Far  Eastern  Affairs,  and  re- 
peated at  a  plenary  session  of  the  Conference. 
His  statement  was  one  of  the  most  remarkable, 
by  reason  of  its  directness  and  unvarnished 
truth,  in  the  history  of  American  diplomacy. 


The  Washington  Conference  287 

After  reviewing  the  correspondence  between  the 
two  governments  and  the  reiterated  assurances 
of  Japan  of  her  intention  to  withdraw  from 
Siberia,  assurances  which  so  far  had  not  been 
carried  out,  Mr.  Hughes  expressed  his  gratifica- 
tion at  the  renewal  of  these  assurances  before 
the  Conference  in  plenary  session.  Unless 
Japan  is  utterly  devoid  of  moral  shame,  she  will 
have  to  make  good  her  word  this  time. 

When  the  treaties  drafted  by  the  Conference 
were  submitted  by  the  President  to  the  Senate, 
they  encountered  serious  opposition,  but  were 
finally  ratified.  The  Republican  leaders,  par- 
ticularly Senator  Lodge,  were  twitted  with 
charges  of  inconsistency  in  advocating  certain 
features  of  these  treaties  when  they  had  violently 
opposed  the  League  of  Nations.  The  Four- 
Power  Treaty  is  much  more  of  an  entangling 
alliance  than  the  Covenant  of  the  League,  and 
the  Naval  Treaty  deprives  Congress  for  a  pe- 
riod of  fifteen  years  of  its  constitutional  right  to 
determine  the  size  of  the  navy  and  to  provide 
for  the  defense  of  Guam  and  the  Philippines. 
In  fact,  there  were  very  few  objections  raised  to 
the  League  of  Nations  which  could  not  with 
equal  force  be  applied  to  the  Four-Power  and 
Naval  Treaties.  The  Four-Power  Treaty  was 
the  main  object  of  attack,  and  Senators  Lodge 


288  From  Isolation  to  Leadership 

and  Underwood  were  greatly  embarrassed  in 
attempting  to  explain  its  meaning.  Its  "baf- 
fling brevity"  demanded  explanations,  but  no 
satisfactory  explanations  were  forthcoming. 
They  talked  in  general  terms  about  the  tremen- 
dous importance  of  the  treaty,  but  they  dared 
not  state  the  real  fact  that  the  treaty  was  drafted 
by  Mr.  Balfour  and  Baron  Kato  as  the  most 
convenient  method  of  terminating  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance  without  making  it  appear 
to  the  Japanese  public  that  their  government 
had  surrendered  the  alliance  without  due  com- 
pensation. According  to  an  Associated  Press 
Dispatch  from  Tokio,  January  31,  1922,  Baron 
Uchida,  the  Jananese  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  replying  to  interpolations  in  the  House 
of  Peers,  said:  "The  Four-Power  Treaty  was  not 
intended  to  abrogate  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alli- 
ance, but  rather  to  widen  and  extend  it."  The 
real  quid  pro  quo  for  the  termination  of  the 
Anglo-Japanese  AlHance  was  the  agreement  of 
the  United  States  not  to  construct  naval  bases 
or  new  fortifications  in  Guam  and  the  Philip- 
pines, and  the  clause  terminating  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance  might  just  as  well  have  been 
attached  to  the  Naval  Treaty,  but  this  would 
not  have  satisfied  Japanese  pubHc  opinion. 
Great   Britain   and   Japan   were  permitted  to 


The  Washington  Conference  289 

terminate  their  alliance  in  any  way  that  they 
might  deem  best.  After  the  Four-Power  Treaty 
was  accepted  by  the  American  delegates,  they 
feared  that  it  would  look  too  much  as  if  the 
United  States  had  merely  been  drawn  into  the 
Anglo-Japanese  Alliance.  It  was  decided,  there- 
fore, at  the  eleventh  hour  to  give  the  agreement 
a  more  general  character  by  inviting  France  to 
adhere  to  it.  France  agreed  to  sign,  although 
she  resented  not  having  been  consulted  during 
the  negotiation  of  the  treaty. 

The  achievements  of  the  Conference,  although 
falling  far  short  of  the  extravagant  claims  made 
by  the  President  and  the  American  delegates, 
are  undoubtedly  of  great  importance.  The 
actual  scrapping  of  millions  of  dollars'  worth  of 
ships  in  commission  or  in  process  of  construction 
gives  the  world  an  object  lesson  such  as  it  has 
never  had  before.  One  of  the  most  significant 
results  of  the  Conference  was  the  development 
of  a  complete  accord  between  England  and  the 
United  States,  made  possible  by  the  settlement 
of  the  Irish  question  and  furthered  by  the  tact 
and  gracious  bearing  of  Mr.  Balfour.  One  of  the 
unfortunate  results  was  the  increased  isolation 
of  France,  due  to  the  failure  of  her  delegates  to 
grasp  the  essential  elements  of  the  situation  and 
to  play  any  but  a  negative  role.     The  success  of 


290  From  Isolation  to  Leadership^ 

the  Conference  was  due  largely  to  Secretary 
Hughes  who,  though  handicapped  at  every  point 
by  fear  of  the  Senate  and  by  the  unfortunate 
commitments  of  President  Harding  during  the 
last  campaign,  may  be  said  on  the  whole  to  have 
played  his  hand  reasonably  well. 

Meanwhile  we  are  still  drifting,  so  far  as  a 
general  European  policy  is  concerned.  Presi- 
dent Harding's  idea  of  holding  aloof  from 
**  Europe's  league,"  as  he  prefers  to  designate  the 
League  of  Nations,  and  of  having  a  little  league 
of  our  own  in  the  Pacific,  will  not  work.  The 
world's  problems  cannot  be  segregated  in  this 
way.  Europe's  league  includes  all  of  the  prin- 
cipal American  nations  except  the  United  States 
and  Mexico,  while  our  Pacific  league  includes 
the  two  leading  European  powers.  As  soon  as 
the  American  people  realize — and  there  are  in- 
dications that  they  are  already  waking  up  to 
the  reality — that  the  depression  in  domestic  in- 
dustry and  foreign  commerce  is  due  to  conditions 
in  Europe  and  that  prosperity  will  not  return  un- 
til we  take  a  hand  in  the  solution  of  European 
problems,  there  will  be  a  general  demand  for  a 
constructive  policy  and  America  will  no  longer 
hesitate  to  reassume  the  leadership  which  she  re- 
nounced in  the  referendum  of  1920,  but  which  the 
rest  of  the  world  is  ready  to  accord  to  her  again. 


INDEX 


ABC  alliance,  162,  165. 

Aberdeen,  Lord,  opposes  annexation 
of  Texas  by  United  States,  108. 

Adams,  Charles  Francis,  114. 

Adams,  Henry,  letter  from  Hay  to,  90. 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  opposes  joint 
action  with  England,  31;  accepts 
invitation  to  send  delegates  to  Pan- 
ama Congress,  154. 

"Alabama  Claims,"  66,  113,  114. 

Alaskan  Boundary  Dispute,  122,  124. 

Algeciras  Conference,  74;  American 
participation  in,  76,  77. 

Alliance,  of  1778  with  France,  5-8; 
proposed  alliance  with  England, 
13,  26;  Holy  Alliance,  22,  24; 
Anglo-Japanese  alliance,  92,  120. 
See  "Entangling  Alliances." 

Alverstone,  Lord,  member  of  Alaskan 
boundary  commission,  123. 

American  Colonization  Society,  $9. 

American  delegation  to  Peace  Confer- 
ence, 225. 

American  Institute  of  International 
Law,  157. 

American  Republics,  Bureau  of,  156. 

American  Revolution,  significance  of, 

.  ^• 

Anglo-American  ideals,  126,  127. 

Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  92,  120,  265 
279,  288. 

Arbitration,  international,  64.  See 
Hague  Court,  OIney-Pauncefote 
Treaty. 

Armistice,  negotiadons  preceding, 
213-217. 

Arms  and  ammunition.  See  Muni- 
tions of  war. 

"Aroostook  War,"  106. 

Austria-Hungary,  protests  against 
trade  in  munitions,  182. 

Balfour,  Arthur  James,  274,  288,  289. 
Beer,  George  L.,  quoted,  99. 
Belgium,    German    invasion    of,    79; 

restorarion  of,  demanded,  207. 
Beresford,    Lord    Charles,    advocates 

open  door  in  China,  86. 
Berlin  Conference  of  1884,  61. 
"Big  Four,"  at  Peace  Conference,  230. 
Bingham,  Hiram,  on  Monroe  Doctrine, 

^31- 


Bismarck,  Prince,  on  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, 45;  on  English  control  of 
North  America,  126;  forces  war  on 
Austria,  47;  forces  war  on  France,  48. 

Blaine,  James  G.,  efforts  to  modify 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  115;  issues 
invitation  to  International  Confer- 
ence of  American  States,  155,  156. 

Bliss,  Gen.  Tasker  H.,  225. 

Board  of  Reference,  in  China,  286. 

Bolivar,  Simon,  153. 

Bolsheviki,  203. 

Bonaparte,  Napoleon,  acquires  Louisi- 
ana, 12;  fails  to  establish  control 
over  Spain's  Colonies,  25. 

Bowea,  Herbert,  51. 

Boxer  uprising  in  China,  88 

Brest-Litovsk,  peace  negotiations  at, 

203,  210,  212. 

Brussels  Conference  on  African  slave 
trade,  62. 

Bryan,  William  Jennings,  negotiates 
treaty  with  Nicaragua,  135;  with 
Colombia,  144;  refuses  to  modify 
neutrality  laws  at  demand  of  Ger- 
many, 182. 

Bryce,  Lord,  quoted,  125,  126. 

Bulow,  Prince  von,  75,  91. 

California,  danger  of  English  occupa- 
tion of,  109. 

Canada,  insurrection  of  1837,  103. 

Canning,  George,  British  foreign 
secretary,  proposes  Anglo-American 
alliance,  26;  delays  recognition  of 
South  American  republics,  33,  34; 
interview  with  Prince  Polignac, 
35;  boasts  of  calling  new  world  into 
existence,  39;  opposes  Pan-Ameri- 
can movement,  155. 

Caribbean  Sea,  American  supremacy 
in,  121;  advance  of  United  States 
in,  132;  new  American  policies  in, 
I32_,  137.  144- 

Caroline,  the,  103. 

Carranza,  Venustiano,  162,  163. 

Castlereagh,  Viscount,  20. 

China,  treaties  relating  to  tariff  and 
open  door,  282-285.  See  Open-door 
policy. 

Choate,  Joseph  H.,  at  Second  Hague 
Conference,  68,  69. 


291 


292 


Index 


Civil  War,  foreign  policy  of  United 
States  during,  65;  disputes  with 
England,  112. 

Clay,  Henry,  opposes  joint  action 
with  England,  31;  instructions 
to  delegates  to  Panama  Ooogress, 
IS*- 

Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  44,  III. 

Cleveland,  Grover,  intervenes  in 
Venezuelan  boundary  dispute,  48; 
withholds  Kongo  treaty  from  Sen- 
ate, 61;  Venezuelan  policy  justified 
by  events,  115;  favours  general  arbi- 
tration treaty  with  England,  116. 

Cobden,  Richard,  essay  on  America, 
102. 

Colby,  Bainbridge,  secretary  of  state, 
259,  260. 

Colombia,  aggrieved  at  seizure  of 
Canal  Zone,  142;  attempts  of 
United  States  to  settle  controversy, 
143,.  144- 

Consuis,  status  of,  in  European  lease* 
in  China,  87,  88. 

Continuous  voyage,  doctrine  of,  72. 
124,  176,  177. 

Cowdray,  Lord,  seeks  concession  from 
Colombia,  142. 

Cox,  James  M.,  candidate  for  Presi- 
dent, 25s. 

Crampton,  British  Minister  to  United 
States,  dismissal  of,  ill. 

Declaration  of  London,  71-73,  I7S, 
177. 

Declaration  of  Paris,  64,  65. 

Declaration  of  Rights  and  Duties  of 
Nations,  adopted  by  American 
Institute  of  International  Law, 
158,  159- 

Democracy  against  autocracy,  198. 

Dewey,  Admiral  George,  on  with- 
drawal of  Germany  from  Venezuela, 
51;  demands  apology  from  German 
admiral  in  Manila  Bay,  119. 

Dickens,  Charles,  "American  Notes," 
102. 

Diederichs,  German  Admiral,  119. 

Diplomacy,  secret,  76,  77. 

Dunning,  William  A.,  "British  Em- 
pire and  the  United  States,"  quoted, 
102,  III. 

Durfee,  Amos,  103. 

Egypt,  financial  administration  of,  by 
Great  Britain,  134. 

England.     See  Great  Britain. 

"Entangling  Alliances,"  warning  of 
Jefferson  against,  12;  Wilson's 
views  on,  187. 

Entente  treaty  of  1904  between  Eng- 
land and  France,  74. 

European  balance  of  power,  interest 
of  United  States  in  preserving,  76; 
disturbed  by  Japan,  171. 


Fenian     movement,     encouraged     in 

United  States,  112,  113. 
Ferdinand  VII,  king  of  Spain,  20,  35. 
Fish,    Hamilton,    secretary    of   state, 

renews   negotiations   for   settlement 

of  "Alabama  Claims,"  113,  114. 
Fiume,  and  Treaty  of  London,  195. 
Foch,  rerdinand,  217-219,  236. 
Fonseca  Bay,  United  States  acquires 

naval  base  on,  135,  136. 
Forsyth,  John,  secretarv  of  state,  104. 
Fortifications  in  the  Pacific,  limitation 

of,  272. 
Foster,  JohnW.,  letter  from  Hay,  to,  89. 
Four-power  Treaty,  278-280,  287-289. 
Fourteen  Points,  205-210,  220,  221. 
France,  treaty  of  alliance  with,  5-8; 

refuses  to  accept  plan  for  limitation 

of  navies,  270,  271;  isolation  of,  289. 

Gases,  use  of  poisonous,  prohibited, 
274,  275. 

Genet,  Edmond  C,  minister  of  the 
French  Republic,  6. 

George,  David  Lloyd,  defines  British 
war  aims,  204-205;  pre-election 
pledges  of,  227;  opposes  French  de- 
mand for  Left  Bank  of  Rhine,  234. 

Germany,  intervenes  in  Venezuela, 
50;  excluded  from  South  America 
by  aid  of  England,  53;  designs  of, 
on  Philippine  Islands,  85;  adopts 
naval  policy,  120;  influence  of,  in 
America,  126;  submarine  policy  of, 
178,  179;  attempts  of,  to  justify,  181; 
protests  against  munitions  trade, 
181;  organizes  propaganda  and  con- 
spiracy in  United  States,  184. 

Great  Britain,  withdraws  from  Euro- 
pean alliance,  22;  intervenes  in 
Mexico,  46;  not  unfavorable  to 
Monroe  Doctrine,  52,  53;  forms  alli- 
ance with  Japan,  92;  points  of  con- 
tact with  United  States,  lOo;  un- 
friendly attitude,  loi;  change  of 
attitude  in  Spanish  War,  118; 
naval  policy  of,  120;  interference 
with  shipments  to  Germany  re- 
sented in  United  States,  1 24;  size 
of  navy,  127;  so-called  blockade  of 
Germany,  174-178.  See  Anglo- 
American  ideals. 

Great   Lakes,   disarmament   on,    103. 

Guarantee  treaties,  offered  to  France, 
235- 

Gummere,  S.  R.,  delegate  to  Algeciras 
Conference,  75. 

Hague  Conference,  of  1899,  67;  of 
1907,  68. 

Hague  Conventions,  status  of,  71. 

Hague  Court  of  Arbitration,  68. 

Haiti,  Republic  of.  United  States  ac- 
quires financial  supervision  over, 
136,  137- 


Ind 


ex 


293 


Hamilton,  Alexander,  opinion  on 
French  treaty  of  1778,  6. 

Harding,  Warren  G.,  elected  presi- 
dent, 255;  ignores  League  of  Nations, 
262;  calls  Washington  Conference, 
266;  differs  with  Hughes  as  to  mean- 
ing of  Four-Power  Treaty,  279; 
attitude  toward  Europe,  290. 

Harris,  Townsend,  95. 

Hay,  John,  secretary  of  state,  protests 

,  against  persecution  of  Jews  in  Ru- 
mania, 78;  formulates  open-door 
policy  for  China,  85;  defines  status 
of  consuls  in  European  leases  in 
China,  88;  insists  on  "territorial 
and  administrative  entity"  of 
China,  89;  private  correspondence 
on  Chinese  situation,  89-91. 

Hay-Pauncefote  treaty,  120,121. 

Henry,  of  Prussia,  Prince,  visit  of,  te 
United  States,  118. 

Hitchcock,  Senator  G.  H.,  252. 

Holy  Alliance,  22,  24. 

House,  Edward  M.,  225,  233. 

Huerta,  Victoriano,  160,  162,  193. 

Hughes,  Charles  E.,  suggests  changes 
in  Covenant  of  League,  232;  asserts 
rights  of  the  United  States  in  man- 
dated areas,  261;  proposes  reduction 
of  navies,  267;  details  of  plan,  268, 
269;  offends  the  French  delegates, 
270;  takes  personal  charge  of  Far 
Eastern  question,  281;  success  of 
Washington  Conference,  due  to, 
290. 

International  Conference  of  American 
States,  156. 

International  Court  of  Arbitral  Jus- 
tice, plan  for,  70;  Permanent  Court 
of  International  Justice,  263. 

International  Law,  attitude  of  United 
States  toward,  64;  attempts  to 
codify,  68,  72. 

International  Law,  American  Insti- 
tute of,  157. 

International  Prize  Court,  plan  for, 
adopted  by  Second  Hague  Confer- 
ence, 68. 

Isolation,  policy  of,  distinct  from  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  3,  5;  policy  no  longer 
possible,  170. 

Jameson  Raid,  in  the  Transvaal,  50. 

Japan,  beginning  of  American  inter- 
course with,  83,  84;  forms  alliance 
with  Great  Britain,  92;  goes  to  war 
with  Russia,  94;  disturbing  factor 
in  world  politics,  171;  advocates 
principle  of  racial  equality,  233,  238; 
demands  German  leases  in  Shan- 
tung, 239;  secures  consent  of  Allies, 
240;  reluctantly  accepts  invitation  to 
Washington    Conference,    266;    ob- 


jects to  S-S-3  ratio,  269;  expansion 
of,  276. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  opinion  on  French 
treaty  of  1778.  7;  warns  against 
"entangling  alliances,"  12;  plans 
alliance  'with  England  against 
France,  12-14;  favors  joint  action 
with  England  against  Holy  Alli- 
ance, 28-30;  author  of  doctrine 
of  recognition,  161. 

Jews,  diplomatic  protests  against 
harsh  treatment  of,  78,  79. 

Johnson,  Senator  Hiram,  246. 
ohnson-Clarendon    convention,    113. 

Knox,  Philander  C,  proposes  neu- 
tralization of  railways  of  Manchuria, 
95;  negotiates  treaties  with  Hon- 
duras and  Nicaragua,  134,  135; 
proposes  settlement  with  Colombia, 
143;  opposes  League  of  Nations,  228, 
231. 

Kongo  Free  State,  treaty  establish- 
ing, signed  by  American  delegates 
but  withheld  from  Senate  by  Presi- 
dent Cleveland,  61,  62. 

Kniger,  Paul,  50. 

Lansing,  Robert,  secretary  of  state, 
replies  to  Austro-Hungarian  note 
on  munitions  trade,  182,  183;  dis- 
misses Austrian  Ambassador  and 
German  military  and  naval  attaches, 
185;  delegate  to  Peace  Conference, 
225,  233. 

Lansing-Ishii  agreement,  95. 

League  of  Nations,  188,  196,  205,  209, 
211,  230,  244-254. 

League  to  Enforce  Peace,  197,  232. 

Left  Bank  of  Rhine,  French  demand 
for,  234. 

Liberia,  Republic  of,  59 

Limitation  of  Armament,  commission 
of  League  on,  265;  Conference  on, 
266-290. 

Liverpool,  Lord,  20. 

Livingston,  Robert  R.,  minister  to 
France,  12. 

Lodge,  Senator  Henry  Cabot,  on  Ore- 
gon dispute,  no,  in;  denies  exis- 
tence of  secret  treaty  with  Eng- 
land, 120;  stands  for  unconditional 
surrender  of  Germany,  217;  issues 
round  robin,  231;  presents  reser- 
vations to  Treaty  of  Versailles,  248; 
presents  Four-Power  Treaty,  278; 
inconsistency  of,  287. 

London  Naval  Conference,  71. 

Luiilania,  sinking  of,  179. 

Madero,  Francisco,  160. 

Madison,  James,   favors  joint   action 

with  England  against  Holy  Alliance, 

30. 
Mahan,  Alfred  T.,  99. 


294 


Index 


Maine,   boundary   dispute   with   New 

Brunswick,  io6. 
Manchuria,     Russian     encroachments 

on,  91-93, .95- 
Marcy,  William  L.,  secretary  of  state, 

views     on     Declaration     of     Paris, 

6S:    ..  . 

Maximilian,   Prince,   placed   by  Louis 

Napoleon    on    throne    of    Mexico, 

46. 
Merchant    vessels,    proposal    to    arm, 

Mexico,  French  intervention  in,  46; 
Huerta  revolution  in,  160;  American 
policy  toward,  160-164. 

Monroe,  James,  sent  to  Paris  to  aid 
Livingston  in  negotiations  for  pur- 
chase of  New  Orleans  and  West 
Florida,  13;  consults  Jefferson  and 
Madison  on  subject  of  British  pro- 
posals for  joint  action  against  Holy 
Alliance,  26-28;  message  of  Decem- 
ber 2,  1823,  36-39;  emphasizes 
separation  of  European  and  Ameri- 
can politics,  43. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  compared  with  pol- 
icy of  isolation,  3;  justification  of, 
4;  formulation  of,  19;  text  of,  36- 
39;  reception  of,  in  Europe,  39; 
basis  of,  43;  sanction  of,  45;  relation 
of,  to  European  balance  of  power, 
46,  52;  attitude  of  England  toward, 
52;  negative  side  of,  57;  adverse 
criticism  of,  131;  not  a  self-denying 
declaration,  147;  reservation  of, 
232,  249. 

Moore,  John  Bassett,  263. 

Moroccan  question.  See  Algeciras 
Conference. 

Motley,  John  L.,  113. 

Munitions  of  war,  sale  of  to  bellig- 
erents, 181-184. 

McKinley,  William,  reasons  for  re- 
taining  Philippine   Islands,  84,  85. 

McLeod,  Alexander,  arrest  of,  104; 
acquittal  of,  105. 

Napoleon,  Louis,  intervenes  in  Mexico, 
46;  decides  to  withdraw,  47,  48. 

Neutral  prizes,  destruction  of,  72,  180. 

Neutrality,  Washington's  proclama- 
tion of  1793,  8;  failuie  of,  in  Na- 
poleonic wars,  14,  IS;  Wilson's 
proclamation  of,  172;  nature  of, 
172,  173;  so-called  ethical  neutrality 
174;  abandonment  of,  186. 

New  Brunswick,  boundary  dispute 
with  Maine,  106. 

Niagara  conference  on  Mexican  ques- 
tion, 162. 

Olney,  Richard,  on  Monroe  Doctrine, 
43;  conducts  correspondence  on 
Venezuelan   boundary  dispute,   48; 


signs  general  arbitration  treaty  with 

England,  116. 
Olney-Pauncefote  treaty,  n6,  117. 
Open-door    policy    in    China,    Hay's 

note    of     September    6,    1899,    85; 

Anglo-American      origin       of,       87; 

guaranteed  by  treaty,  284. 
Oregon,  joint  occupation  of,  107. 
O'Shaughnessy,  Nelson,  162. 

Pacific  and  Far  Eastern  Questions, 
Conference  on,  266-290. 

Panama  Canal,  effect  of,  on  naval 
policy,  132. 

Panama  Canal  Zone,  seizure  of,  142. 

Panama  Congress  of  1826,  153,  154. 

Panama  Tolls  Act,  121. 

Pan-American     Financial     Congress, 

r,  '57- 

Pan-American  Scientific  Congress 
IS7. 

Pan-American  Union,  156. 

Pan-Americanism,  153-IS7- 

Pauncefote,  Sir  Julian,  signs  general 
arbitration  treaty  with  United 
States,  116;  signs  Canal  treaty,  120. 

Piatt  Amendment,  provisions  of,  144, 
I4S- 

Peace  Conference  of  Paris,  225-242. 
See  Hague  Conference. 

Perry,  Commodore  Matthew  C.  com- 
mands expedition  to  Japan,  83,  84, 

95- 

Philippine  Islands,  McKinley's  rea- 
sons for  retaining,  84,  Se,. 

Polignac,  Prince,  interview  with  Can- 
ning on  subject  of  the  Spanish  col> 
onies,  35. 

Polk,  James  K.,  settles  Oregon  di»- 
pute,  no. 

Portsmouth,  treaty  of,  94. 

Prize  Court.  See  International  Prize 
Court. 

Prizes,  destruction  of,  179,  180. 

Recognition,  doctrine  of,  discussed 
with  reference  to  Mexican  question, 
161. 

Reparations,  236,  237. 

Reservations  to  Treaty  of  Versailles, 
248-251,  2^4. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  forces  Germany 
to  withdraw  from  Venezuela,  51; 
sends  delegates  to  Algeciras  Con- 
ference, 75;  exerts  influence  to  pre- 
serve European  balance  of  power, 
76;  protests  against  persecution  of 
Jews  in  Rumania  and  Russia,  78, 
79;  invites  Russia  and  Japan  to 
peace  conference,  94;  incurs  ill 
will  of  Japan,  95;  submits  Alaskan 
boundary  dispute  to  limited  arbi- 
tration, 123;  establishes  financial 
supervision  over  Dominican  Repub- 
lic, 133,  138;  Big-Stick  policy,  139; 


Index 


295 


extension  of  Monroe  Doctrine, 
140;   seizure   of  Canal   Zone,    142. 

Root,  Elihu,  proposes  international 
court  of  justice,  69;  author  of  Piatt 
Amendment,  146;  visits  South 
America,  1 56;  suggests  changes  in 
Covenant  of  League,  232;  member 
of  commission  to  draft  statute  of 
Permanent  Court  of  International 
Justice,  263;  presents  resolutions  on 
China,  277. 

Rush,  Richard,  conferences  with  Can- 
ning on  South  American  situation, 
26,  33,  34-  ,,       ,      . 

Russia,  occupies  Manchuria,  91,  92; 
opposes  opening  of  Manchurian 
ports  to  American  commerce,  93; 
goes  to  war  with  Japan,  94;  revo- 
lution, of  March,  1917,  198;  of 
November,  1917,  203. 

Russo-Japanese  war,  94. 

Sackville-West,    Lord,    dismissal    of, 

Salisbury,  Lord,  backs  down  in  Vene- 
zuelan dispute,  50;  warns  President 
McKinley  of  Germany's  designs  on 
Philippines,  85. 

San  Remo  agreement,  259,  260. 

Santo  Domingo,  financial  supervision 
over,  133,  134. 

Secret  Treaties,  193. 

Self-determination,  198,  203,  205. 

Senate  of  the  United  States,  debate* 
Treaty  of  Versailles,  244-254. 

Seward,  William  H.,  protests  against 
French  occupation  of  Mexico,  47. 

Shantung  question,  at  Peace  Confer- 
ence of  Paris,  239-242;  at  Washing- 
ton Conference,  280-282. 

Siberia,  Japanese  troops  in,  276; 
promise  of  Japan  to  evacuate,  286. 

Slave  trade,  provision  for  suppression 
of,  in  Webster-Ashburton  treaty, 
59,  60;  Brussels  conference  on, 
62. 

Slavery,  and  isolation,  58 

South  America,  neglected  by  United 
States  as  field  for  commercial  devel- 
opment, 52;  open  door  in,  53. 

Spanish  colonies,  revolt  of,  25. 

Spanish  revolution  of  1820,  20. 

Spanish  War,  turning  point  in  rela- 
tions of  United  States  and  England, 
118. 

Submarines,  question  of,  discussed 
at  Washington  Conference,  271, 
272;  use  of,  limited  by  treaty,  274, 
275. 

Sumner,  Charles,  113. 

Taft,  William  H.,  proposes  to  bring 
Nicaragua  and  Honduras  under 
financial  supervision  of  United 
States,   134,   135;  tries  to   reestab- 


lish friendly  relations  with  Colom- 
bia, 143;  suggests  changes  in  Cove- 
nant of  League,  232. 

Tardieu,  Andre,  report  of  Algeciras 
Conference,  76;  quoted  on  Armistice 
negotiations,  217,  218; 

Temperley,  H.  W.  V.,  "History  of  the 
Peace  Conference  of  Paris,"  191. 

"Ten  Points,"  278. 

Texas,  annexation  of,  opposed  by 
Great  Britain,  107,  108. 

Thayer,  William  R.,  gives  version 
of     Roosevelt-Holleben     interview, 

Tocqueville,   Alexis    de,   "Democracy 

in  America,"  102. 
Treaty  of  London,  195. 
Treaty  of  Peace  with  Austria,  263. 
Treaty  of  Peace  with  Germany,  263. 
Treaty  of  Versailles,  signed,  242;  laid 

before  Senate,  243;  debate  on,  244- 

254;  votes  on,  252-254. 
Twenty-One  Demands,  276. 

Vera   Cruz,    American   occupation  of, 

162;  evacuation  of,  163. 
Verona,    Congress   of,    19,   21;   secret 

treaty  of,  22-24. 
Vienna,  Congress  of,  19. 
Villa,  Francisco,  162,  163. 

War  aims,  of  Allies,  196;  British,  204. 

War  of  1812,  15. 

Washington,  George,  requests  opinions 
of  cabinet  on  French  treaty,  6;  issues 
proclamation  of  neutrality,  8;  Fare- 
well Address,  9-1 1. 

Washington  Conference,  266-290. 

Washington,  treaty  of,  66,  114. 

Webster,  Daniel,  secretary  of  state, 
104,  105. 

Webster-Ashburton  treaty,  59,  60, 
107. 

Wellington,  Duke  of,  at  Congress  of 
Verona,  21;  protest  and  withdrawal, 
22. 

West  Indies,  American  supremacy 
in,  120. 

White,  Henry,  delegate  to  Algeciras 
Conference,  75;  to  Peace  Confer- 
ence, 225. 

William  II,  German  Kaiser,  telegram 
to  President  Kruger,  50;  forced  to 
withdraw  from  Venezuela,  51;  visits 
Morocco,  74;  demands  retirement 
of  Delcasse,  75;  insists  on  general 
conference  on  Morocco,  75;  thwarted 
in  efforts  to  humiliate  France,  77; 
abdicates  and  flees  to  Holland,  2 19. 

Williams,  Talcott,  on  McKinley's  rea- 
sons for  retaining  Philippines,  85. 

Wilson,  Henry  Lane,  160. 

Wilson,  Woodrow,  secures  modifica- 
tion of  Panama  Tolls  Act,  121;  ex- 
tends    financial     supervision     over 


296 


Index 


Nicaragua  and  Haiti,  136,  IJ7; 
varns  Latin- Atnerican  states  against 
granting  concessions  to  European 
syndicates,  140,  141;  attitude  of, 
on  questions  of  international  law 
and  diplomacy,  151,  152;  general 
Latin-American  policy,  152,  t6s; 
New  Pan-Americanism,  153;  Mex- 
ican policy,  160-164;  ^s\is  for  decla- 
ration of  war  on  Germany,  185; 
views  on  extension  of  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, 187;  political  philosophy  of, 
192;  refusalto  recognize  Huerta,  193; 
reasons  for  neutrality,  194;  calls  on 
all  belligerents  to  state  war  aims, 
19;;  first  discussion  of  war  aims, 
196;  war  address,  199;  draws  distinc- 
tion between  German  people  and 
German  GoTernment,  30O-302j  re- 
ply to  Pope,  301;  announces  Four- 


teen Points,  20S-210;  decides  to  go 
to  Paris,  225;  suffers  political  defeat, 
226,  227;  greeted  with  enthusiasm 
rn  Europe,  228;  proposes  League  of 
Nations,  230;  returns  temporarily 
to  th«  United  States,  231;  makes  con- 
ceissions  to  French  and  British,  238; 
returns  to  the  United  States  and 
lays  treaty  before  Senate,  242;  tours, 
the  country  on  behalf  of  League  of 
Nations,  246;  illness  of,  247;  letter 
read  at  Jackson  day  dinner  propos- 
ing referendum  on  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles, 2^2,  253;  awarded  Nobel 
Peace  Prize,  255;  withdraws  from 
participation  in  European  affairs, 
259. 
Wood,  General  Leonard,  146. 

Yap,  island  of,  260-262, 


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